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ABSTRACT 
In this thesis I examine how young urban professionals in Beijing relate to their experience of 
participating in the modern Chinese capitalist economy. Their experiences are seen along 
economic and social lines: from considering economic and social historical context to 
discussing the on-going process of individualisation in China as presented by young urban 
professionals through how they talk about economic life and social life. Relating to economic 
life, the ideal workplace and the various factors that influence their choice of workplace, from 
corporate culture to corporate welfare provision is presented. Different spheres of corporate 
culture inform their choices when assessing companies, as they tend to reject a cultural 
Chinese business approach in favour of international companies due to their disregard of the 
importance of guanxi, social connections in a company with a culturally Chinese corporate 
culture. The ideal job provides security for the future through being financially high-yielding 
and stable. In a gendered version, women should have a stable job that is not too demanding, 
conveniently in harmony with an explicit ideal of the undisputed male breadwinner. This 
interplay between economic life and social life is recurring theme throughout the thesis, as 
social life and economic life are the two meta-levels that the underlying current of 
individualisation manifested itself the most clearly on when my informants articulated their 
view of the challenges they are facing and the options they have. The new, individualised 
social life in urban China is discussed through the strong emphasis on marriage and concern 
for the social self; a social pressure on men to carry the family name on and a social disregard 
for women who fail to marry. It is considered appropriate for men to marry down, again the 
ideal of the undisputed breadwinner, ensuring that women who succeed too well become 
unmarriageable, written off as “leftover-women”. Different spheres of corporate culture again 
influences the strategies of young urban professionals, as State Owned Enterprises, the high 
seat of culturally Chinese corporate culture, provide an unprecedented stability, gives various 
welfare perks including potentially the immensely important Beijing hukou residency permit, 
and also are more likely to give peiyang, corporate training as young urban professionals 
emphasise the importance to continuously improve themselves. This drive to improve oneself 
is discussed in terms of suzhi, a Chinese concept of “human quality” that political rhetoric 
insists on increasing on a national level, as the insufficient suzhi is preventing China from 
modernising. The emphasis placed on peiyang might be seen as internalising the national 
concern for suzhi. This internalisation is symptomatic in the analytical approach towards for 
young urban professionals in terms of class, as it relates to individualisation.  
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Introduction:  Theoretical and methodological perspectives 
 
The ethnographic study presented in this thesis aims to investigate the modern Chinese urban 
capitalist economy of Beijing through the lived lives of a segment of its participants; young 
urban professionals. These young urban professionals are integral in the economic machinery 
of China
1
. It is well covered in existing literature that China’s economic development is 
firmly entrenched in a long-standing, state-led project of national revival; this I will return to 
below. The young, urban professionals play an ambiguous role here, being educated and 
resourceful young urbanites they are key to the economic miracle the national revival is built 
upon; being outside the economic and political elite, they represent a potential danger to the 
elite. I will show how young urban professionals experience a certain distance towards the 
political establishment and their handling of the national revival project. The young urban 
professionals, being specialists with university education, play a fundamental role as China 
seeks to move on from being “the factory of the world” and towards becoming a 
consumption-driven, innovative economy
2
. This announced restructuring of the world’s 
second largest economy may become one of the globally most formative political projects of 
the 21st century, especially when accompanied with the predicted downgrade of the US as the 
world’s largest economy in favour of China. I aim through extensive interviews to shed 
ethnographic light on the experiences and viewpoints of the people living in the midst of this 
process. The underlying, formative process that my informants are living in the midst of is 
one of individualisation in China, a society historically often referred to as collectivist. Based 
on my interviews of my informants we can see that individualisation as a transition process 
was encountered on two levels; in economic life and in social life. As key informant Zhao 
Yumei said it; “Business is your working life. Marriage is your daily life… I hope! My 
generation does not have more to talk about. Their life is marriage, work and family, and 
that’s what they talk about”.  Zhao Yumei places her hope in marriage, as she is not yet 
married. In both economic and social life, individualisation comes today as the state retreats 
its omnipresence and no new collective stands ready to replace it. This is the process that my 
                                                 
1
 When I refer to China throughout this thesis, it will be The People’s Republic of China (PRC). This must not be 
confused with The Republic of China (ROC), which will be referred to as Taiwan. 
2
 Considering what Hu Jintao told the 18
th
 Party Congress in November 2012: “Major progress should be made 
in changing the growth model. On the basis of making China's development much more balanced, coordinated 
and sustainable, we should double its 2010 GDP and per capita income for both urban and rural residents. The 
contribution of scientific and technological progress to economic growth should increase considerably and 
China should become an innovative country. Industrialization should be basically accomplished”.   
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informants talked about, and that I will discuss in this thesis. Historically this means the 
transition from Mao’s state-focused collectivism to Deng’s economic liberalization policies.In 
everyday urban life in the era called radical Maoism
3
 it was the danwei work unit that was the 
economic collective which the individual had to submit to. The transition from collectivism 
towards individualisation is the transition from state allocated economic rights and duties 
within the danwei to not having any corresponding economic collective today, as no form of 
employment in China bestows such extensive rights or duties upon its workers as the danwei 
did at the height of its political and economic importance. The individual is now the harbinger 
of his own success: The current economic freedom granted by the state is freedom to succeed 
and a corresponding freedom to fail. As everyone outside the highest echelons of the 
economic elite, the young urban professionals must navigate economic uncertainties, such as 
price inflation, Beijing’s soaring real estate market, different welfare policies and their formal 
rights towards the state as a part of their daily-life economic experience. This opens for 
discussion and analysis of choice management; what objectives do young urban professionals 
pursue and what are the preferred strategies in this?  
Through examining this based on ethnography, I will present some of the daily life concerns 
of young urban professionals, the approaches they employ to handle these concerns, and the 
rationale behind these approaches. The reorganisation of the Chinese political economy 
towards a Chinese capitalism is not just causing the individualisation of young urban 
professionals, it also provides many of the alternative answers to the challenges that young 
urban professionals must manoeuvre. The diversification of the Chinese economy presents 
several strains of strategic options.  In these, the state’s new policy of selectively exercised 
state ownership through the State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), which have a danwei corporate 
legacy, is an important formative actor. The danwei predecessor of today’s State Owned 
Enterprises might arguably be referred to as a total institution, following Goffmann (1959). 
Corinne-Barbara Francis states as a working assumption for her study of the reproduction of 
danwei corporate features that 
“the Chinese Communist danwei is an institution which embodies deeply embedded 
social, governmental and cultural practices and norms and that such institutions do not 
disappear easily but tend to reappear under new guises under new economic and 
political conditions.” (Francis 1996, 841)  
 
                                                 
3
 Radical Maoism refers to the rule of Mao from the declaration of the People’s Republic in 1949 to his death in 
1976.  
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The word danwei is still used for employers, but the total institution danwei is today part of 
history. In sum these aspects of market freedom that dominates in economic life are also 
affecting social life. This has made clear to me by my informants by their constant referring to 
problems relating to social issues, particularly marriage. Young urbanites no longer need the 
approval of their employer to marry, as they did during the height of danwei influence. Also, 
the pre-revolution collective of the Confucian paternalist family has changed in fundamental 
ways. During Maoism the lineage based system was briefly attempted replaced by the 
imposition of socialist ideology. Rather than individual submission to the kin group the 
Communist Party wanted to create a socialist collectivism, expressed as “the People”, again 
represented in urban everyday life by the danwei. This has changed. The tendencies towards 
individualisation following the retreat of the danwei are not as concerned with the ideological 
dimension of the transition from socialist class struggle to “socialism with a market economy”, 
but represent processes within a market economy. Gone are the collective that guided the 
decisions of the individual, like the paternalist Confucian extended family or the total 
institution danwei. Instead the young urbanites in China are faced with new choices also in 
the social field, choices they have to make for themselves. This is reflected in my informants’ 
talk about marriage, work and family; there are a plethora of choices to be made that 
following individualisation is now to be made by an individual where previously the 
collective would have had a say, and I have studied how individuals express concerns and 
hopes regarding these decisions. As linages and patriarchs no longer assert power over the 
choices of individuals, the individual is free to both succeed and fail. Individualisation does 
not imply that society does not enforce certain ideals on individuals; it implies that the 
enforcement is lessened. Chinese society may not be as family-oriented as it once was, but 
there is still a strong-felt expectation towards young people to marry, settle down and have the 
child that weigh on the minds of young urban professionals. 
 In both economic and social life the individual is therefore forced to take a stand on 
what constitutes a desirable job, what constitutes a desirable spouse, what constitutes success 
in life and when having identified such factors, the individual must decide how to obtain them. 
These are concerns that stand out as important to my informants, and in my conversations 
with them the young urban professionals constantly put emphasis on how to expand their skill 
base and work experience as well as reflecting on social issues, particularly how sexual 
relations play a role in their work-places, and ultimately how to find a spouse.  
4 
 
Who are the young urban professionals?  
The emic side: 
In a conversation corporate head-hunter Susan Long, whose job mainly consists of providing 
companies with suitable young urban professionals, told me: “The ideal young urban 
professional has good education, speaks good English and has some experience or special 
training They should also have a good introduction letter giving a good self-presentation, 
showing passion and enthusiasm”. In general, my informants were comfortable with using the 
English term “young urban professionals” about themselves. Looking for a Chinese word for 
young urban professionals, several Chinese friends suggested bailing
4
, meaning literally 
“white collar”. Bailing is a loan word based on the English expression “white collar worker”. 
No one ever suggested or mentioned Qing Zhang’s phonetic loan word “yapishi”, a 
Sinification of  the term “yuppies” (Zhang 2005, 436) Nuances of meaning might well be lost 
in translation between “white collar worker” in English and bailing in Chinese, so I asked one 
of my key informants, Chen Xiaomei, to tell me more about what bailing connotes in Chinese. 
Chen Xiaomei told me that bailing had entered popular usage about ten years ago, and was a 
loan word from English. The corresponding term “blue collar worker” has not been borrowed; 
its Chinese equivalent would be gongren
5
 (worker). A separation is made within the State 
Owned Enterprises for who is a bailing or not; SOE employees can be bailing, but the 
officials in an SOE would just be referred to as officials, not bailing. To be a bailing, one 
must work in a big company, preferably an international one, she said. Also, one must hold at 
least a bachelor degree. The fact that Chen Xiaomei said “preferably an international one” 
suggests that some bailing can be more bailing than others.  The average salary of a bailing 
would be 15 000 yuan
6
 a month, and one does not qualify for being bailing if one makes less 
than 8000, she continued. If you make more than 20 000 per month, one can be called jinling, 
meaning “golden collar”. Running Chen Xiaomei’s definition of bailing by another key 
informant, Linda Wei, the latter agreed on all points, save for pointing out that jinling is 
internet slang. Linda explained that although internet slang words are well known, one rarely 
use these in everyday oral speech. Jinling is, according to this informant, a narrower term than 
bailing.    
 Chen Xiaomei added a final detail of interest: all the salary categories mentioned 
                                                 
4
 白领 
5
 工人 
6
 XE currency converter gives the following exchange rates: 100 Chinese Yuan (CNY/RMB) is approximately 
101 NOK, 16,5 USD or 12 Euro. (www.xe.com, accessed 15.12.2013).  
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above should be official, “white” salary. “White salary” means that off-the-books income is 
not counted, and in Beijing, with all its corporate headquarters, government entities and 
national supervising bodies, the “grey” income one may add to one’s official salary through 
doing “favours” to “friends” can easily exceed several times one’s “white”, on-paper income. 
The term “grey” here is also emic: a separation is made between being corrupt and making 
favours, between receiving gifts and taking bribes. Mafia in China is called hei shihui, black 
society, making grey the semi-legal middle ground between organised crime (black) and 
lawfulness (white).  An expat I talked to recounted that a Chinese friend of his told him: "My 
father is a clean official. He doesn't take bribes. Well, not bribes over 10,000 yuan. Obviously 
he takes gift cards and those kinds of things under 10,000 yuan, because if he didn't take those, 
none of the other officials would trust him."  The separation between black and grey is not 
stringent and rests on no coherent definition; there is no apparent reason why exactly 10,000 
per bribe should be the limit between necessary group conformity and corruption, as the 
official’s son implied above. The distinction between black and grey seems rather arbitrary 
and this arbitrariness is a headache for corruption-hunters in China: how expensive a watch 
can a CEO give his new friend, the Police Commissioner, for his birthday before it is a bribe? 
This part of business in Beijing is not unknown to the young urban professionals I talked to. 
Accountant Francis Wang told me that “in Beijing, it’s harder to bribe your way. Things are 
more regulated
7
 here.” Corruption is somewhat beside the point here: the point to be made 
here is merely that the bailing must make at least 8000 a month in official income. As a 
context for this number it can be mentioned that the average income in Beijing is 5223 Yuan 
per month
8
. The financial side of being bailing can be summarised in two points. Firstly, the 
minimum one must earn in order to be bailing is nearly twice the average salary, so - bailing 
is well-paid. Secondly, for bailing status only “white”, legitimate income is counted. This 
adds an interesting moral dimension to bailing status. I should add here that this description of 
the emic requirements for being bailing does not make a perfect match with what I found 
among my informants. They generally matched the education description, but not necessarily 
the salary part.  
The etic side  
Young urban professionals became a point of discussion when 1984 was declared year of the 
yuppie by Newsweek magazine. The term yuppie was a media buzz word that American 
                                                 
7
 The informant used the word biaozhun, a multi-faceted term. A suggested translation is discussed below.  
8
 http://www.chinaabout.net/beijing-2012-average-monthly-salary-reached-5223-yuan-us-836/. 
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sociology had to confront as yuppies were believed to become an unstoppable force in 
American politics:  
“The media has reported the emergence of a new political species: the Young Urban 
Professionals, children of the baby boom who now have college degrees and high-
paying jobs. […] A leading newsweekly proclaimed 1984 their “year” (Newsweek, 
1984) and declared that they were becoming the dominant political and cultural force 
in American society.” (Hammond 1986, 487) 
 
The yuppie “political species” was predicted to become “the dominant political and cultural 
force” in the US, but the concept had its glory days towards the end of the eighties and in 
early nineties, thereafter fading from political and cultural analysis. Its decline in popularity 
may be because the mainly ascribed identity group called yuppie was criticized on analytical 
grounds for having a too “amorphous” definition (Carpini and Sigelman 1986, 517). In media, 
the yuppies was considered a very potent and influential political segment, but researchers in 
political science disagreed: Carpini and Sigelman critizises “the media attention that was 
lavished on the emergence of young urban professionals, or “yuppies,” as a political force.” 
(Carpini and Sigelman 1986, 502). John Hammond applied “anyone born after 1945 with a 
college degree” as a loose definition of yuppies, which was clearly too general to analyse 
from. By adding income and occupational variables, the yuppie segment fell to “a mere 1,1 
percent” of the 1983 General Social Survey (Hammond 1986, 492). This showed that when 
definition of yuppies was made less vague and therefore more relevant for political analysis, 
the category was so heavily decimated that they could not be the political earthquake they 
were being sold as, and therefore less relevant for political analysis; which can explain why 
“the rise of the yuppies” are no longer cover stories on Newsweek magazine.  
 Yuppies may have lost its importance in American sociology, but the term emerges in 
contemporary discussions on China. In a contribution to a wider debate on modernity in China, 
Fenggang Yang observes that “anthropologists have observed that a new class of yuppies in 
China has embraced the company [McDonalds] as a means of connecting to the world (Yang 
2005, 438) Among the more extensive anthropological contributions on yuppies is Friederike 
Fleischer’s book Suburban Beijing (2010) Focusing on conspicuous consumption in housing, 
Fleischer uses “chuppies9”, a short form for Chinese young urban professionals, as a social 
categorisation of the strata she studies (Fleischer 2010, xv, 58) alas without providing a 
stringent definition. As no definitions of “chuppies” are being provided, it is hard to see how 
                                                 
9
 I put “Chuppies” in scare quotes but not yuppies, as yuppie is in fact a dictionary indexed word, for instance in 
www.dictionary.cambridge.org. (Accessed 22.10.2013).  
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“chuppie” avoids the problem of no concise definition, the problem that saw the yuppie 
approach discarded from sociology in the US. The question of transferability of the term 
yuppie/”chuppie” also arises when a word coined to describe an American political trend in 
the eighties are being used in describing China today. The reason yuppies were to be seen as a 
political force was their perceived political unity, stemming from a similar background. 
Hammond writes: 
“The huge birth cohorts of the baby boom were said to share some important 
formative experiences: childhoods of prosperity, high educational levels, and now, 
occupational attainments and salaries which match their ambitions.” (Hammond 1986, 
487)  
 
The formative experience that Hammond lists that fits China the least is “childhoods of 
prosperity”; the average university graduate in China today had most likely not a prosperous 
childhood, compared to an American age mate. The transferability of this assumption to 
China was even more inappropriate when Hammond made the argument in 1986: a 22 year 
old graduate in 1986 would be born in 1964, just three years after the “three hard years10”, 
when tens of millions starved to death in a man-made famine, and two years before the 
beginning of the “ten years of chaos11”. Still Zhu, Zhao and Li compares young political 
radicals in China to American “yuppies” as early as 1990, with their only reservation being 
that yuppies in the US was generally politically conservatives, thereby applying the term 
yuppie to people who grew up during or right after the Cultural Revolution (Zhu, Zhao, and 
Li 1990). A 22 year old graduate in 2012 would be born in 1990, when the Chinese economy 
was in no state to provide childhoods of prosperity to everyone. Granted, the prosperity of a 
childhood in the nineties in China greatly exceeds that of a childhood in the seventies, but 
there are no indications that the “chuppies” that Fleischer studied or the young urban 
professionals I have studied shared childhoods of prosperity that in any way can be compared 
to the American childhoods of prosperity in the fifties and sixties that Hammond calls a 
formative experience for the American yuppie. Concluding the etic side of studying young 
urban professionals; they have been treated as a group earlier, mainly in the discussion about 
yuppies, but as a category young urban professionals is a diamond in the rough as there are 
problems concerning definition; the lack of a concise definition led to the demise of yuppie 
                                                 
10
 Acknowledging that the Great Leap Forward (1958-60) was not a great leap forward, the famine years of 
1959-61 are now referred to as Three Hard Years, for instance in Ren (2013, xi).  
11
 Historians dispute when the Cultural Revolution ended; Mao declared it over in 1969 when the army 
intervened to end the most violent phase and restore some degree of order, yet Mao referred to it as unfinished as 
late as June 1976 (Schoppa 2010, chapter 18) . I have seen the period from the beginning of the Cultural 
Revolution in 1966 to Mao’s death in 1976 referred to as Ten Years of Chaos in China.  
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relevance in political science and sociology. Earlier debates on young urban professionals 
focused on the political role of the US yuppie and there are assumptions about shared yuppie 
background that cannot be transferred to Chinese young urban professionals.  
What are the concerns of the young urban professional? A selection of themes. 
As I have stated above, my main material is based on my interviews of the young urban 
professions. These interviews are presented in chapters 3 and 4, and show what type of 
concerns this group of people articulated during our conversations. Generally these concerns 
were two types – first about the economic issues, mostly in relation to their work and second, 
about social issues, particularly the issue of marriage. Related to the economic sphere of life, 
many concerns of young urban professionals found a suggested answer through the workplace.  
Chinese companies versus international companies 
A key concern was the difference between Chinese enterprises on one side and international 
companies on the other. “Chinese” companies rarely refers to ownership but to corporate 
culture; whether the company has a cultural approach to business that the informants label 
“Chinese”, or not. Thus “Chinese,” when used to describe companies, becomes an adjective 
loaded with meaning, and young urban professionals expressed scepticism towards the 
Chinese cultural sphere of business. International companies were praised for having no office 
politics. In international companies there is supposedly no “face games” where leaders 
demand recognition of their hierarchical superiority from employers who must “give face” to 
their leaders. Key informant Zhao Yumei told me that “Chinese companies are dictatorships, 
just as the political hierarchy”. In international companies, there is no need to build the 
networks of interpersonal relations, guanxi, that are considered omnipresent in China by both 
China scholars and Chinese themselves. The zhongjian, “doctrine of the mean”, originally a 
concept from Confucian teachings on the virtue of moderation, was used to describe the 
caution one must exercise in a corporate environment dominated by distrust, alliance-making, 
scheming and backstabbing. Alliances can be made in many ways: “In a company there are 
always women willing to sleep with bosses”, key informant Hannah Liu told me, and 
ambitious men who cannot sleep their way up the career ladder seeks to apply other measures: 
“Seniors might get backstabbed. Juniors just work. Smart juniors would kiss ass and drink 
with the boss”, Hannah commented.  
State Owned Enterprises, a door to “peiyang” and “hukou”.  
9 
 
Young urban professionals stated their disgruntlement with this emphasis on social 
networking skills over professional skills, opening for discussing the tension between guanxi 
and meritocracy as mutually exclusive modes of corporate organisation. Valuing guanxi or 
social skills over professional skills is something that earns companies the label as “Chinese” 
in terms of corporate culture. No companies are considered more “Chinese” than the State 
Owned Enterprises, often stemming from the Maoist total institution called danwei. By many 
observers mistakenly believed to be in demise, the State Owned Enterprises exert great 
influence on business in China. There are several desirable outcomes of SOE employment 
that young urban professionals must consider in order to strategize towards desired outcomes. 
The SOEs might be “Chinese” in the corporate culture sense, placing greater emphasis on 
connections than ability, but they offer a job stability aspect that is considered highly 
desirable. This enhanced job stability is considered especially auspicious for women, who 
should not have a too demanding job. For young urban professionals, the State Owned 
Enterprises are the most likely source of obtaining peiyang, a form of corporate grooming that 
I will argue should be viewed in light of the debate on the role of suzhi, “human quality” in 
China. Employment in the SOEs is also the most likely path to obtain a Beijing hukou, the 
very important certificate of citizenship to Beijing that is the prerequisite for access to welfare 
goods in Beijing. As we will see, the hukou is considered very important in contemporary 
China. For those without a Beijing hukou, the insurance provided by their employer are their 
main economic safety net, replacing the function of the danwei under Maoism and the 
patriarchal kin group before that. The retreat of state welfare obligations towards the 
individual presents great insecurity in how to manoeuvre to secure one’s position. This 
concern extends beyond the corporate realm, as young urban professionals express political 
concerns related to the marketization of welfare services as well as social concerns such as the 
importance of marriage (for the unmarried).  
The importance of marriage 
Social issues are also commented upon and among the issues brought by the informants issues 
related to marriage take on a special importance. Marriage is discussed as its meaning is 
contested; ranging from instrumental marriages where the wife gets a breadwinner while the 
husband gets the necessity to continue the family line, to “naked marriages” where love 
overcomes lacking the socially prescribed material prerequisites of a marriage, such as 
housing. The power relation between husband and wife is discussed as husbands fear to be 
rivalled by their wives, while wives fear being replaced by mistresses, a male symbol of 
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prestige. This provides concern towards beauty; key informant Annie Huang told me that 
Chinese women fear ageing as their husband might find a second wife, and therefore refrain 
from breast feeding their one child, pampered in all other ways due to being the carrier of all 
hope for two family lines. As there is a considerable social pressure to have children, young 
urban professionals express such strong-felt disapproval of the education system that their 
eventual children will have to pass through that two female informants said they would rather 
not have children than to raise one in China. The need to bribe children into kindergartens 
through “gifts” to the staff is mentioned as a reason to immigrate to the US by one young 
urban professional. In total, young urban professionals navigates numerous concerns which 
upon further investigation might provide insights regarding their experience of participating in 
the contemporary Chinese capitalist economy.  
Individualisation and strategies for constructing the successful self  
Having discussed what the term young urban professionals might mean, and what their major 
concerns are, we should look more closely into what the process of individualization they are 
involved in might mean as well. When attempting to approach Chinese capitalism by studying 
how young urban professionals strategize to achieve what they hold to be success, a socio-
historical context concerning the idea of success should be presented, and also how the notion 
of success affects the Self of my informants. The idea of a successful Self is strongly 
connected to ideas about the social Self. China has traditionally been considered a collectivist 
society, where being part of a larger unit is central to the identity of the individual. Before the 
communist takeover this unit was the family. Francis Hsü (1971) has pointed out how the 
traditional ideal household, with several generations living under the same roof, led by the 
oldest male relative, provided an atmosphere that gave collective social identity prominence 
over individual identities.  Thereafter the CCP rejected the perceived feudal traits of 
patriarchal paternalism and aimed to create a new collectivist identity based on belonging to 
the communist People, who should exercise collective ownership over all means of 
production. A profound interplay between a collectivist economic structure and a collectivist 
social identity was an important aim in Chinese socialism.  Eating out of the common pot or 
rather, eating in the collective canteen demanded a day-to-day submission to the group with 
no real alternative. The collectivist focus of radical Maoism with its focus on individual 
sacrifice for the greater good resonated with the earlier ethic of individual submission that 
Confucian paternalism demanded. But things were to change. When Deng Xiaoping’s reforms 
started to dismantle the economic collectives of radical Maoism, the rural People’s 
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Communes collective farms as well as the urban danwei industrial complexes, the political 
collectivism of radical Maoism disappeared but with no clear ideological strategy to take over. 
The economic reforms created a space in which the new economic, political and family 
structure all put extensive pressure on the individual to find his or her own way in life.A 
plethora of recent literature aims to shed light to this on-going process of individualisation in 
China. Among the most notable contributions is Yan Yunxiang’s The Individualization of 
Chinese Society. Yan comments that: 
[…] the ethics of everyday life shifted from an emphasis on self-sacrifice and hard 
work for a greater goal, such as building the new socialist society, to a new focus on 
self-realization and pursuit of personal happiness in concrete and materialistic terms. 
In other words, what makes one’s life meaningful has changed from a collective ethics 
to an individual-centered ethics, similar to the shift from “being good” to “feeling 
good” observed in US society (Yan 2009, xxxv)  
 
The new ethics of everyday life in China focus on the dual goals of self-realisation and pursuit 
of personal happiness, and both aspects are pointed at by my informants. Thus I need to focus 
on the emerging ideal of pursuing personal happiness that Yan argues is receiving prominence 
in “the ethics of everyday life”. This transition from a collective ethics to an individual-
centred ethics seems to partly follow generational divides, as Yan documents how the lament 
about the immoral selfishness of the upcoming, more individualised generation is not 
unfamiliar to contemporary China (Yan 2009). The driving forces of individualisation is here 
that social and historical processes isolate the individual in new ways, while simultaneously 
telling the individual that life is no longer made meaningful by adapting to a greater 
fellowship, but by self-realisation and pursuing a notion of happiness. Unfortunately 
happiness is an elusive concept, difficult to define philosophically and probably more difficult 
to compare in terms of inter-subjectivity, in both etic and emic perspective. This frequently 
makes people quite ironically look to others when wondering where to look for their own 
individual happiness, making happiness a phenomenon swept in emotions and individual 
experience that is highly individual, while simultaneously having socially negotiated aspects. 
Erving Goffman’s (1959) theory about social life as a screenplay may here be integrated with 
Richard Jenkins’ (Jenkins 1996) work on social identity as based on ascription and self-
ascription. If your social performance demonstrates what society agrees should provide 
happiness then you will be ascribed happiness from others, an ascription that might be 
internalised to become self-ascription, convincing you that you are indeed experiencing 
happiness.  
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Absence of happiness is frequently explained as caused by lacking something else, be it the 
lack of money, status, position, popularity, health, sex, love, not having children, having 
daughters but no son, not having been on pilgrimage to Mecca (if you are a Muslim), not 
having an expensive Canada Goose windbreaker, not having a BMW, not having the 
measures of a model or the abs of an athlete. For those who feel happiness is missing, it can 
often be phrased as “if only…”  This follows cultural norms: In traditional China with its 
strict patrilineal descent, it would be agreed upon that a married couple with five daughters 
are truly unfortunate, lacking a son to be happy. An involuntary childless couple in a different 
cultural setting, for instance the US, would give their right hands for their five daughters. The 
conditions for happiness also follows historical context: there are no longer anyone in China 
that curse their luck for having inherited a bad class label from their parents, while once upon 
a time in China class labels were the basis for distributing scarce resources; Stockman 
mentions the disgruntlement of offspring from bad class technical experts towards the 
children of good class political cadres when the latter tended to be favoured in access to the 
education system (Stockman 2000, 134).  
 The new consumer-oriented capitalist market economy in China seems to fetishize 
individuality by making it something that must be expressed through consumption. As the 
individual can construct itself as successful through owning prestige objects, I asked Hannah 
Liu about what constitutes prestige objects. She told me that “prestige comes from the money 
paid and the public recognition, like the artist’s reputation. If you buy a painting with no 
public recognition and you did not pay big money, there’s little or no prestige in owning it. 
There is no intrinsic prestige in quality art. You can get lots of prestige from a shit piece of 
art if it is expensive shit from a famous person. That gives lots of prestige. The market makes 
items prominent answers to the “if only”-questions individuals hold, trying to convince 
teenagers with perfectly functioning Samsung cell phones that true happiness is an iPhone 5. I 
asked Chen Xiaomei what rich people in China showed their wealth through: “For men, it is 
expensive cars like Mercedes, BMWs… you know, cars like that which looks expensive, or 
luxury goods like fancy watches. For women, it is Chanel”, she said with a theatrical posh 
hand gesture. In China, conspicuous consumption is conceptually connected to the new 
market economy; while before the central planning economy had little luxury to offer. The 
larger point to be made here is that individualisation is an increasingly relevant context for 
understanding China. This also goes for my informants, both in their economic roles as well 
as their social roles. Based on their own formulations we can point at several concepts made 
use of by my informants to talk about the various forms of individualization.  
13 
 
Peiyang: corporate grooming  
One of the concepts that my informants repeatedly discussed was peiyang. Ironically, I only 
realised this towards the end of the field work when I did an extensive interview in Chinese 
with my wife as a backup interpreter, as her command of Mandarin exceeds mine. After I 
encountered peiyang as a concept in Chinese, I asked most of the English-speaking 
informants about it as well. Peiyang was presented as the sum of the training provided in a 
company and the internal career mobility of a company. The emphasis placed on good 
peiyang reveals something about the outlook of young urban professionals: they feel 
compelled to continue improving themselves and are concerned about career mobility, aiming 
to keep climbing the ladder. Key informant Linda Wei showed how peiyang should be seen as 
a means to and ends when she commented: “If I get a good salary, I don’t’ care about what 
opportunities the company can offer me”. A point of interest here is whether Linda refers to 
both training and internal career mobility when saying “opportunities”. There is reason to 
believe that she refers to the latter only, as the concern of receiving training is connected to 
the influential concept of suzhi in a way that internal career mobility is not. A multi-faceted 
term with no apparent equivalent in English, suzhi is a notion of quality that the Party has 
politicised. Kipnis translates the original meaning of suzhi as “the unadorned nature or 
character of something” (Kipnis 2006: 297). Its usage took on a new meaning when the 
Communist Party started blaming insufficient renkou suzhi, a too low “population quality”, 
for keeping China from modernising (Anagnost 2004). As Vanessa Fong (2006) argues, suzhi 
is best gained by education and I argue that the concern for peiyang comes from a desire to 
keep educating oneself also after graduation. If offered a good enough salary, Linda might 
forgo career development, but not receiving extra training in the workplace would mean an 
end to raising suzhi through continued education.  
Social connections in China: Guanxi 
While peiyang as an emic term was only encountered towards the end of my field work, 
guanxi was introduced at the very start, as several informants asked me during our first 
interview if I was familiar with guanxi. Where peiyang, a word hard to translate directly, was 
never used as a Chinese word in English conversations until I had brought it up, the word 
guanxi, also a word hard to translate directly, was frequently used in conversations going in 
English. The concern for guanxi is a pressing one, as Zhao Yumei related guanxi to nothing 
less than happiness in life: “Without guanxi, one can most likely not live an easy life. If you 
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have no guanxi, but high nengli [ability
12
] you have a chance, but a slim one. The pressure is 
high; think of the high suicide rates among graduates, who have high nengli”. Guanxi could 
be referred to also without using the word explicitly, but relation to the concept remained 
obvious even if a word like “connections” were used: When I asked Hannah Liu if there was a 
Chinese dream similar to the American dream
13, she said: “The Chinese dream is to get 
connected. Even ayis
14
 [housekeepers] need connections. Haven’t you seen people sleeping on 
the street or in train stations? That’s unconnected villagers. The police will send squatters 
home, so if you have no connections in Beijing that you can stay with, they’ll send you back 
and the money spent on the train ticket to Beijing will be wasted.” My informants never 
attempted to produce a stringent definition of guanxi, as that would be an etic rather than emic 
concern. As an applied emic concept, the centrality of guanxi can be seen in how guanxi 
keeps occurring as an explaining factor. When I for instance asked about how young urban 
professionals spend money, Hannah Liu told met “They eat out a lot. They don’t cook at home, 
unless they have kids. Eating out is partly a guanxi thing. You eat out with colleagues and 
friends from university studies or high school classmates, who become one child policy 
substitute cousins”. Xiangqun Chang writes that “guanxi seems to have become an important 
notion and a general analytic concept for the understanding of social exchange and 
relationships in Chinese society” (Chang 2010, 453). The broadness of the term guanxi  is a 
headache to China scholars: Kuang-kuo Hwang
15
 has presented guanxi as three types of 
relationships: the expressive tie, the instrumental tie and the mixed tie” (Hwang 1987). 
According to Chang, Ambrose King divided guanxi into social exchange (social guanxi) and 
economic exchange (economic guanxi). (Chang 2010, 454). Due to the broad scope of the 
term, it is difficult to summarise my informants’ view on guanxi, but seemed that economic 
guanxi, or the instrumental tie, was dominant over social guanxi. Annie Huang said to me that 
“in Beijing, it is hard to make real friends in a bar. People don’t trust each other in Beijing. 
Most people who have moved to Beijing do not plan on growing old here anyway.”. Arthur 
Kleinman notes that individualisation seems debase an established balance between the 
instrumental and the expressive tie: 
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 Here referring to the dream of starting with two empty hands and working one’s way to becoming a respected 
self-made man; the idea that anyone can make it in America.  
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 Ayi (阿姨) literally is the term for aunt, father’s younger sister. It is a polite form of addressing an older 
woman if she seems younger than your father.   
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 Also known as Huang Guanggao when transliterated by the pinyin system.  
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“The new stream of individualistic orientation and self-fashioning brings with it to the 
fore the material desires and practises of consumerism. It also brings an egocentric 
pragmatism in personal relationships that alters ties long considered to be based in 
cultural ethics towards a troubling “you-scratch-my-back-I-scratch-yours” pattern that 
can propel corruption” (Kleinman: foreword in Yan 2009,xxi).  
 
As people do not come to Beijing to make new friends, social guanxi seems subjected to 
economic concerns. So and Walker has argued that economic guanxi and social guanxi should 
not be set in opposition to each other;   
“[…] guanxi represents the totality of the relationship between two persons. It is 
impossible to differentiate between the affective aspects of friendship and the 
utilitarian aspects of the business relationship. When one aspect ends so will the other.” 
(So and Walker 2006, 6) 
 
Annie Huang made some reflections that run in the same vein: “As you grow older you adopt 
a more instrumental view on friendship, more business-like. You consider what you and the 
other party can bring to the table. The friends one makes when one is young are the true 
friends”. Annie here implies that if a relation is too dominated by the instrumental tie, the 
relation cannot be called true friendship. Noteworthy, she says that true friends are made 
when young, and as she is in her mid-twenties “young” here would mean before adulthood, 
when one has less of an economic instrumentalist agenda. The importance of instrumentalist 
guanxi was frequently commented upon by my informants, who expressed a critical stance 
towards the importance of having connections and the gains that can be made from 
manipulating connections. Young urban professionals clearly would prefer professional 
ability to play a larger role over having the right connections, while simultaneously cannot 
neglect to cultivate guanxi of their own, due to its importance. It should here be mentioned 
that guanxi can be peiyang corporate grooming if the employer actively seeks to equip the 
employee with social connections.  
The importance of Beijing 
As a group being successful in the new China it is also of importance to the young urban 
professionals where they are. They have their preferred type of places, and the key place to be 
for a young urban professional is Beijing. Although my informants also were critical to what 
went on in their city of residence there is little doubt that Beijing is important. This must be 
understood in view of the central role held by China’s capital city in the national imaginary. 
Friedrike Fleischer explains that the geographical fixation that followed the implementation of 
the hukou system (to be explained below) in the Maoist era created a “national development 
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hierarchy with Beijing at the top” (Fleischer 2007, 298). Louisa Schein has commented that 
urbanity is “an artefact of popular cultural production and consumption in post-Mao China” 
(Schein 2001, 225). Read together, Schein’s observation about urbanity as an artefact of 
popular cultural production and consumption works with Fleischer’s observation that there is 
no place in China considered more developed, hence more modern, than Beijing. If urbanity is 
a good, then Beijing has more of it than any other city, and the current rate of urbanisation in 
China suggests that people indeed want urbanity.  Fleischer criticizes Schein, who writes 
about “imagined cosmopolitanism”, for approaching urban modernity as a dream that all can 
share: “imagined cosmopolitanism” then becomes  
“[…] an almost egalitarian notion since even window shoppers can dream that they 
take part in the new global consumer culture. In contrast, I would maintain that the 
growing integration of China into global economic flows is an ever more important 
aspect of how Chinese society is stratified today “ (Fleischer 2007, 300).  
 
Stornes’ (2012) study among un- or underemployed university graduates in Beijing is relevant 
to this discussion regarding how imagined the cosmopolitanism of imagined cosmopolitanism 
can be. Stornes finds that just living in Beijing is considered such a success that it 
counterweights unemployment or underemployment, making a living doing odd jobs in an 
illegal settlement at the fringe of Beijing (Stornes 2012). The young urban professionals I got 
to know were indeed able to consume Beijing cosmopolitanism, living within the fourth ring 
road
16
 and having done well at the job market. Their cosmopolitanism certainly did come with 
constraints, primarily financial ones. When I referred to a super-trendy (and rather over-priced) 
bar I had been invited too, Linda Wei giggled and said “I only go to that place if I’m treating 
company guests with the company’s credit card”. As I will return to, my informants and I did 
not visit each other’s homes, but met on a specific kind of neutral ground. Although Beijing is 
considered the peak of urbanity, as Fleischer argues above, the preferred places of young 
urban professionals would be focused on the consuming Beijing’s cosmopolitanism rather 
than consuming Beijing. No one ever suggested outings to quintessential Beijing scenery such 
as the Summer Palace, the Great Wall or Jingshan Park. Instead, we would meet in restaurants, 
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 I noticed how centrality in Beijing often correlates with desirability. Centrality, and with it, desirability is 
conceived in concentric layers following the ring roads, centered at the Forbidden City.  This would make 
southern inner Beijing (say, within the 3
rd
 ring) more desirable than southern outer Beijing (outside the 3
rd
 ring). 
People would often ask about whether an address was inside or outside the nearest ring road, and inner seemed 
to be held in higher esteem than outer.  
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bars and coffee shops. If we ever ventured into the Beijing trademark hutongs
17
, it was only 
the recently renovated, trendy hutong areas such as Gulou and Wudaoying hutong, where a 
bar, café or restaurant with a satisfactory degree of cosmopolitanism could be found. 
Cosmopolitanism is not only found in renovated hutongs. In Beijing, fancy restaurants can be 
found in shopping malls as they market the same cosmopolitanism to the same target group. 
Between a Ralph Lauren perfumery and a Maybelline makeup boutique there was a fancy, but 
affordable seafood restaurant, south China style that one of my informants decided I needed to 
experience. Affordable is a key word here, as conspicuous consumption comes with financial 
constraints for ordinary young urban professionals. With the vast amount of fancy restaurants, 
cafes and bars that Beijing offers and the various preferences of my informants, I was rarely 
taken to the same place twice. If I were to suggest where to meet, I had a limited repertoire of 
places that I liked and that I was confident my informants would like too. Comparing to 
studies I’ve read touching upon cosmopolitanism in Beijing I could discern a hierarchy of 
cosmopolitanism, as the informants of Stornes (2012) viewed a noodle soup hard-seat diner as 
a cosmopolitan experience because of its American fast-food inspiration: I firmly believe that 
my informants would not have their appetite for cosmopolitanism saturated by such a venue. 
That’s not to say that the strata my informants belonged to would never eat there; they might 
drop by for a quick and convenient meal to saturate non-metaphorical, physical hunger. 
Following the hierarchy of cosmopolitanism, a noodle soup fast-food diner would not be a 
place my informants would bring a friend (or a field working anthropology student); it would 
not have a sufficient air of cosmopolitanism to it. I did ask some of my informants if they had 
any guidelines for how to pick restaurants when treating others, and they provided some basic 
guidelines on the art of treating in China. I asked this in order to investigate what made an 
appropriate venue, but the answer given focused interestingly much more on finding the 
appropriate amount to spend: not too little, as that would be insulting, and not too much, for 
then the other party would be unable to reciprocate, causing embarrassment. Interestingly, the 
rules of thumb regarding appropriate spending were much more articulate than the rules of 
thumb defining an appropriate venue: “I would take people to a decent place, maybe a little 
bit expensive”. Both “a decent place” and “a little bit expensive” are not very precise 
descriptions, but upon further inquiry the definition of “a little bit expensive” turned out to be 
100 kuai per person, 150-200 for the more important events. What “a decent place” would 
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 Hutong  (胡同) translates into «alleys» and are features of old Beijing. Unfortunately many hutongs have been 
demolished to pave way for concrete, glass and steel high-rises. Most of the remaining hutongs are now listed as 
cultural heritage and therefore protected.  
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mean was not explained further. When I later in the conversation mentioned that I had been 
taken to the Imperial Manchu Restaurant by another informant, this particulate restaurant was 
held out as a good place to treat guests; “my former boss always treated guests there”. That 
the Imperial Manchu restaurant was sufficiently cosmopolitanism yet sufficiently could be 
deducted from the fact that I was taken there by a young urban professional in the first place, 
but I had acquired sufficient yet rudimentary “silent knowledge” to recognise the restaurant as 
that kind of place that appealed to young urban professionals, albeit being too much of a 
novice to be able to articulate why. Since social conceptualisation of space was not the focal 
point in my field work, I did not pursue this lead and therefore offer no closer definition that 
“a decent place” other than relating it to the literature discussing the importance of 
experiencing cosmopolitanism, as referred to above. I argue that cosmopolitanism and 
conspicuous consumption are strongly interrelated in Beijing as a part of the conspicuous 
consumption is precisely consuming the cosmopolitanism of an international metropolis.  
Methodology: an interview-oriented field work 
This thesis is based on a six months anthropological field work in Beijing, China. My wife 
Camilla Aasen Bøe and I conducted separate anthropological field works simultaneously from 
august 2012 to early march 2013. Prior to the field work we took a leave of one semester from 
the University of Bergen to study mandarin at the department of intensive studies at Beijing 
Language and Culture University (BLCU). While studying at BLCU we chose to live in a 
potential field site in western Beijing (Xicheng shi), just outside the second ring road. 
However, several practical reasons made us change address to Dongsi hutong area in eastern 
central Beijing when the field work started. Where we lived wouldn’t have influenced my 
field work among young urban professionals since we would always meet on neutral ground. 
They did not visit our home, we did not visit theirs; this will be discussed further below. 
Moving did save me a lot of trouble commuting, as the preferred neutral ground often were on 
or close to eastern metro line 10, such as Sanlitun/Tuanjiehu or Central Business District area. 
(Guomao).  
 I got in touch with my informants mainly through the snowballing method. I quickly 
discovered that free time was a scarce resource for young urban professionals. So after being 
introduced, in several cases I sensed it wiser to ask if they could help me with my master’s 
degree by meeting me for an interview, rather than suggesting just hanging out. My 
informants were very empathic towards my cause as they themselves have been grinded 
through the Chinese education mill. Although I had studied mandarin before coming to China 
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and spent another six months studying prior to the field work, nearly all my interviews were 
conducted in English, as my informants’ command of English vastly exceeded my command 
of Mandarin. Knowing some mandarin was occasionally still useful, as the example in the 
vignette to chapter one demonstrates. An initial challenge proved to be to conduct an 
interview with person I had met only once or twice before, often briefly and in a larger social 
setting, and then make the interview just so formal that the other party did not feel I was 
wasting their time, but casual and relaxed enough to establish a personal relation so that they 
would agree to meet me again. Luckily I was able to work out this balance quite well with 
most of my informants, securing a base of key informants that I could meet on a regular basis. 
This is somewhat reversed to the impression I have gained of a typical anthropological field 
work, where one would socialize first and bring out the note book later. Only towards the end 
of the field work did I feel comfortable enough to ask key informants just to “hang out” rather 
than asking for an interview for my master thesis. At first I worried that this meant poor field 
access and that my informants were treating me as a stranger, keeping me at a comfortable 
distance that I needed to overcome in order to conduct a fruitful field work. Sawa Kurotani 
(2004) encountered a similar problem in her field work about Japanese business wives in the 
US and wrote an interesting methodological article problematizing what is “proper” social 
anthropological access. Kurotani was initially frustrated that she was only allowed to partake 
in short lapses of leisure time with her informants, far from the Malinowskian anthropological 
ideal of living in their huts and eating their food. Initially suffering the same disappointment, 
having read Kurotani before going into the field helped me come to a similar realisation as 
Kurotani eventually did: by partaking in social interaction the same way as her informants did, 
Kurotani ended up knowing her informants as they knew each other (Kurotani 2004). If 
Erving Goffman’s (1959) classic theory of approaching social interaction as a screenplay is 
applied to Kurotani’s work, Kurotani’s frustration was to never see her informants interact in 
a back-stage setting, as their interactions was front-stage performance only. The interesting 
point to be taken is that this was not because of insufficient access, but because of the nature 
of the relationships between her informants. Similarly, I was frustrated by lack of back-stage 
access as I was meeting my informants one at the time in cafes and restaurants, having asked 
explicitly if they would meet me for an interview.  
In hindsight, this can serve as grounds for some reflections about social relations in 
contemporary China. Due to its massive growth the recent years Beijing is a city of strangers, 
which sets its mark upon social life in Beijing. I asked some of my informants about their 
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social life, and the connection was made explicitly by one of them: “I don’t go out much, 
maybe once a month. It depends on how much stress there is at work and on money. I have 
many “friends” from partner companies on weixin18 and stay in touch with people there 
instead of going out. Also, remember I’m not from here. Originally I had no network in 
Beijing”.  
In my worst fears early in the field work, I imagined that there was an abundance of 
Tupperware parties and movie nights hosted in people’s homes that a talented field worker in 
Beijing would gain access to within the first two weeks of the field work, but that I failed to 
gain access to, making me a hopeless anthropologist. As the field work unfolded, I came to 
realize that this was not so as I saw close, long-term friends prefer to interact on neutral 
ground rather than in the more intimate, back-stage setting of one’s home. The long-term 
presence of the field worker will expose “silent knowledge, and I obtained some insights 
concerning the preferred places of young urban professionals through being introduced to that 
kind of places by my informants; even though extensive interviews was my main mode of 
operation I learned something about the places of young urban professionals. My informants 
and I did not visit each other’s homes, instead we met on neutral, but not random ground; 
appropriate meeting places for young urban professionals are subject to some kind of 
screening process that I could sense the contours of. Had my field work been more oriented 
towards the social use of space, I might have asked my informants to articulate this, but I did 
not. Another reason that my one-on-one interview mode was to some degree representative of 
social life in Beijing is the observation that young urbanites in Beijing rarely actively 
scramble together large groups of people for leisure, making me meeting my informants 
mostly one at the time more representative for the social life of my informants. In a Chinese 
birthday party I was invited to, hosted in an Italian restaurant we were six guests, not counting 
the host. The host was born and raised in Beijing and could probably easily found a hundred 
acquaintances to invite, but Chinese social life is not so. Providing interesting grounds for 
comparison, I was invited to an expat’s birthday party the weekend after, which had closer to 
fifty guests. When I mentioned this to one of my informants, she commented: “Chinese count 
close friends when they invite, westerners include acquaintances. Spending time with 
acquaintances is more of a business thing to me”. Something that should be mentioned here is 
that the Chinese host paid for everything for all the guests as Chinese custom dictates, while 
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 A Chinese micro-messaging service often explained or referred to as “Chinese Twitter” despite certain minor 
differences. A major difference to Twitter is that Weixin is subject to government censorship.  
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in the expat’s party the mainly foreign guests were prepared to cover their own costs in full. 
In brief, the factors that made my field work depend greatly on one to one interviews is that 
leisure time is a scarce resource for young urban professionals, neutral ground is preferred for 
meeting places and larger group situations are rarely initiated, even for celebrations; as 
Kurotani, I interacted with my informants similar to how they would interact with each other.  
The organization of the thesis  
In chapter one I will provide a brief and incomplete overview of the economic history of 
modern China as this is a vital context to understanding the political history of the People’s 
Republic, moving to focus on the institutional history of employment and public welfare  
In chapter two I will aim to clarify the historical approach of the CCP towards the family, 
both under radical Maoism and in the reform era.  
In chapter three I show how my informants relate to the capitalist economy in contemporary 
China, discussing the importance of guanxi and the disapproval of young urban professionals 
towards the importance of guanxi in contemporary China, a symptom of a greater scepticism 
towards a culturally Chinese approach to business where the international companies provide 
a safe haven. I will move on to discuss what makes a good job and how the SOEs, the most 
culturally Chinese of Chinese companies, fit in here. I will finish this discussion of the 
experience of Chinese capitalism by looking at how the disappointments of young urban 
professionals are voiced both in relation to marketization of welfare and in relation to the 
over-development of Beijing, the promised land within China.  
In chapter four I will discuss concerns that young urban professionals hold concerning social 
life, particularly marriage and gender.  
In chapter five I will present a summary discussion of young urban professionals, discussing 
how an ongoing process of individualisation in contemporary China can be found in both 
economic and social life, before moving on to discuss if young urban professionals can be 
approached as a class.  
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CHAPTER 1:  From danwei socialism to capitalist State Owned 
Enterprises: the importance of economic organization in new China  
 
Since the various stages of the political project of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is 
highly influential on any attempt to understand China, firstly understanding the political 
projects of the CCP is immensely helpful. An important tool to understanding the CCP 
political project is found by applying the economic history of modern China as an historical 
context. Modern China is by historians often counted from signing of the Nanjing treaty in 
1842, the first humiliation of China by foreign powers after the end of the first opium war. 
The first opium war came because the British Empire needed to improve their trade balance 
with China, but had very little to sell;  
“Had it not been for the South Asian and Southeast Asian items, the British position 
would have been a complete disaster. Woollens, the main British export, hardly 
appealed to Chinese in tropical Canton and its environs. Even with the country trade, 
there was a severe trade imbalance. British ships arrived in Canton with 90 percent of 
their stock composed of bullion, mostly silver” (Schoppa 2010, 51).  
 
The British therefore started growing opium in India and selling it in China, disregarding the 
fact that the opium trade was banned by imperial edict in China. Because the superintendent 
of foreign trade was a representative of the Crown, Britain declared war when a Chinese 
official seized and destroyed 2.6 million pounds of British opium in Guangzhou in 1839 
(Schoppa 2010). After a military campaign where China’s military backwardness was made 
painfully clear, the treaty of Nanjing was signed in 1842. The Nanjing treaty was the first of 
many treaties where China had to compromise her sovereignty and grant concessions to 
various powers, who all demanded “equal treatment policy”: whatever concessions were 
given to one foreign power should automatically be extended to the others (Fenby 2009).  
The period from the end of the first opium war to the end of the Chinese civil war in 1949 is 
in Chinese called “the hundred years of shame” 19. The hundred years of shame is bitterly 
remembered in China for the encroaching of foreign powers upon China and the concessions 
extorted, the rampant corruption of the imperial bureaucracy making the reactionary and 
intrigue-ridden Manchu court unable to rule the realm and the many great rebellions against 
Manchu rule. For the various leaders China’s leaders after the fall of the Qing dynasty, 
modernisation and industrialisation was a way of restoring China as a superior civilization, a 
cornerstone in the imperial Chinese worldview (cf. Pye 1990). To show the centrality of 
                                                 
19
 Bai nian chi -百年耻  
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industrialising and comparing to other nations in the mass mobilisation rhetoric of the CCP, 
Keith Schoppa provides the following excerpt reporting from the Great Leap Forward, a mass 
campaign focused on industrialisation through popular participation through mass 
mobilisation where “backyard furnaces” producing iron were central:  
The people felt elated and stimulated; millions of hearts had only one wish – to fight 
hard to achieve and surpass the goal of producing 300,000 tons of iron in 1958 … The 
people composed a song describing [the construction of large numbers of furnaces]:  
The Communist Party is really wonderful.  
In three days more than a thousand furnaces were built.  
The masses strength is really tremendous.  
The American imperialists will run off, tail between legs 
The Chinese people will now surpass Britain 
The East wind will always prevail over the West wind. (Schoppa 2010, 331) 
 
The economic and military impotence of China compared to the intruding foreign powers 
made the CCP conclude that feudalism had to be abolished through revolution. The 
realization of the socialist utopia that the revolution should accomplish would be a restoration 
of Chinese greatness in a new socialist guise. As Robert Marks (2002) argues China 
historically has always been an economic superpower, with the exception of the last two 
hundred years. Robert Marks claims that “just two hundred years ago […] China and India 
accounted for two-thirds of the world’s economic output”  (Marks 2002, 1). Marks argues that 
it is more useful to see the economic growth  that China (and India) has experienced the last 
decades as a return to a long-term historical normalcy rather than something extraordinary 
(Marks 2002). During the 19
th
 century, the industrial revolution in Europe and the US 
increased their economic capacities while the semi-colonial encroachment on China kept 
China from modernizing her economy. The economic implications of the hundred years of 
shame were that China lost out on the industrial revolution. Although it has been politically 
convenient in China to place as much historical blame as possible on foreigners, Jonathan 
Fenby notes 
“A disproportionate role in China’s troubles would subsequently be attributed to this 
intervention. […] The country’s primary troubles stemmed from domestic sources, not 
the British warships that routed the imperial junks on the Pearl River. Nor was it 
foreigners who held back economic and material modernization: on the contrary, their 
concessions in Shanghai were the most advanced part of the nation, while Chinese 
visitors to Hong Kong returned impressed by conditions in the colony” (Fenby 2009, 
10) 
 
So what little there was of China’s first modern industry, it was in general owned by 
foreigners who poured investments into China (Stockman 2000, 126). These investments, and 
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the industrial investments made by Chinese capitalists were light-years away from keeping up 
with the rapid industrialisation happening elsewhere, for instance in the Steel Belt in the US, 
Germany’s Ruhrgebiet or the northwest of England. To illustrate the economic state of China 
when the “anti-Japanese war”20 started in 1937, Keith Schoppa provides the following 
examples:  
By 1937, China with its 400 to 500 million people had less industrial production than 
Belgium, with 8 million people. Even with attention focused on construction of 
highways, railroads, and telegraphs, the little that was accomplished is rather shocking: 
By 1937 China had the same mileage of modern highways as Spain, one-third of the 
telegraph lines of France and less railroad mileage than the state of Illinois  
(Schoppa 2010, 213). 
 
In light of this, it is no wonder that Mao was obsessed with industrially catching up with the 
west. This steely determination to industrialize is an important context for understanding early 
socialist China. One could for instance mention that in the first five-year plan, 63 percent of 
the total state investments went towards capital construction, of which agriculture including 
water conservation subsequently received a meagre share of 5 percent (Tang and Parish 2000, 
19). Keith Schoppa writes about the over-emphasis on certain areas of the economy during the 
Great Leap Forward:  
Steel making was one such area. Communes built their own steel furnaces – at least 1 
million dotted the Chinese landscape. Fueling them led to large-scale deforestation; 
any wood, including that of used coffins, was gathered to stoke the flames […]. For 
the cause, people contributed iron tools and implements, window frames, pots and 
pans – all to go into the making of pig iron. But because the manufacturing techniques 
were faulty, what was produced cracked easily. Useful iron implements, tools and 
utensils in many cases necessary for daily tasks, had been turned into something 
totally useless (Schoppa 2010, 331) 
 
The consequences of this fanatic drive towards industrialisation should not be forgotten: an 
estimated 46 million people died in the famine caused by the Great Leap Forward, which 
Jonathan Fenby calls “the world’s worst manmade famine” (Fenby 2009, 397).  The desire to 
industrialize rapidly was shared by the Guomindang
21
 , the ideological enemy of the Chinese 
Communist Party. Deborah Davis says both parties were “authoritarian Leninist parties”, who 
“shared a dream of rapid industrialisation led by state monopolies” (Davis 2000, 
                                                 
20
 Kangri zhangzheng抗日战争 –the most commonly used name for World War II in China.  
21
 Guomindang (国民党) translates to “Chinese National People’s Party”, but is better known as The Chinese 
Nationalist Party. The Guomindang regime evacuated to Taiwan after losing the Chinese civil war and has ruled 
Taiwan since. It is in older literature often rendered “Kuomintang” following the Wade-Giles Romanization 
method.   
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252,emphasis mine). I argue that the Deng’s economic reforms has been faithful to this aim, 
as post-Mao China has achieved rapid industrialisation, maintaining state monopolies in key 
sectors and strengthening state owned enterprises. Having now briefly shown how a period of 
history collectively remembered as a time of national humiliation was explicitly connected to 
China’s economic capacities or rather, the lack of these capacities, I will now focus on the 
strategies employed by the party-state after the civil war in order to provide the economic 
growth needed for the restoration of China to again be acknowledged as The Central 
Kingdom
22
.  The difference was that this time, China’s restoration as a centre of civilizational 
superiority should come in the form of Maoist socialism
23
.  
The East is Red: the political vehicles of Chinese communism following 1949 
Although the Great Helmsman successfully rallied the Chinese peasantry to win the civil war 
the Party-state had little more than land reform to offer in immediate return – giving the 
peasantry land that paradoxically was taken back during collectivisation.  In fact, the 
peasantry posed a problem to the new regime when flocking to the cities in search of better 
conditions. Henderson and Cohen write:  
“During the decade after 1949, problems of urban development and unemployment 
were exacerbated by the migration of millions of peasants into the cities. Beginning in 
the early fifties, the government addressed this problem through a series of regulations 
that gradually established state control over both the urban and rural population.” 
(Henderson and Cohen 1984, 30).  
 
The population control policy that forced the peasantry to stay at their farms was the 
introduction of the hukou registration system. Introduced in urban areas in 1951, hukou was 
made national policy in 1955 to curb the influx of rural migrants to the cities as people were 
migrating to the cities faster than the industrialisation could create urban jobs. All citizens 
would be registered with a hukou registration, defining their citizenship as either urban or 
rural and confining the holder to a geographic place of belonging. It served its purpose well, 
virtually curbing internal migration until the system was relaxed in the 1980’s. Not only did 
the CCP force farmers to stay at home: bent on rapid industrialisation the CCP also focused 
                                                 
22
 In Chinese, China is called 中国, ‘Middle Kingdom’ or ‘Central Kingdom’. China as a civilizational centre 
was fundamental to the worldview of Imperial China and is reflected in the semantics of the name itself.  
23
 The Chinese insistence on Chinese civilizational superiority meant that the alliance between the Soviet Union 
and The People’s Republic could not last, as Moscow insisted on being the leader of the “second world”, 
resulting in Mao’s suspension of the alliance and the proclamation of the “third world”, the unaligned nations, 
under China’s leadership. (Kissinger 2011) 
27 
 
their welfare provision towards the urban citizenry. Deborah Davis describes the effect of this 
policy: 
Through rationing and migration controls, the communist leadership divided the 
population into a rural majority tied to their land who were responsible of raising their 
own food and a urban minority who had the right to buy state grain.(Davis 2000, 251) 
 
I will treat hukou as the first and most basic level of welfare segregation in Maoist China. 
Hukou welfare segregation can again be divided into two subcategories: firstly, agricultural 
versus non-agricultural and secondly, urban versus rural. Agricultural and non-agricultural is 
the separation between those whom the state would feed and not, as mentioned by Davis 
above. Urban and rural simply categorises the place one is registered to. The general rule 
would be that these two subcategories came in pairs; non-agricultural urban versus 
agricultural rural, with very few exceptions. The most likely exceptions of people holding 
non-agricultural yet rural hukou can be found when Yan Yunxiang provides a list of people 
belonging to si shi hu, ‘four types of households’ which Yan, following Weber identifies as 
one of six status groups in Xiajia village. According to Yan this “the spouses and children of 
state cadres, workers, teachers, and military officers, all of whom live in the village and 
belong to the urban population” (Yan 2009, 4). The si shi hu gained their semi-cadre 
privileged status from having a breadwinner who had cadre status proper, and the households 
held a privileged position through receiving dual economic benefits. The government 
employee breadwinner had a guaranteed cash income, yet the household still received shares 
of grains and other goods at subsidised prices from the collective distribution system, all 
while being exempt from working for the collective. It was such a privileged position that in 
some rural areas they were called dui lao shen, which according to Yan literally translates ‘the 
gentry of the production teams’ (Yan 2009, 4). This illustrates the welfare segregation level 
between state food recipients and those who grew their own food well, but for a general 
discussion of hukou, it might be useful to apply Zhiqiang Liu’s24 simplification to avoid 
getting trapped in hukou bureaucratic technicalities: 
“Hukou can also be classified into non-agricultural and agricultural hukou based on a 
person’s entitlement to state-subsidized food grain. Although agriculture hukou exists 
in urban areas and non-agricultural hukou exists in rural areas, these cover only a 
negligible share of the population in these areas. Hence, we ignore this distinction and 
                                                 
24
 Throughout this thesis, Chinese names will be rendered in pinyin (without tone markers) with family name put 
before given name. Exceptions will be made when the author him- /herself has chosen to westernize the name 
constellation, such as Zhiqiang Liu, or use another Romanization form than pinyin, such as Wen-hsin Yeh. 
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equate urban hukou with non-agricultural hukou and rural hukou with agriculture 
hukou”  (Liu 2005, 133) 
 
The same simplification can be found in Jacka, Kipnis and Sargeson (2013). Understanding 
hukou and its consequences are vital to understanding life in Maoist China. Tang and Parish 
even calls it a caste system when arguing that  
“China is now evolving from a caste to a class system of social organisation. Chinese 
leaders may not have intended this, but over the years, desired or not, their policies 
produced a caste of privileged urbanites against a rural caste of have-nots” (Tang and 
Parish 2000, 17)  
 
While the rural population was literally being held in place by the hukou system; the state 
prioritised the industrialising cities when allocating resources. The difference between urban 
and rural living standards “favoured city-dwellers with a ratio of at least three-to-one toward 
the end of the Maoist period”. (Perry and Lü 1997, 3). Henderson and Cohen argues that the 
traumatic political campaigns in China, the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, 
were responses to this unfairness as they were “designed to emphasize egalitarianism”, which 
they argue is symptoms of a more general problem; “the dilemma faced by all modern 
socialist nations: how to maintain socialist ideals of equality while promoting modern, 
industrial development” (Henderson and Cohen 1984, 1). As the literature shows China 
suffered this dilemma too, mainly prioritising technocratic industrial development over social 
equality, with the exceptions of the two Maoist campaigns mentioned.  
 The second level of welfare segregation regarded the urban work force. Essential here 
is the Chinese danwei institutional system. Danwei literally means “unit”, but is normally 
translated “work unit”. Lü and Perry note that: “surprisingly, considered its everyday use, the 
concept of the danwei is not clearly defined in China” (Perry and Lü 1997, 5)25 The working 
definition of the danwei system that Lü and Perry offer is: 
“[A] hierarchy of state-owned workplace units (schools, factories, hospitals, 
government agencies and the like) whose employees were guaranteed a variety of 
perquisites denied to peasants in the countryside: secure jobs, affordable housing, 
inexpensive medical care, a range of subsidies for everything from transportation to 
nutrition, and generous retirement pensions.”(Perry and Lü 1997, 3) 
                                                 
25
 They continue: “According to one of the most authoritative contemporary Chinese dictionaries, Cihai, the 
word “danwei” has two basic meanings: First it refers to a measurement unit; second “it refers to agencies, 
organizations, or departments within an agency or organization”.  Other dictionaries offer similar definitions. In 
common parlance, however, the word “danwei” carries a much broader meaning. It refers not only to 
administrative units but also to other work units – including enterprises, retail shops, hospitals and schools.” 
(Perry and Lü 1997, 5) 
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The second level of welfare segregation came in two forms both involving the danwei system: 
firstly there was the discrimination of temporary workers in danweis noted by Solinger (1997). 
Secondly it was the differences in welfare provisions between different danweis; not two 
descriptions of danwei perquisites are similar, because the danwei provision varied. As these 
two forms both concerns the rights of the urban work force through their danweis, I treat them 
as one level of welfare segregation. The danweis were a fundamental organisational vehicle in 
the Maoist political economy, and remains central in the economic and political system also 
after Deng Xiaoping's reforms. The macro-level impact of the danwei system on Chinese 
political and economic development especially under Mao is greater than one might think. Lü 
and Perry illustrate the centrality of danweis in socialist China’s economy when writing:  
“The actual control of assets and revenues by the danwei is so extensive that one 
might argue that the main form of property rights in China has long been “work unit 
ownership” rather than state ownership. According to official statistics from the 
Bureau of State Property Management, the assets controlled by administrative and 
non-productive units that should actually belong to the state amounted to 892 billion 
yuan by the end of 1993.” (Perry and Lü 1997, 10) 
 
To summarise: the first and most basic welfare separation based on the hukou system made 
the city-dwellers haves where the rural peasantry were have-nots. Thereafter, there was a 
second welfare segregation dividing the haves from the first segregation into have-more and 
have-less, based on whether or not one was employed in a large danwei. An illustrative 
example of the realities of welfare segregation might be Fenby’s report that during the 
Cultural Revolution, so unsustainable methods were implemented to boost agricultural 
production according to political orders that “before long, peasants at funerals burned 
imitation urban registration forms so that the dead might get the benefit of living in cities in 
the afterlife” (Fenby 2009, 459-460).  
The social importance of the danwei: influences on urban identity 
Moving the discussion of the danwei system from a macro-economic perspective towards a 
more conventional anthropological approach, one should notice just how central danwei 
membership was to the daily life of the urban citizenry. The significance of the danwei system 
in its heyday also imposed itself on visiting scholars. Thøgersen and Heimer notes one could 
not miss the significance of the danwei:  
When someone asks you for the tenth time which work unit you belong to, you realize 
that work units are important elements of Chinese urban social structure, even if your 
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research topic happens to be something completely different” (Heimer and Thøgersen 
2006, 11) 
 
According to Wen-Hsin Yeh, the distinguishing feature of a danwei “was a lifetime social 
welfare system virtually from cradle to grave, and a network of relationships encompassing 
work, home, neighbourhood, social existence and political membership” (Yeh 1997, 60). 
There seems to be some general agreements in literature about the danwei and its features: Lü 
and Perry (1997, 11) call the encapsulation of the danwei as a community and social cell for 
“perhaps the most distinctive feature of the danwei”. Fleischer (2007, 290) calls the danwei a 
“limited spatial orbit”. Francis (1996, 840) talks about the “segmented and cellular social 
structure […] of the Chinese Communist work unit system”, while Henderson and Cohen 
(1984:xiii) discusses the “relative insularity” of the danwei”. Being a cradle-to-grave welfare 
provider, the danwei would dominate the lives of the Chinese urban citizenry both before 
entering and after exiting the workforce, making it important to refer to the recipients of 
danwei welfare as danwei members rather than staff, as one would also find school children, 
worker’s spouses and retirees amongst the recipients of danwei services. (Henderson and 
Cohen 1984, 13). A generation of urbanites born and raised in a danwei believed they would 
work, live and die in their danwei, as changing danwei was a complicated bureaucratic 
process.  
 
The danweis was not just surrounding the individual metaphorically in one’s economic and 
political life; it was also surrounding the individual quite literally. The danweis was normally 
built as walled campuses, with the buildings facing inward. Henderson and Cohen lived in a 
Chinese hospital danwei for a year, and noticed how  
“There is a real sense of inside rather than outside the work unit, not only because 
there actually are walls around it but because so much of life and work is dependent 
on the unit. (Henderson and Cohen 1984, xiii).  
 
The organisation of space inscribes structures of meaning on its occupants, as Bourdieu has 
shown in the famous example of the kabyle house (Bourdieu 1979). Within the demarcated 
space of the danwei, the individual could find nearly all one needed “from cradle to grave”. 
There are two mechanisms in play simultaneously here. One is the physical organisation of 
space in a danwei: The walls that Henderson and Cohen mentions above are later described 
more closely: “Heavy wrought-iron gates hang on either side of an eight-foot wall that gives 
the impression of encircling the entire hospital complex” (Henderson and Cohen 1984, 10).  
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The other mechanism is the political organisation of space, separating the danwei from its city. 
The urban citizenry connected to a larger danwei rarely needed to leave the danwei, as all one 
needed could be found within. One’s access to all one needed was lost outside the danwei: the 
physical walls were also a political boundary where one’s welfare rights ended. A quote from 
Henderson and Cohen summarises this symbioses:  
“The walls and gates and the close proximity of most services create an atmosphere of 
people working and living together in a somewhat closed community. The profusion 
of shared experiences, the necessary cooperation, and the routines performed by all 
sharpen the sense of community”(Henderson and Cohen 1984, 13). 
 
It is interesting to note the social centrality that the danweis came to hold with a daily-life 
example from Perry’s work: The question asked to identify a stranger in China had always 
been “where are you from?”, but during the communist era, the answer changed from the 
imperial and republican era’s regional origin (I’m from Anhui Province) to danwei affiliation 
(I’m from Number 17 cotton mill). (Perry 1997, 42). Bourdieu’s kabylean house will if 
applied here connect the physical danwei structure, as an encapsulating, physically 
demarcated cell with how the danwei became a significant part of the individual’s identity. As 
the danwei buildings towered around you on all sides when within the danwei, so also the 
danwei became a towering presence in the identity of Chinese urbanites. This is very 
illustrating if viewed in light of Jenkins’ work about identity. Drawing on Barth’s work on 
ethnicity, Jenkins (1996) argues that all social identity, rather than not just ethnic identity, 
consists of external and internal identification; who you say you are and who others recognise 
you as. Perry has shown that the danwei system changed the primary criteria of identification 
from a socio-geographical affiliation to a danwei. By socio-geographic affiliation I refer to 
that, somewhat confusing, a Chinese might even still state a place he has never been to as his 
“home place”, as laojia in Chinese can both be one’s actual home and one’s place of origin in 
an extended, social sense – where his or her family stems from26. Saying that you are from a 
place you never been to makes the sense of socio-geographic affiliation a good example of 
Benedict Anderson’s “imagined community” and Jenkins’ “internal identification”. In Perry’s 
example it should be emphasized that it is the name of the danwei that is stated, not the 
danwei’s address or location. If the answer had been address or location, it would still be a 
geographical entity, like when answering by stating a place or region of belonging in earlier 
times. Instead, the answer became an organisational component of the Chinese political 
                                                 
26
 This is especially so for southern China, where the clan structure was more dominant, making single-surname 
villages and ancestral estates more common than in northern China (cf. Potter and Potter 1990).  
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economy. This demonstrates neatly how the danwei system imposed itself on the identity of 
its affiliates, and serves to connect three perspectives on the danwei: as a unit of production, a 
unit of political control and distribution and as a lived experience of Chinese urbanites. The 
danwei did not impose itself only on Chinese nationals: Henderson and Cohen describes how  
“The danwei began to dominate our thoughts and conversations. As we talked with 
other foreigners in Wuhan, we heard about their work units and were able to make 
direct comparisons of physical structure, function and, most important, the unit 
directors and administrators, to whom the Chinese and we referred as “our leaders” 
(Henderson and Cohen 1984, 5)”.  
 
As I will return to, the identity aspect of the danwei created an expectation of mutual loyalty 
between employee and employer, making job stability a fundamental ingredient in the 
contemporary benefit bundle that the State Owned Enterprises offer. Further, this thorough 
discussion of the workings and importance of the danwei system is needed for two purposes. 
Firstly to illustrate the welfare legacy of the danwei system in order to shed light how welfare 
in China has in recent history been corporate welfare rather than state welfare, following 
Perry and Lü’s division between state coffers and danwei coffers (Lü and Perry 1997). 
Secondly to help build a case for arguing that the particularities of the Chinese danwei system 
has created a corporate culture legacy that must be accounted for when discussing what 
Dorothy Solinger calls “transitional hybridization of the firm” (Solinger 1997). There are 
continuities in how business is done in China that can be traced back to the political 
organisation of both pre- and post-reform danweis.  
Family life under danwei influence 
Due to the danwei‘s cellular structure, the economic distributive function and the political 
control function, the influence of danwei greatly exceeded the influence one normally ascribes 
to an employer. A danwei would normally penetrate nearly every aspect of daily life of its 
members, making the danwei’s stance on family matters important. Henderson and Cohen 
noted as late as 1984 an interconnection between danwei housing policy and the traditional 
family-orientation of China: 
 “[…] the only immediately apparent segregation in our danwei was that between 
single and married people. In a family-oriented society such as China, unmarried 
people may be its most disadvantaged minority”  (Henderson and Cohen 1984, 21).  
 
According to Yeh, “figures of authority in the danwei became influential presences in an 
individual’s significant personal decisions such as those concerning marriage, education, and 
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career moves” (Yeh 1997, 61). Perhaps the most totalitarian feature of the danwei was when it 
was charged with controlling worker’s fertility:  
“The danwei work unit system affected all areas of life, starting with housing and 
welfare and eventually leading to power over the right to have children” (Fenby 2009, 
372).  
 
This makes the danwei remind of what Erving Goffmann called total institutions, although 
Henderson and Cohen argues against applying this label to Chinese danwei institutional form 
(Henderson and Cohen 1984, 8, footnote 1). As mentioned by Yeh above, the danwei was 
influential in family affairs such as marriage, but allowing much more personal freedom than 
infancy betrothal, a pre-revolution feature banned by the CCP. Henderson and Cohen report 
that the cellular nature of the danwei system was recognised by administrators who made a 
strong attempt to find both spouses’ jobs or provide training for jobs in the same danwei, and 
also influenced potential spouse selection, as “it is not uncommon for single people assigned 
to the unit to pair off and marry” (Henderson and Cohen 1984, 20). Contrasted to when 
marriage was subject to the alliance-making strategies of the traditional patriarchal family in 
China, danwei marriage is an interesting point of individualisation, as the new dominant 
collective (danwei) did not regulate what the previous dominant collective (the patriarchal 
family) did, leaving the individual with a new-found freedom to find its own way. 
Interestingly Henderson and Cohen reports that:    
There seemed to be a feeling that, as one person put it, it was “not appropriate for 
people of unequal education to marry”. This sentiment was borne out in our 
observations of young people with similar occupations and educational degrees 
pairing up, as well as the very common occurrence of husbands and wives having the 
same or similar occupations (Henderson and Cohen 1984, 20-21). 
 
This is highly interesting as I encountered very strong-felt cultural notions about the 
importance of male superiority in a marriage, especially in terms of education and salary. An 
explanation might be the relative isolation of the danweis, making marriage in China 
temporarily shift from an ideal of exogamy to praxis of endogamy where the individual 
sought safety in sameness, the marriage version of hiding in the herd. The epoch when the 
danwei system was at its most extensive was also a time of political turmoil, particularly the 
Cultural Revolution which aimed to combat new elites forming within the revolution. The 
focus on the appropriateness of marrying people of equal status can be seen as a safety 
mechanism in a time where no one, including revolutionary heroes from the highest echelons 
of the party like Zhu De, Bo Yibo and Deng Xiaoping, could feel safe from accusations about 
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being a “capitalist roader”. Another possible explanation might be the state’s control over 
education, job assignments and wages, making successful women less a threat to their 
husbands as the political control over, or denial of, social mobility removed the pressure on 
the husband to outperform his wife.  When the danwei institution was reformed to become 
more like international companies, the social pressure on husbands to outperform their wives 
emerged. This will be discussed further in chapter 4. The point here is to examine the 
influence of the danwei on family life rather than the responses to that influence, such as 
intra-danwei endogamy.  
Professionals in the danwei  
That the term bailing, young urban professionals’ suggested translation of young urban 
professionals has emerged and entered common usage the last ten years brings attention to the 
role of professionals in the danwei. It is further interesting that the corresponding term blue 
collar worker was not translated, Chen Xiaomei said blue collar worker is just gongren, 
worker,. While bailing is a new term, the distinction between the manual labour of a blue 
collar worker and the non-manual labour of a white collar worker is not new in China. In the 
rural People’s Communes, peasants phrased this ‘brown hands’ and ‘white hands’, 
respectively (Yan 2009, 4). Yan writes that the “avoidance of manual labour in farming had 
long been a key privilege enjoyed by the cadres, the si shi hu, and some of the political 
activists, namely, the ‘white hands’”. (Yan 2009, 14). Of these six status groups, the three 
groups highest in the hierarchy, who escapes the manual labour of the peasants, are related to 
cadre status (Yan 2009, 3). Urban danweis also had similar distinctions between manual 
labour workers on the factory floor and their elevated colleagues doing non-manual labour in 
offices. In the hospital danwei that Henderson and Cohen studied;  
“Personnel are divided into three broad occupational categories: cadres (ganbu), 
technicians (jishuyuan) and workers (gongren).  These general categories cover a 
variety of occupations, each with each own ranking system and wage scale.” 
(Henderson and Cohen 1984, 32) 
 
The dual nature of the relation between state-run industry and Party-state meant that 
privileged positions often required party membership. The more privileged the position, the 
more likely that it was staffed by a party member. The correspondence between privileged 
position and party membership would hence mean that the distinction between blue collar 
workers and white collar workers were in a danwei with the more prominent distinction 
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between cadre and non-cadre, making the privileged ones cadres because they are privileged 
rather than actually cadres. This is confirmed by Henderson and Cohen: 
“Administrative and professional personnel in such state-run enterprises are called 
cadres. In the hospital these include the physicians, the nurses, and the entire range of 
administrators from the director to the secretaries and assistants. In the medical college, 
physicians, scientists, teachers, accountants, and administrative personnel are all 
referred to as cadres.”(Henderson and Cohen 1984, 32) 
 
The foremost privilege of the privileged would be escaping manual labour, which Yan above 
in a rural context calls a key privilege. As the distribution of privileges comes up, social 
stratification within danweis should be discussed. It may be extrapolated from Li Qiang 
description from what s/he calls a two-phase marketization process that workers held interests 
in opposition to those of cadres and intellectuals: 
“in the first phase few from the central social groups (cadres and intellectuals) enter 
into the market economy […] As a result of the change, complaints from white-
collared workers, such as cadres and intellectuals, have been largely reduced, but 
complaints from workers and peasants have rapidly increased (Li 2010, 39) 
 
Li here puts cadres or intellectuals in opposition to manual labourers such as workers and 
peasants. What is more interesting is that Li sets the interests of cadres and intellectuals in 
opposition to workers and peasants; here Li merges what I above called the first level of 
welfare segregation into one, as rural peasants’ does not stand alone against urbanites, whom 
the state accepts a responsibility of feeding. Li shows that marketization makes these groups 
act similar; hence it is reasonable to believe it is out of shared interest. Regarding the second 
level of welfare segregation, the systemic difference in welfare provision seems to be between 
rather than within danweis as not two descriptions of danwei welfare provision are the same. 
The approach to social stratification within a danwei seems also to differ: Henderson and 
Cohen observe that “The director of the hospital, for example, lived in an apartment below a 
garage mechanic. Perhaps in response to earlier abuses by officials, the danwei administration 
maintained a low profile in terms of housing” (Henderson and Cohen 1984, 21). Lisa Rofel, 
on the other hand encountered less an egalitarian distribution of scarce resources: “Among 
Hangzhou residents, only high-ranking intellectuals and cadres may erect heating stoves in 
their homes” (Rofel 1989, 4).  
Treating white-collar workers under economic collectivism as “cadres and intellectuals” 
somewhat solves the problem of why white-collar workers in danweis were placed in any 
category similar to bailing, save for the obvious reason that bailing is a loan word from 
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English, and few of those reached Chinese before the opening-up reforms. The doctors, nurses 
and even assistants at the hospital danwei that Henderson and Cohen studied might not all 
have been party cadres or intellectuals, but was still considered a part of this social group in 
wage policies, with no indication that people conceptualised differently.  
 Doctors and nurses certainly wore white collars that would separate them from the 
workers who proverbially or not wore blue collars, yet they were not lumped into a social 
category called bailing. I argue that bailing was the conceptual response to a new social 
stratum of educated office workers in the private sector; a new word was needed as these 
enterprise employees were non-cadre but also not blue collar workers, a contradiction back 
when all was state-owned and thereby Party-controlled. Linking the application of the term 
bailing to the growing importance of the private sector would be corresponding with Chen 
Xiaomei’s claim that the term surfaced in popular usage approximately ten years ago. 
Material from Li Qiang supports this:  
“Third, changes also happened to the cadre group. Before the Reform, the cadre group 
was expanding, and managing staff of enterprises and professionals were counted as 
cadres. After the Reform, with the advancement of modern enterprise, the managing 
staff gradually separates from the government official’s group. The group of 
government officials has become more and more standardized, and it only refers to 
officials at various levels of government departments who exert public power and do 
public service.” (Li 2010, 41-42) 
 
This corresponds both with what my informants said about bailing and the analysis above, as 
Li also argues for a change in the social categorisation of managing staff following the 
reforms; I claim that the bailing category came in place as a response to this. Further, Li 
agrees to what Chen Xiaomei told me: the category “officials” has been reworked, so 
managing staff in SOE’s can be included as bailing unless they hold some public office, or 
hold their position through official Party nomination, such as for instance a labour union 
leader.  
The political dimensions of a new Communist capitalism in China  
One of the key features of contemporary Chinese capitalism is the interplay between market 
and a market-meddling authoritarian regime in a setting without a strong rule of law – until 
recently an unthinkable combination that according to western capitalist orthodoxy should 
neither be viable nor sustainable over time. Yet it persists in China, who again ignores the 
orthodoxies of an imported –ism with European origins. A key tool in the Chinese economic 
strategy is the State Owned Enterprises (SOE). James McGregor writes: 
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If one examines global economic systems, however, the China Model is most fittingly 
described as authoritarian capitalism. The ruling Party chooses and appoints the Party 
members who lead the country’s largest and most important businesses, which are 
almost all state-owned enterprises. These SOEs monopolize or dominate all significant 
sectors of the economy and control the entire financial system. Party leaders deploy 
the SOEs to build and bolster the economy – and undergird the Party’s monopoly 
political control” (McGregor 2012:2).  
 
Hence, the SOEs are fundamental in both the economic and political structure of 
contemporary China.  The SOEs are based on the old danwei conglomerates that dominated 
the Chinese economic and political model before the marked reforms, but they do not occupy 
such a central function in the Chinese economic and political system as the pre-reform 
danweis did. One must separate between the historical danwei and the present term danwei, 
for the term is still used. The SOEs are danweis that have survived a decade of political 
reform, and are groomed to become pillars in the new economy. The reform of the state 
owned enterprises has been a prioritized task entrusted to some of the heaviest of China’s 
political heavyweights, namely Zhu Rongji and Wu Bangguo
27. Zhu Rongji’s famous joke 
about the SOE’s might illustrate the state of the SOE’s before Zhu started the SOE reforms: 
“One man works, one man watches and one makes trouble”. (McGregor 2012a, 18). The 
finest breed of State Owned Enterprises is no longer in such a sorry state. James McGregor 
describes how some are being equipped to take global market shares away from the world’s 
leading companies (McGregor 2012a). McGregor claims the best of the best SOEs, called 
“national champions”, are the pillars of this go-see-conquer foreign markets strategy of the 
Party (McGregor 2012a). When discussing the SOEs it is important not to confuse the average 
SOE with those selected few chosen to become “national champions”, as not all SOEs that 
survived reform this far is in such a fortunate state. There are still state enterprises that are 
either lagging behind or are being uncertain in how to go about things in a new economy. If 
John Farquharson’s book In the Belly of the Dragon can be treated as an indigenous account 
even if the author is not indigenous to China, Farquharson provides an interesting 
ethnographic description of the inner life of an SOE and makes clear, the SOE’s are still 
learning by doing in many respects. (Farquharson 2013). The company that that Farquharson 
worked for is clearly far from being one of the “national champions” companies, but both 
champions and runners-up SOEs are elements in the Chinese business-scape if such a term 
                                                 
27
 Zhu Rongji was Premier during President Jiang Zemin’s second five-year term. Wu Bangguo was chairman 
and Party secretary in the Standing Committee in the Hu Jintao administration, making him chief legislator. Wu 
ranked 2
nd
 in the official ranking of state and party leaders, only exceeded by President Hu himself, thus even 
premier Wen Jiaobao ranked below Wu in the power pyramid.  
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may be coined. Business-scape, inspired by Appadurai’s (2011) finance-scapes, could be seen 
as the social landscape of businesses connected to a geographically demarcated place or 
market, which in addition to categorising by business technicalities such as sector and market 
share, also could classify companies according to corporate culture, if this is found to vary 
significantly within a business-scape. I will return to this with concrete examples below, when 
discussing how my informants would use “Chinese” as an adjective when discussing different 
companies. Not only could the company’s activity (e.g. IT, construction or corporate finance), 
market share and profitability be mentioned, but companies could be rated on a continuum of 
Chinese-ness, as e.g. “not very Chinese” or “very Chinese”, and this would be a reference to 
corporate culture.  
The importance of corporate culture to an economy  
Anthropology is well known with how the way business is conducted comes with a cultural 
side to it; business is more than the economist’s impersonal calculations and the lawyer’s set 
of legal-bureaucratic procedures. This is perhaps even more so in China, where both legal-
bureaucratic framework and praxis is less absolute than in those economies that China likes to 
compare herself to
28
. In Chinese business, building friendships and interpersonal trust 
frequently takes privilege over contract-making and haggling negotiations as the focal point 
of securing business agreements; Farquharson describes how fourteen days of chugging 38 
percent baijiu rice liquor from wine glasses for lunch and dinner took its toll on a German 
businessman in China (Farquharson 2013, 30). The reason time was spent this way was that 
this, being a trust-building activity, is important in Chinese business. The importance of trust 
in business is seen from small restaurants run as family businesses in Sichuan (Bruun 1993), 
to landing multimillion-dollar contracts in Beijing (Leblanc 2008). Jack Leblanc has a self-
styled “business memoir” that colourfully portraits the social dimension of business, and can 
be treated as another indigenous account from another non-indigenous participant in Chinese 
business. Leblanc (2008) takes the reader through his ascent from being middle-man in rather 
small-scale negotiations in Chongqing in 1989 to top level business consulting based in 
Beijing in 2006, where the importance of interpersonal relations and trustworthiness is 
demonstrated clearly throughout the book as being pivotal in Chinese business. This is an 
entry point for discussing the importance of understanding the State Owned Enterprises, who 
are considered the nest of the most “Chinese” corporate culture. I argue that understanding the 
                                                 
28
 Not to suggest that lawyers, legal technicalities and ordinary business negotiations does not occur nor matter, 
it does. (c.f Leblanc?).  
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SOEs are vital if one wants to understand contemporary Beijing business, and with it, the 
paradoxical Chinese socialist capitalism. The importance of the SOEs is vital to approaching 
Chinese business. Aiwah Ong and Li Zhang write:  
“The major blow struck for privatization in the official sense was the dismantling of 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) through acquisition by managers at low prices, along 
with the reorganization for efficiency which frequently involved laying off workers.” 
(Zhang and Ong 2008) 
 
Unfortunately this leaves the reader with the incorrect impression that the state-owned 
enterprises were dismantled completely and no longer exists. As James McGregor (2012a) 
and Richard McGregor (McGregor 2012b) argue in more recent publications, this is not the 
case. Ong et al. were wrong to read the obituary over the SOE’s as the reports of their deaths 
have been greatly exaggerated, in fact the SOEs are made to be pillars in the Chinese 
economy as several important sectors are still under state monopoly. Some SOEs are even 
groomed to be able to compete and win in the global market outside China (McGregor 2012a). 
Although studying the workings of culture and cultural ideas within the business elite in 
modern capitalist economies are somewhat outside the traditional scope of social 
anthropology, anthropology has dealt earlier with how the social or cultural dimensions of the 
inner life of an industry or a sector of the economy affect society at large. Karen Ho’s wrote 
an anthropological study of Wall Street based on her experience from working at Wall Street 
as an analyst, and demonstrates how culture matters in also in American big business and how 
this culture can and should be studied anthropologically. Ho demonstrates how cultural ideas 
hatched in Wall Street spread beyond the New York finance district and contributed to setting 
the tone for policymaking that had serious influence on American society (Ho 2009). 
Unfortunately there is no room to elaborate on Ho’s contribution, but the implication of her 
findings should be mentioned. Through an increasingly globalised economy and the global 
influence of the US, these Wall Street ideas are bound to reach and influence the rest of the 
world too, in an unknown form and degree. What happens in China are increasingly having 
global influence too, albeit not to the same degree as events in the US may have. Since the 
SOEs are significant players on the Chinese business playground, the hypothesis here will be 
that there are social and cultural influences to the SOE business approach that through their 
importance in the national economy are influential in how business in China in general is 
done. As global business becomes increasingly intertwined, some elements of this standard 
operating procedure might even be transferred across international borders. The cultural and 
social mechanisms influencing the SOE business approach is built on the political history of 
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China, the corporate legacy of the danweis and the political economy of China as well as 
traditional ideas about business in China.  
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CHAPTER 2: More than economy: a communist revolution of hearts and 
minds  
 
The Chinese Communist Party also had its ambitions fixed on a more thorough reworking of 
Chinese social organisation. Aiming to create a socialist nation of dedicated socialist citizens, 
the CCP was unimpressed with the revolutionary character of the Chinese people. The Party 
considered “the average citizen of China the heir of an irretrievably useless and backward 
tradition - deeply prone to error unless properly led”. (Schrecker 2004, 221). Mao himself 
even referred to the Chinese people as “poor and blank” (ibid.), or in Schoppa’s translation, 
“blank sheets” (2010, 347) The CCP, like its Soviet ‘older brother29’, intended to recast its 
citizenry and create a new, ideal citizen. For the CCP to be able to establish the socialist 
hegemony needed to dismantle the existing hegemonic Confucian doctrines that was so 
influential in China. As elements and interpretations have been added to the original writings 
of Confucius himself, Redding’s reservation regarding Confucianism as a coherent term is 
useful to consider: “the prevailing ideology for most of its [China’s] recorded history has been 
a set of ideas which go under the convenient label Confucianism.” (Redding 1993, 43). Hsü 
Dau-lin for instance attributes the very central five relations doctrine to the Confucian disciple 
Mencius rather than Confucius himself (Hsü 1970, 28). Confucianism should therefore be 
treated as a historically aggregated and historically negotiated body of orthodoxies and 
orthopraxis rather than as the pure and original teachings of the sage, just as all attempts of 
implementing Marxism has added to and interpreted the original works of Karl Marx. Perhaps 
not stemming from Confucius himself, the five relations of Confucianism is quintessential 
doctrine in the historically applied Chinese Confucianism saying that there will be harmony 
throughout the realm if there is harmony in the following five relations: elder brother to 
younger brother, father to son, husband to wife, friend to friend and ruler to subject. It is 
noteworthy that of these five vital relations, four was strictly hierarchical, herein the three 
familial relations
30
. Stockman comments that “Confucian social theory placed special 
emphasis on family relationships as the core of a stable and harmonious society” (Stockman 
2000, 94). Since three of five Confucian relations regarded the family the inner workings of a 
family was a highly political matter in imperial China, to which an extraordinary rigour was 
                                                 
29
 The PRC was initially very eager to ‘learn from the Soviet Union’ (and receive Soviet material aid as well as 
transfer of technical expertise). The Soviet Union was then frequently referred to as Soviet Older Brother (Su 
Lian Da Ge – 苏连大哥).  
30
 Friend to friend was the odd case, and was therefore “friendship was more celebrated in Chinese literature than 
any other social relationship” (Schoppa 2010, 9)  
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applied. The responsibility for maintaining the family collective was primarily performed 
through the duties of marriage and childbirth. For women, this resulted in the doctrine of “the 
three obediences”, namely obedience to her father before marriage, her husband after 
marriage and her son as leader of the family if her husband died (Stockman 2000, 96). For 
men, the duty towards the family was obedience towards family elders, including the 
deceased through ancestor worship, and the continuation of the family name. Romantic love 
was not given primacy in traditional Chinese marriages:  
“The primary purpose of the marriage was to continue the family patri-line. Marriage 
was considered to be a family rather than an individual matter and hence was arranged 
by parents, sometimes when the prospective spouses were in their infancy” (Stockman 
2000, 96).  
 
Not continuing the patri-line was a serious social transgression. Due to the ideal of exogamic, 
patrilocal (or virilocal) marriage, girls had been “socialised from early age to accept that their 
fate was to leave home and marry into a family of strangers” (Stockman 2000, 97). Upon 
entering the new household the bride held “a very low status, which improved only when she 
had fulfilled her primary function of producing a male successor” (Stockman 2000, 97). For 
men, the status of court eunuchs indicates that no worldly success could compensate for not 
being able to continue the patri-line; none of the splendours a eunuch could achieve at court 
could counterweight his inability to reproduce. The biological function of castrating the 
eunuchs that were essential servants at court was that castrated men posed no threat of 
sullying the patri-line of the emperor and therefore could be allowed in vicinity to the 
emperor’s harem. Jennifer Jay shows that castration held a more social function too:  
 “[…] their castration was supposed to cut of family ties and thereby ensure both 
chastity in the harem and loyalty to the ruler. […] The very existence of eunuchs 
contradicted the basis of Confucian society, where the family and male descendants 
were of the utmost importance. The eunuchs were social outcasts due to the fact that 
their castration violated filial piety, which held that the greatest crimes were to leave 
no heir and to harm the body that was given by parents. The harshest curse a Chinese 
could make even today would be to wish the adversary to have no descendants (Jay 
1993, 466) 
 
If high rank at court and access to the Son of Heaven himself was rewarded with nothing but 
scorn and contempt, the logic should extend to (non-castrated) childless men of great worldly 
success, such as great artists, revered scholars or successful generals; all their achievements 
lingering in the shadow of their failure to produce a son. The point to be made is that the 
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primary duty that the collective required from the individual was a duty the individual could 
not deliver alone; it takes two lips to kiss.  
Aiming the socialist social reorganisation project at the family 
Marxist dogma argues that the holders of power will attempt to naturalize the obfuscating 
effects that the superstructure holds on the material base, and the traditional Chinese family 
system had been actively interwoven with Chinese feudalism, as the patrilineal, patriarchal 
and patrilocal features can be viewed as: 
“[…] the core features of an ideological discourse of the family sustained by and for 
the powerful elements of imperial Chinese society, sustained by and for the powerful 
elements of imperial Chinese society, comprising in particular the central imperial 
state, powerful and wealthy families in given localities and men in general.” 
(Stockman 2000, 98) 
 
Since peace and economic growth was the highest priority of the Party following the 
devastating wars, the Party started out with an ambivalent stance towards reforming the 
family. Ideologically the traditional family was central in Confucianism, which was central in 
the Chinese feudalism which the CCP was determined to eradicate, making the traditional 
family a symptom to a greater disease, feudalism:   
“The Communist approach to the family was in many ways radical, but it was always 
a part of a wider programme of social change, the underlying philosophy of which did 
not accord very much significance to the institution of the family as such; Marxist 
theory allocated it to the superstructure, dependent on changes in the material base 
“ (Stockman 2000, 102). 
 
On the other hand, hierarchical families with a strictly enforced inner discipline were a 
suitable governmental tool as patriarchs could assist in keeping the young and restless in place. 
Zhang and Schwartz comments that the CCP initially played on Confucian family centrality to 
smoothen what they term the first wave of land reform, from 1949 to 1952 (Zhang and 
Schwartz 1997, 194). This can be seen as a strain of the CCP ideological pragmatism that 
eventually would produce “socialism with a market economy”. Stockman comments on the 
same phenomenon: since “the government was primarily concerned to develop the economy, 
and to this end the hierarchically structured family could at times be a useful means” 
(Stockman 2000, 102). The pragmatist practical approaches did not alter the fact that the CCP 
aimed to reform the Chinese family in the name of socialism.  This reform was not to wait for 
the new socialist material base to create a new, socialist superstructure; the reform was to 
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come by law. Somewhat in contradiction to Marxist dogma, the political reform of the 
superstructure was seen as a step on the way to a new material base:   
“Apart from a desire to reduce the power of patriarchs, the aim of the Communist 
leadership was to lay the foundation for a stable and happy family life which would 
enable family members to devote their efforts to the construction of a new socialist 
society” (Stockman 2000, 103) 
 
As the CCP set out to reform the family, there were numerous practises that the Party decided 
had to be addressed. Under the headline Revolution in the family, Keith Schoppa writes: 
“the [1950 Marriage] law allowed single women, divorcees and widows to own land 
in their own names; land reform thus benefited one group in Chinese society that had 
never been able to hold land. But the law went well beyond economic rights; it struck 
at the very heart of the traditional family system […] The Marriage Law abolished the 
traditional family system “based on arbitrary and compulsory arrangements and the 
superiority of man over woman.” The new system was based “on equal rights for both 
sexes and on the protection of the lawful interests of women and children”. Arranged 
marriages, child betrothals, polygamy, and the selling of women into marriage were 
forbidden. Women, as well as men, could initiate divorce proceedings. Infanticide was 
forbidden.”  (Schoppa 2010, 313).  
 
This part of socialist doctrine received, not surprisingly, less approval from the Chinese 
peasantry than land reform. In fact, it was met with fervent resistance, often causing the local 
representatives of the state to budge on the implementation of the law as there was greater 
local autonomy, hence greater room for resistance, in Mao’s China compared to Stalin’s 
Soviet Union. The author Xinran noted that when travelling in the Chinese periphery, she 
encountered policies under implementation that Beijing ordered implemented twenty years 
earlier (Xinran 2010). In hindsight, the CCP during radical Maoism were less authoritarian 
than their Soviet counterparts. The implementation of socialist state atheism may serve as an 
example: Weller and Sun notes that “temple religion suffered in China throughout the 
twentieth century”, included the Guomindang period, but total repression was only attempted 
under the Cultural Revolution, which Weller and Sun calls “a relatively short compared to 
what happened in the Soviet Union, for example. It was not enough to break social memory” 
(Weller and Sun 2010, 33). Concerning the resistance against the marriage law’s attempt to 
“abolish the traditional family system”, Schoppa writes:  
“[…] the law was on the books but was not always put into practice. The right to 
divorce created considerable confusion and disorder when hundreds of thousands of 
women in unhappy marriages tried to divorce. Husbands and their mothers, who stood 
to lose wives and daughters-in-law, were angry. The local party cadre whose job it 
was to execute the law was caught in the middle. […]  In most cases, cadres became 
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the major problem that undercut the Marriage Law; it was not strictly enforced in the 
countryside” (Schoppa 2010, 313-314).  
 
The ownership that husbands and their mothers claimed over wives and daughters-in-law, not 
forgetting the obedience demanded from unmarried daughters, ideologically coincided with 
the well-being of the nation as a whole since the superiority of husbands over wives and 
fathers over children represent two of the five Confucian relations upon whose harmony the 
harmony of the realm depended. It seems safe to conclude that traditional Chinese family life 
was a form of social organisation that the communist party could not accept politically. 
Following Marxism, the feudalist family structure, being feudalist superstructure, should 
wither away as the feudalist material base was replaced with a socialist material base, but this 
clearly survived radical Maoism.  
Moderate Deng and the second revolution of social life in China  
The Cultural Revolution is counted as the most Maoist period of radical Maoism. It was also 
arguably the most authoritarian period of radical Maoism, with its purges, condemnations, 
self-criticisms and struggle-meetings:  
“Authoritarianism was the Maoist way […] Revolutionary violence was the means to 
pursue that way, and anybody considered likely to step out of line was automatically a 
counter-revolutionary” (Fenby 2009, 527) 
 
After Mao’s death, Deng Xiaoping started the process known as kaifang gaige, ‘open-up 
reform’. Weary of the excesses of the Cultural Revolution, Deng Xiaoping advocated 
carefulness in the reform process captured in the quote “crossing the river by feeling the 
stones”. The reforms therefore started to carefully dismantle those features of political 
Maoism whose results were deemed unsatisfactory, such as the ‘iron rice bowl’ danwei 
institution and the rural People’s Communes. Amid the opening up-reform measures 
dismantling the class warfare authoritarianism of Mao, Deng introduced the probably most 
authoritarian feature of authoritarian socialism in China, the introduction of fertility control, 
the one child policy. As Fenby writes,  
“But, in one area of life, state interventionism was stepped up as the regime tried to 
impose a one-child policy. China already had a high legal minimum age for marriage – 
twenty for women and twenty-two for men. Permits were required to give birth. There 
had been sterilization drives. But the population still rose. In 1979, a one-child limit 
was implemented in cities – a second child was allowed in the countryside after a gap 
of five years” (Fenby 2009, 556)  
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Mao had initially fervently resisted all ideas about regulating population growth, claiming 
instead that there was strength in numbers that China’s enemies feared (cf. Kissinger 2011, 
155-156). The Deng reform era therefore brought change along two lines. One was the 
economic liberalisation; the other was the strengthening of state intervention in fertility 
control. The introduction of the one-child policy is an important context for understanding the 
life situation of my informants, as they were all, as far as I know, only children. This is 
important due to the 4-2-1 effect, where four grandparents and two parents all look to one 
child, putting an immense pressure on this child. The 4-2-1 effect is doubled if two one child 
policy children marry: there might be eight grandparents and four parents all depending on the 
income of the married couple, and if they have their own “little emperor”, there are potentially 
fifteen people living on two salaries and whatever meagre pensions the twelve retirees/seniors 
have, if they have any. The quick-fix, easier said than done, would be simply to get 
sufficiently rich, which was becoming available through the market reforms. Economic 
liberalisation in the 1980’s meant the reintroduction of private enterprise, both rural and urban, 
and frequently this followed pre-revolutionary patterns; Bruun found that for private 
businesses, people often returned to the pre-revolution household occupation, since 
knowledge, tools and equipment was often still available (Bruun 1993). Further, the family 
business re-emerged as the preferred mode of corporate organisation, but soon to lose the kin 
group as a recruitment base as the effect of the one-child policy set its mark on the coming 
generations. As family businesses re-emerged, other changes happened to the organisation of 
the Chinese economy, allowing new ways of attempting to solve all problems by getting rich. 
At a juncture between state ownership and new, private enterprise are the Township and 
Village Enterprises (TVE), which was neither state-owned nor a privately owned firm but a 
“communal organisation very far removed from having well-defined property rights”, 
according to Weitzman and Lu (1994).As the TVEs were exclusively a rural phenomenon, 
they will not be discussed here even though their remarkable growth was fundamental to the 
Chinese economy in the 1980’s; an interesting point about the TVEs are that they seemed to 
be based on the (non-farming) experiences of the People’s Commune collectives, being run 
by local governments and being responsible for many social programmes (Chang and Wang 
1994). For the state owned industrial enterprises, increasingly realising that productivity had 
to be raised there was no pre-revolutionary experience to draw upon as China’s pre-revolution 
economy was in a very low degree industrialised, as discussed in chapter 1. Lisa Rofel 
suspects that she was allowed to work a regular shift during the latter half of her two-year 
field work in a Hangzhou partly because factory management hoped she would “impart more 
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knowledge of Western management techniques” (Rofel 1989, 8). The fate of the state owned 
enterprises in the emerging free-market capitalism in China is central to the scope of this 
thesis which brings us back to examining that which makes young urban professionals into 
professionals; their role and place in Chinese capitalism.     
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CHAPTER 3: Listening to informants – making a career in the new China 
 
- «I used to work in a State Owned Enterprise, you know”, Francis Wang tells me as we chip 
away at a delicious Sichuan hotpot; a whole flatfish in a fiery soup. We’re in a fairly new, 
nicely decorated restaurant close to Francis’ workplace. It’s a dreadful November chill 
outside, and we agree that a spicy hotpot is just right on a day like this.  
- “I didn’t know that”, I say. Francis does accounting for a European NGO, and that’s about 
all I know about his professional life.  
- “After I graduated from a university back home in Fujian, I did field accounting for a 
Beijing based road construction company that was state owned. It was a lot of travelling and 
long stays in temporary lodgings in the middle of nowhere. The physical and mental work 
environment was not good… but of course, white collar workers like me weren’t the worst 
off”, he says. “Besides, there was a lot of office politics. Giving face and those kinds of things, 
you know.” I nod understandingly; several other Chinese young urban professionals that I 
have talked to have mentioned this.  
- “It was a strong social pressure to gamble and do bad things like that”, Francis says and 
takes a sip of the hot soy milk we’ve ordered. “I got a Beijing hukou from it, but I never got to 
enjoy Beijing while working there. We travelled all the time”.  
- “A Beijing hukou31, that’s not bad” I say. “Why did you quit?” I wonder.  
- “Many reasons. Apart from what I’ve already mentioned, it was boring. The tasks and 
assignments I got were simple. So I decided to quit, without having a new job ready for me. 
My parents were very worried, but I managed to calm them. I’m good at persuading” he says 
with a smile. “It was a hard time for me until I found a new job. That was really bad. You 
know, the job in the construction company was as safe as it gets. You can’t get fired in a state 
owned enterprise, that’s nearly impossible, even if you do a bad job. The internal control and 
supervision was very lax”.  
- “Was this the job you had before the one you have now?” I ask.  
- “No”, he says, “I got a job in an American company. I was head of accounting for their 
Beijing office. The China HQ was in Shanghai. I found that I really liked to work for a foreign 
company. Everything is standard”. I’m not quite following what “standard” is supposed to 
mean, until I translate it back to Chinese:  
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 Hukou is still a very important: individuals are no longer bound to their geographical place of hukou 
assignment as during radical Maoism, but hold their welfare rights towards that place – a Beijing hukou gives 
you near-free treatment at public hospitals in Beijing.  
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- ”Standard… do you mean like… biaozhun32?”  
-“Yeah, biaozhun. Foreign companies are biaozhun, I really like that. No office politics, no 
face games. I realized I wanted to stay with foreign companies, but I needed to improve my 
English. So I attended an American ESL school near Nanjing. The school was connected with 
an orphanage and a company. I got hired as a tour guide, driver and fixer. The boss asked me 
after a while what I wanted to do with my life. When I said that I wanted to get back into 
accounting, he put me in touch with the NGO that I’m working for now. There you’ve got my 
story”, he smiles. The fish is nearly gone now; we are both trawling with our chopsticks in the 
soup, hoping to find another piece, agreeing that it was indeed delicious.  
- “So what’s next on your list? You’ve got a university degree, a Beijing hukou, a good job 
and English training?”  
-“Eeh... Find a girlfriend, I guess”, he says in a slightly lowered voice before quickly 
changing the topic. “I want to move back to Fujian at some point. Beijing is too polluted and 
too expensive. You know, back where I’m from, normal people can afford to buy a house”.  
This vignette is a condensed excerpt of a conversation I had with a young, urban professional 
in Beijing in November 2012. Within this short vignette, many of the most pressing concerns 
for young urban professionals are being touched upon. Through Francis’s story, we encounter 
what I will term different cultural spheres of business. Beijing is an economical melting pot 
comprised of State Owned Enterprises, joint ventures, privately owned Chinese enterprises 
and international companies. Solinger refers to danwei reform as a stage in a transition when 
she discusses the “transitional hybridization of the firm” (Solinger 1997) Solinger coined this 
term when predicting the future to come for the danweis, therefore one should assume that 
this hybridization will firstly be for the SOE’s who must adjust from their “traditional” way of 
doing business to a more internationalised business approach: from being economically 
inefficient cradle-to-grave welfare providers to becoming “national champions” as  
“Traditional” here would be referring to earlier times in general; a mix of corporate culture 
features of the pre-liberation
33
 era, features attained during radical Maoism, features from the 
reform era and external contemporary influence, as China’s economic reforms have been very 
focused on transfer of knowledge from Western investors to their Chinese partners. 
(cf.Leblanc 2008). The making of the danwei institution itself was not without traces pre-
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 Biaozhun as a noun means ‘standard, norm, criterion’ according to the Hanping Dictionary. Used in context 
here I suggest it could be translated as “according to protocol”.  
33
 ‘The liberation of China’ is CCP parole for winning the civil war and establishing the People’s Republic. 
Reunification with Taiwan is sometimes jokingly referred to as ‘liberating Taiwan’(Leblanc 2008)  
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liberation era economic features that seeped in to the workings of Maoist economy, as Yeh 
(1997) has shown when discussing the influence of experiences from Shanghai finance on the 
danwei system.
34
. This is an important reminder as it shows a turn-over in legacy from widely 
different political eras; elements stemming from eras very unlike in policy, e.g. radical 
Maoism and the Deng reform era, may therefore play a part in understanding Chinese 
corporate culture.  
 “Transitional hybridization of the firm” is a difficult term to grapple with, as there are 
no way of telling whether a form is a temporary, transitional hybrid between two more 
permanent forms or the appearance of a brand new permanent form– and the notion of 
permanent form is problematic in its own right. Applying the term with this reservation, it 
seems that the present-day Beijing business scene is an opposition in corporate culture mainly 
between the SOEs and the international firms, with the private Chinese firms mostly taking 
the middle ground. SOE’s here are not uniform, as some have ventured more towards 
international corporate culture than others. The need to transform in a new business 
environment that Solinger prescribes to the SOE’s will extend to privately owned Chinese 
firms who take inspiration from the SOE’s or subscribes in some degree to the danwei 
business legacy. Interestingly, Corinne-Barbara Francis has shown that the hybridisation of 
the firm should not be reduced to just shedding the danwei legacy. In a study tellingly titled 
Reproduction of Danwei Institutional Features in the Context of China’s Market Economy 
(1996) Francis studies whether private high-tech firms would reproduce danwei welfare 
mechanisms. Francis choose Chinese high-tech companies in Haidian district in Beijing for a 
case study as she assumes these companies would not have any corporate legacy from the 
seventies: 
“Being newly emerged industrial sector with extensive international contacts high-tech 
firms may be expected to have a greater capacity for change and to be more likely to 
introduce managerial, institutional and cultural innovations […] Evidence of 
institutional continuities in this sector could thus support an argument for the 
likelihood of continuity in other sectors” (Francis 1996, 845)” 
 
Corinne Francis indeed finds that high-tech companies proactively chose to or was unable to 
avoid implementing danwei-like welfare schemes. Francis identifies four factors explaining 
this tendency, which there is no room to elaborate on here. What should be mentioned is a 
highly interesting observation:  
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 Three authors spend a chapter each in Lu and Perry (eds) (1997)discussing different pre-liberation legacies 
that influenced the establishment of the danwei institution. Unfortunately, there is no room for elaborating on 
these legacies here.  
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“In the large and more profitable firms, the level of provision [of various welfare] was 
often on par with, and even surpassed, that of state-owned enterprises (Francis 1996, 
845).” 
 
One of most central of the danwei institutional features that Francis found that the IT 
companies had to reproduce was free lodgings (Francis 1996, 845-847). In an interview I did 
with Emily Wang, an operational manager at a four-star hotel owned by Korean joint venture 
this same tendency was revealed.  “Of our 300 staff, we have dormitories for 150. The rest 
rents private apartments together. Interns have free lodgings in their contracts, but that can’t 
be in dorms, so we have to rent private apartments for them”, Emily told me. Interns have 
relevant high school training and therefore rank above ordinary staff members, which gets 
hired on the basis of “basic English and acceptable appearance”. The private apartment that 
the interns share is with bunk beds, twelve interns sharing a two bedroom apartment. Because 
of the considerable social distance between young urban professionals and staffers and interns 
the hotel industry I did not pursue the topic of worker welfare with Emily. Instead I focused 
on her experiences from hotel management and gendered labour relations; this I will return to 
below. The point to be made here is merely that the extensive danwei housing tradition
35
 has 
left a corporate legacy that I as a field worker could still discern in 2012, more than 30 years 
after the reintroduction of private enterprise in China.  
Beijing business according to my informants  
When discussing Beijing business with my informants I found that the differences between 
SOE’s, private Chinese companies and international companies were a common point of 
reference. The young urban professionals I talked to generally focused more on differences in 
corporate culture rather than ownership. My informants would frequently use “Chinese” as an 
adjective when describing companies, and would also ascribe certain traits of corporate 
culture to being “Chinese culture” at large. Consider for instance what Wayne Gibson, an US 
national, told me when I asked about his experience of working with Chinese co-workers in a 
phone producer: “I don’t work that much with Chinese, actually. We are six in my sale’s team, 
there’s only one Chinese plus one from Hong Kong. My boss is Chinese. He prefers to hire 
foreigners to deal with foreigners. This is his mentality, and it is very Chinese”. When asked 
if this could be generalised outside his own company, Wayne responded “yes, I do think so. I 
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 Francis (1996, 850)quotes Chinese sources for figures showing that in 1983, 57, 5% of all housing was owned 
by enterprises and other work units.  
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think that Chinese companies that can hire foreigners to deal with foreigners will do so
36
. I’m 
talking about higher levels of business here, not in the factories. Language plays a part here, 
but it’s not only about speaking English, because they [Chinese managers] are pretty clueless 
on how to go about things abroad. If they cannot hire a foreigner to deal with foreigners, they 
will try the Chinese way of handling things, like guanxi”. The art of guanxi is about building a 
network of interpersonal trust and reciprocity. Guanxi is frequently held out as a key to 
understanding China in readers on China, especially readers aimed at a western corporate 
audience who want a slice of the Chinese market pie; see for instance China Uncovered 
(Story 2009). Reading the chapter about guanxi in a “how to do business in China”-book in-
flight going to China to do business negotiations ought not to suffice: Mayfair Yang 
demonstrates aptly the complexity of guanxi when writing: “In the art of guanxi three 
elements - ethics, tactics, and etiquette - intertwine with and merge into one another in the 
course of practice” (Yang 1994, 109). As Kleinman noted above, the ethics in guanxi may be 
in decline as the instrumental tie of guanxi gains prominence over the expressive tie of guanxi. 
Jack Leblanc has shared his experiences on how building interpersonal trust as a base to 
establish a business relationship upon can manifest itself in Chinese business: excessive baijiu 
drinking, lavish banquets, exclusive karaoke clubs and occasionally, prostitutes (Leblanc 
2008). A Canadian expat working in a big Beijing design firm told me that the hard partying 
in business negotiations was as much about “having dirt on each other” as having fun together, 
which in a strange way seemingly builds trust. One can only speculate in what Francis Wang 
in the vignette meant when he talked about “social pressure to gamble and bad things like that” 
as reason for quitting the road construction company. Francis’s example shows that not all 
young Chinese yields to conformity and join the party like Jack Leblanc did; Francis left a 
safe job in favour of unemployment to get away from “gambling and bad things”. Other 
informants were more explicit than Francis. Hannah Liu gave the following career advice: 
“smart juniors will kiss ass and drink with the boss. My former boss really loved this. We’d be 
chugging down good red wine in a western restaurant being very loud and noisy. This is a 
face thing. You should know how to do this, or you’ll make yourself unimportant”. If this is 
extended to Francis Wang’s experience, it seems clear that just refraining to gamble and “do 
bad things” is not really an option. One could say about gambling with colleagues what is said 
in gambling; you are either in, or out. Francis Wang threw his hand and left the SOE. Hannah 
Liu further commented that people work with colleagues and play with colleagues, with no 
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 Kissinger (2011) has made similar observations about Chinese diplomacy, arguing that letting foreigners deal 
with foreigners is a long-standing tradition.  
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separation between the people you work with and those one enjoy leisure with. Hannah 
summed it up like this: “If you want a promotion, you better put in some extra effort socially. 
You don’t have to be very good at what you do professionally, though…” Wayne Gibson 
touched upon the same phenomenon: “A Chinese workplace stereotype is to aim to approach 
level of mediocrity, then slip through the cracks and get away with it. You’ll find this 
everywhere, but the Chinese do it to a shocking extent. The point is to be promoted to level of 
incompetence. Do well over time, and you will be promoted. When you get promoted, you get 
more complex responsibilities and at some point you can’t do good anymore. Then you should 
settle for mediocrity and try to get away with it.” Did Chinese nationals share the same 
experience from Beijing business? Annie Huang told me that “distrust of strangers is Chinese 
culture”, a claim supported in literature by Redding (Redding 1993). Annie continued: “most 
people adhere to zhongjian. They don’t want to stand out with their opinions. Do you know 
zhongjian?” I did not, so I hastily looked it up: my Hanping dictionary app translated 
zhongjian as “doctrine of the mean37” without any further explanation. Annie explained 
zhongjian with a proverb saying “the tallest tree will be chopped down first”, and continued to 
elaborate: “Ancient culture still affects modern Chinese. No one wants to be seen as an 
individual in the work place, they want to hide in the herd. I’m like that at my work place too 
towards my Chinese colleagues, but not towards my western colleagues”. Hiding in the herd 
should not be read as saying that ambitions and promotions are not desired. It instead 
promotes an idea, or ideal, of carefulness that Annie explains as a Chinese cultural trait. The 
conventional wisdom of keeping one’s head down seems to be extended beyond the 
individual: Wayne Gibson commented on the market share of his employer that “my company 
want to be an inventive and creative company, but the Chinese mentality of risk-aversion 
stops them”.  This “better safe than sorry”-attitude can probably be extended to state policy 
level, as demonstrated by Deng Xiaoping’s maxims about avoiding global leadership and 
“crossing the river by feeling the stones”, meaning very slowly and carefully. Even if there is 
a cultural legacy for this carefulness, it can also be seen as a response to individualisation, 
where the increasingly highlighted individual seeks the safety of unity. As internal 
competition is harsh, whether the crowd is as safe place to hide should be scrutinized further.  
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 Zhang and Schwartz (1997, 195) also translates it as “doctrine of the mean”, presenting it as “Confucius’ 
philosophy of moderation”  
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Sharp elbows, sweet tongues: backstabbing and alliance-making in the workplace 
When networking is more important for promotions than skills and standing out 
simultaneously is considered a risk, the combination of skills and ambitions become 
potentially dangerous. This makes guanxi, the art of alliance-making, in the workplace 
important knowledge, with the Chinese measure of prestige and honour (“face”), forming the 
backdrop here; chugging red wine with your boss is a face thing. The importance of face, 
herein proper acknowledgement of rank, should not be underestimated: Hannah told me of 
two bosses she has known that only talked to people of the same rank, unless you were of use 
to them. This meant that they would not extend the most basic courtesies to subordinates. 
“They don’t send emails; they only do phone calls because these can’t be forwarded, so 
there’s no proof. Obviously, this kind of bosses is hated by their employees, but they don’t 
care”.  
 Wayne Gibson told me he had experienced the workings of alliance-making first-hand. 
“I saw this in my company. A boss from Product Operations yelled at an employee from 
Schedule department, who was clearly in the wrong. They were both Chinese. The Schedule 
department guy fumed at being yelled at in public, but he was not in Prod-Op’s chain of 
command and was buddy with the head of the business unit, so he was protected.” Hannah 
Liu had also witnessed network-building and alliance-making in the workplace, she told me. 
In Hannah’s own, apt words: “There are always women in a company willing to sleep with the 
bosses, Chinese and foreign bosses alike. The training manager in a BIG foreign real estate 
company got promoted to HR director after dating the Chief Financial Officer. She then 
headhunted in her former colleagues from her former company, who was a competitor. This is 
very Chinese”. When I asked Hannah about personal experience of alliance-making and face 
games, she replied: “Sure. My previous boss is a narcissist. His entire world revolves around 
HIM. Scratch his back, he might scratch yours”. To have one’s back scratched sometimes 
outranks the concern for the well-being of the company, being subordinated to personal aims. 
Wayne thinks his employer suffers from this: “[company38] wants to internationalise and 
become a top-notch global company, but you see Chinese stereotypes. No company mentality, 
no team spirits. People are very concerned with their KPI’s [key production indicators]. A lot 
of conflicts stem from conflicting KPI’s, and unless two person’s KPI’s coincide, cooperation 
will be very hard”. When asked about meritocracy versus alliance-making, Wayne responded: 
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“meritocracy is present, but not very strong. One need more than fulfilling one’s KPI’s. 
Everyone has an agenda. It was rumoured that a company boss wanted an employee out so 
badly that he was willing to let good deals fail to shame the employee he wanted out of the 
company”.  
 It would be misleading to believe that alliance-making, conspiring co-workers and 
narcissist bosses are phenomenon exclusive to business in China or Beijing. Silicon Valley, 
Wall Street and the City of London are most certainly no kindergartens either, but it remains 
interesting that several informants ascribe either these phenomena themselves or the degree 
they appear with as something Chinese, in adjective form. I encountered an empirical case 
that expands the perspective on social life in Chinese business by having the phenomena 
reversed. I interviewed Ye Wen, a Chinese national who returned from studying in Germany 
to work for a German industrial design company in Beijing. She shared her frustrations about 
her boss, a German national “who doesn’t understand China. He once called in an employee 
to work overtime on his day off after working loads of overtime already. In our company, you 
need to work two days overtime to get a full day off, so this was a big deal. The boss called 
him in because he could not take a taxi alone in Beijing after living in Beijing for three years! 
He speaks some Chinese but he just wants someone to fetch him because he’s the boss. 
Chinese who are not used to foreigners will just listen to the boss and do as they are told. My 
boss probably knows he’s not well-liked”. When hearing this, a general reflection that Hannah 
Liu offered came to mind. Hannah told me that “foreign companies sometimes has very 
strange office environments; the Chinese bosses in foreign companies are there because they  
really want to work for foreign companies and therefore relentlessly wants to do good, in a 
dog-eat-dog way, while the foreign company HQ might send their office idiot to China to get 
rid of him. The combination is not good!” Farquharson also reports having observed the 
strategy of sending the office idiot to China to get rid of him (Farquharson 2013). Office 
politics was something my informants, like Francis in the vignette, ascribed to a Chinese 
business culture, but Ye Wen told me that her German boss plays office politics towards the 
HQ in Germany by making his Chinese employees submit all kinds of reports to him, so he 
can forward them to Germany and thereby look productive. This paper mill hampers 
efficiency in the Beijing office, Ye Wen said. “We have to make excel presentations of 
everything!”  
 Ye Wen’s boss aside, it seemed generally agreed upon amongst my informants that 
Chinese corporate management was lagging compared to international companies. Susan 
Long told me she used to work for Wangkou, a very famous online company. “Wangkou has 
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grown too fast, the management is a mess”. Management and corporate culture was by my 
informants frequently related to ownership structure; SOE’s versus the private sector, and 
particularly the international companies. Susan said that “international companies are more 
structured, they have procedures for things. Chinese companies does not, they are still 
maturing”. This argument is very similar to Francis Huang’s remark in the vignette about 
Western companies being biaozhun, which, when used as an adjective, can be translated as 
standardized or according to protocol/regulation. It is also possible that some Chinese 
companies are considered not biaozhun because their extensive body of procedures are seen 
as random and hampering efficiency. Zhao Yumei told me of a friend who jumped ship from 
a well-paid job in the private sector to taking the public servants exam and moved on to 
working in the police, having her official salary move from 10 000 per month to 2000 per 
month. Tellingly, Zhao’s friend made this career move because her father held high rank in 
the police, making it a probably well-calculated strategic move. Zhao’s friend had worked 
with HR, so the police decided to make use of her in the database department. Microsoft 
Excel could have made her job very easy, hence efficient, but was for reasons unknown not 
allowed. Instead, things had to be done manually. Although this example is from state 
employment, it might be valid for some state owned enterprises too. Annie Huang said she 
could not stand working in an SOE because of the bureaucracy.  
 
The problems ascribed to Chinese companies were not just lack of procedures or inefficient 
bureaucracy. Zhao Yümei herself had studied abroad, and aimed for foreign companies when 
she returned to China. As she put it: “after living abroad you don’t fit into the local bullshit 
leadership culture.” Asking her to expand on this, Zhao told me about a friend of hers. “I 
have a friend who studied abroad, and got a job afterwards in a company connected to China 
Social Reform Institute. He hates it, because he studied abroad. I don’ want to end up like 
him”. I asked what he hates about his company, and why he should hate it more because he 
studied abroad. “He hates the office politics, face games and guanxi competitions”, Zhao 
replied. The phenomena described above concerning emphasis on alliance-making rather than 
skills are here clearly associated closer to Chinese companies where Chinese cultural traits 
such as face and guanxi are important. Drinking with your boss might be tactical anywhere, 
but the more important it was to acknowledge company hierarchy by giving face, the more 
one should drink when toasting with the boss. “You have to be good at drinking in SOEs. I 
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drank a lot there. One time, in Xinjiang, they made me do ganbei
39
 with baijiu
40
 in a milk 
glass”, Annie Huang remembered from her time in an SOE. Young urban professionals do not 
necessarily accept this lifestyle as a necessary extension of their professional life. As Francis 
Wang’s case from the vignette shows, it does not take foreign influence for young Chinese to 
disapprove of a more traditional Chinese business approach. Francis left the SOE not because 
he had studied abroad or been exposed to any international influence, but on moral grounds. It 
was after he left the SOE that Francis discovered that he could escape what he disapproved in 
the SOE corporate culture by going into international companies, and moved on to an 
American company and finally a European NGO. Not all Chinese employees in international 
companies work there because they dislike the way things are done in Chinese companies, but 
for those who do dislike the traditional Chinese management and business culture; seeking 
refuge in international companies seems to be a strategy. Zhao Yumei says this is a two-way 
street as foreign companies in China likes to hire Chinese who has studied or worked abroad, 
as she claims the companies find these employees more open-minded.  
 
A growing distaste for guanxi 
Through guanxi, making use of social connections becomes an important tool in achieving 
strategic life goals. Thomas Heberer found in a survey that “more than half of the surveyed 
Han and Nuoso entrepreneurs found social connections (Ch. Guanxi) to be an indispensable 
form of social capital” (Heberer 2007, 89). Indispensable is certainly a strong word, but as we 
will see, in China having guanxi can open doors while lacking guanxi can see doors closed. 
As a case of doors closed because of insufficient guanxi, Zhao Yümei told me that her father 
wanted her to apply for the public service entry exam, the gongwuyuan kaoshi. She declined 
for two reasons: one was that she did not want to become a public servant. The other was that 
she did not have sufficient guanxi anyway to pass the interview which is the second stage of 
the examination. Her father could understand the reasoning behind the latter reason, but 
wanted her to have a go anyway and hope for a lucky strike. Her father’s motivation in urging 
her to take the public service exam was, interestingly, that public service would be a good 
way of obtaining guanxi, especially since Zhao’s father wanted her to enrol for the Beijing 
public service exams. Since officials have the distribution of resources and permits for a 
living they are certain to be in a good position for making new, influential friends. 
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 Ganbei – 干杯 – literally ‘empty cup’, similar in usage to the English expression ‘bottoms up’.  
40
 Baijiu – 白酒 – literally ‘white alcohol’. Rice liqueur with an alcohol percentage normally from 40% to 60%.  
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Unfortunately for Zhao’s father his daughter considers building guanxi “a meaningless 
activity", as mentioned above, and claims she would not wanted to become a public servant 
even if their family had sufficient guanxi to get her past the interview.   
 Commenting on one’s lack of guanxi is uncontroversial, but bragging about one’s 
connections is a breach of guanxi etiquette. Hannah Liu told me with emphasis that “you do 
NOT talk about your guanxi. You don’t talk about bribes or grey money either, but you can 
show off your wealth, for instance if someone enters a restaurant and orders a casket of the 
most expensive red wine
41
 without asking the price.” Since none of my informants therefore 
talked about their own guanxi, presenting a case showing how connections had opened doors 
for my informants requires reading between the lines. Take for instance Annie Huang’s way 
from majoring in chemistry to financial analysis: Working as facilitator in an SOE, Annie was 
brought to Beijing as an assistant when her boss from the SOE relocated to Beijing to work 
with planning and logistics for the 2008 Olympics organising committee, a very attractive and 
prestigious position. Annie got the job with the Olympic committee through her boss. The 
friends and acquaintances made from the Olympic committee job made the base for her next 
job: after the Olympics Annie set up a language school teaching English to Chinese people. 
This was based on the experiences made and network gained from working with the 
preparation for the Olympics. Although Annie commented that the connections she made here 
was mostly good for getting government jobs that she did not want, I assume that for someone 
with a major in chemistry, the step from language tutorship to working in an investment fund 
was helped by knowing the right people, or knowing someone who did; guanxi. Whether 
Annie received the original SOE facilitator position in south China through own merits or 
family connections, she did not say, but she did say that both parents and three out of four 
grandparents had worked in the government. Like Zhao Yumei’s father, Annie’s parents 
wanted their daughter to work for the government too. Annie, who works in finance, told me 
that finance was tough to enter without financial education or an MBA, but having the right 
degree was no guarantee either: “they normally check personal background, education, family 
background”, Annie said. As family background checks is no longer checking your father’s 
class label to see if he is branded as counter-revolutionary, a family background check might 
very well be checking what kind of allies the company can make by hiring a candidate. With a 
major in chemistry, Annie had enrolled into a part-time MBA programme in addition to 
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 There is little tradition for red wine in China, so the conspicuous element of buying red wine would be that 
expensive red wine is imported. Hannah added with a grin that New Money in China buys expensive French 
wines to show off their wealth and then mixes with Sprite and ice cubes because they don’t really like the taste.  
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working full-time, but she got the job first and enrolled later. She claimed she enrolled to 
avoid boredom, and to network and meet new people. “An MBA can’t get you good jobs, 
guanxi and who your father is can get you good jobs”, she commented. This discrepancy 
between meritocracy and personal favouritism is said to be changing in China today, but is 
still an annoyance for those who lack guanxi. A preference of ability and personal attributes 
rather than connections was said to be an emerging trend in Chinese society. “Guanxi is 
becoming less important”, Susan Long commented. “People don’t care about who you are, 
but how you are as a person”, Susan said. Lisa Hoffmann encountered the same attitude:  
Reforms in the [work] assignment system, they [students] felt, allowed those with real 
talent and ability to have the opportunity to get ahead […] Social prestige, many 
claimed, had begun to align itself more naturally with merit and education-based 
criteria in recent years” (Hoffmann in China Urban XX:59, org. it).  
 
Having good education, the young urban professionals I met frequently complained, subtly or 
less subtly, about how the importance of guanxi was to their disadvantage. Often this was 
phrased as a critique of the role guanxi plays in China. While the importance of guanxi in 
China is well studied, the indications of a tendency towards the rejection of guanxi are 
interesting. Several young urban professionals left clear impressions that they would have 
preferred meritocracy to play a greater role in China, rather than having to know someone that 
knows someone. Linda Wei told me about a young woman she had befriended at a business 
banquet: her father is the chairman of [SOE
42
] and the daughter is a loan employee in the 
Ministry of [same sector]. The fortunate daughter has her career lined up for her by daddy, 
who arranged the loan deal to the Ministry so the daughter can get into Beijing high circles 
and build guanxi. “We call it kongjiang in Chinese when someone pops up from nowhere and 
goes straight into a good job. It implies being helped by someone.” Linda said dryly. 
Kongjiang
43
 means airborne; add -bing (soldier) as a suffix and get the Chinese word for 
paratroopers. The analogy between an airdrop, especially paratroopers, and the son or 
daughter of someone important appearing seemingly from nowhere is obvious. In this case it 
is obvious how guanxi can open doors; before being loaned out the ministry, the fortunate 
daughter Linda met made it to become assistant director in a SOE in only 1,5 years, Linda 
told me. The flip side of having such good connections is that it rules out meritocratic 
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achievement, as people with such good connections will always be under the suspicion of 
nepotism when they achieve something, Linda explained. This is similar to what Lisa 
Hoffmann was told by an unnamed woman at a job fair:  
“If a job is available in the talent market then you have a fair chance, but most of the 
best jobs are not in the market. My classmates find the better jobs through their 
parents or friends [which I won’t do] because then others will look down on me if I 
use guanxi and they will say I got the job because of my father. I think I can work hard 
and in the future I can be more successful than those others [who used connections].” 
(Hoffman 2001, 57, original brackets) 
 
The young urban professionals I knew had good educations, but had generally not equally 
good connections. This can partly be deducted from their jobs and life styles: those who are 
fortunate to be blessed with both ability and connections will skip the queue past more 
“ordinary” office jobs like those my informants generally held. This is seen in the case of the 
SOE chairman’s daughter who fell “airborne” out of the sky to become assistant director in 
another SOE in just one and a half years. It follows that I count high-level management as 
something else than ordinary professionals, something to be discussed further in chapter 5.  
 Although my informants would prefer ability to count more and connections less, 
ability and connections are not automatically in opposition. Guanxi and ability normally 
works in parallel, as it would take strong connections indeed to walk into a job one is 
completely unqualified for. If lacking ability one would need very good connections indeed to 
compensate. The interview stage Zhao Yumei did not have the needed guanxi to pass was 
after the public service exam. Failing the exam and still obtain a position as public servant in 
Beijing would require firm intervention from powerful friends indeed. For mere mortals 
without such supreme connections, guanxi is often that extra feather that shifts the scale in 
their favour, given that they have sufficient ability. If social capital is conceived as abstract 
social money, various ambitions would come with varying prices and one must assess if has 
sufficient social capital to afford a certain strategy. Zhao Yumei also told me about a friend of 
hers who worked in a partly state owned bank. Zhao’s friend had the guanxi to get the job 
interview that she was hired from, but not enough guanxi to get promoted. Further 
complicating, she would not only need to build in-house guanxi towards the bank 
management to get promoted, but also bring customers on board. Bringing customers on 
board could be achieved through good salesmanship, but could also be solved with guanxi 
outside the bank. If Zhao’s friend had rich parents, they could place their savings at her 
employer on the condition that the daughter was promoted. This could also be used to secure 
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being hired, if that was the case. If the parents are not rich enough themselves, they can assist 
their child in finding people whose savings can be placed in the bank to secure promotion. 
From this, Zhao concluded that meritocracy exists to a certain degree amongst those who 
made it to the inside, but making it to the inside takes guanxi. “We call it qiaomenzhuan44, 
which means door opener, a password. You need this”, Zhao told me. A case demonstrating 
the parallel workings of ability and guanxi was unveiled when I asked head hunter Susan 
Long about how guanxi favours affected her work life. Susan told me that she weren’t too into 
this after living in the US for over a decade, but once she was approached by family and asked 
to help a young man find a job. He could not speak English, so Susan could not help him, as 
she deals mostly with international firms. For this unfortunate young man, there was a 
potential interplay of ability and guanxi, but his abilities were insufficient. If his ability, here 
the command of English, had been sufficient he might just have had the right connections 
through Susan to land a good job. 
 
The unfairness of guanxi 
Guanxi is a long-standing Chinese social technique central to understanding China.  It is 
probably the nearest thing to a gate-keeping concept, following Appadurai (1986), for China. 
It should here be noted that Xiangqun Chan has argued that guanxi is being over-emphasised 
by western scholars on China and that her suggested model, lishang-wanglai
45
 is emically 
preferred over guanxi by Chinese. (Chang 2010) . The declining importance of guanxi is 
interesting as guanxi is per definition not individual. The two main facets of meaning to the 
word is “relation, network”. Guanxi-as-relation has at least two parties. Guanxi-as-network 
will have many. Hence, the individual cannot simply choose to obtain guanxi; like marriage, 
it takes two to tango. If the restaurant owner has no personal relation to the Health Inspector, 
he might have a relation to someone who does, who can ask for “a favour” on his behalf. If 
the Health Inspector agrees, the middle man owes him a favour and the restaurant owner owes 
a favour to the middle man. If these favours are money in an envelope it borders corruption. If 
it is delayed reciprocity between old friends, corruption charges are hard to prove, and it is not 
counted as true corruption. Recall here the young man who insisted his father was an 
incorrupt official as he took no bribes larger than 10 000 yuan, only “gift cards and things like 
that”. Although guanxi is too complex a phenomena to be reduced to simple instrumentality, 
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it is interesting that Stornes notes that her informants quickly made an impression of how 
useful knowing her would be; they concluded that she was “empty guanxi” because she did 
not want to start a business neither in China nor in Norway (Stornes 2012) This revelation did 
not mean terminating their relation, an indication that guanxi cannot reduce social relations to 
instrumental utility calculations.  
 Shmuel Eisenstadt (Eisenstadt 1973) has argued that patron-client relationships 
working within the modern bureaucratic state can be called neo-patrimonialism. The age-old 
guanxi technique within an industrial socialist bureaucracy would qualify as an example of 
Eisenstadt’s point. Where the bureaucrat, the supposedly faceless servant of the state is 
supposed to grant equal rights upon all the state’s subjects, a highly relevant problem with 
neo-patrimonialist guanxi-based manipulation of polical rights is the unfairness of it: the more 
one have to offer, the more one can obtain; as reciprocity is central in guanxi, guanxi have-
nots have little to offer. A rural migrant in Beijing, for instance a street vendor, would have to 
“pull”46 an incredible amount of guanxi to see a doctor when sick, assuming the vendor does 
not have a Beijing hukou, nor health insurance nor enough money to pay the going rate. The 
vendor’s remaining hope would be to know someone who knows someone who can help 
obtain the desired favour. Unfortunately, it would be exceptional if the vendor knows 
someone that can ask such a favour of a Beijing doctor, whereas it is nothing exceptional 
about the rich and powerful making some phone calls so they can skip the queue at the best 
hospitals. Adding to the unfairness, the doctor might even abstain from asking payment from 
the rich and powerful as a gesture of good-will, (giving face) and as a basis for establishing a 
relation of delayed reciprocity. Using this example as an entry point to relating guanxi to the 
question of welfare, capital here comes in three relevant forms: hukou is political capital, 
guanxi is social capital and money is financial capital. For instance hospital access can be 
granted by knowing someone, by having a Beijing hukou or by simply paying for urban 
hospital access. The marketization of Chinese welfare services has (re)introduced financial 
capital as a relevant capital form where the pre-reform welfare distribution would have no 
room for openly paying one’s way. As Nancy Chen observers, “it is increasingly possible for 
people from rural areas with money rather than connections to bypass the old referral system 
from county to province to city hospital” (Chen (ed) 2001, 178). The marketization of health 
in China constitutes a shift of importance from the political rights that the urban hukou 
individual held against the danwei during the Maoist era, towards an increased importance of 
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social or financial capital. In this respect urban citizens have moved from having collective 
welfare rights towards an atomization of their welfare rights, a shift that should be seen as a 
force of individualisation. Nancy Chen writes:  
“Shifts in state health care policies during the post-Mao period, from guaranteed 
medical care to more complex combinations of reimbursements and self-payment have 
meant that individuals are ever more responsible for health care cost. There is an 
increasing everyday sense that well-being and the pursuit of health require more 
personal wealth in an era of commodified medicine.” (Chen 2001, 166) 
 
The transition from medical care guaranteed by the state towards a complex entanglement of 
state commitments, market mechanisms and individual responsibilities is seen as a reduction 
of welfare commitment by the state. The benefits one can draw from the compulsory 
insurance schemes all legally hired workers must pay, the wu xian yi jin
47
 ( lit.“five 
insurances, one fund”) did not impress the young urban professionals. “The money people 
pays for the insurances is money they’ll never see again”, Hanna Liu commented. “The money 
goes to the government, but does not give any real benefits. The benefits one can draw are 
weak, for instance easy-to-cure diseases treated in lower tier hospitals by trainee doctors. In 
China, if you don’t pay extra for treatment they’ll let you die.” The wu xian yi jin is a 
compulsory insurance of minimum 7% of the monthly wage, and that money is then matched 
by the government, with the exception of the housing fund. Above a law-enforced minimum, 
the employer and the employee negotiate over how much of the insurance premium the 
employer will cover. Emily Guang, the hotel manager, told me that in addition to the 
compulsory insurance her hotel covered 45% of the premium for their employees in private 
insurance programme, but commented similar to Hannah Liu that the money paid in 
compulsory insurance “is basically lost, of course”. The difference between hotel staff and 
proper bailing young urban professionals can be seen here: Linda Wei had 90% coverage paid 
by her company, highly likely in a better and more expensive insurance programme  
What makes a good job: hukou, management, corporate welfare and job stability 
I asked Chen Xiaomei about the characteristics of an ideal job. Providing a rather 
uncontroversial answer, she told me that the ideal job was stable and financially high-yielding. 
What is of more interest is that there is a generational divide between young urban 
professionals and their parent’s generation in what to aim for when approaching the labour 
market. Chen Xiaomei told me job stability was of greater importance to the parent generation 
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of today’s young urban professionals, counting a good job as a job one could have for life, she 
said. The parent generation’s attitude can be seen as simultaneously stemming from either the 
“iron rice bowl”, the nickname for the absolute job stability provided by the danwei system 
before reform, or from the insecurity following the breaking of the unbreakable “iron rice 
bowl”, or both. When I asked what was on the minds of young urban professionals, Hannah 
Liu told me that young urban professionals worry about two things: job security and career. 
While there is a historical, political and cultural legacy for desiring job stability, there are 
little corresponding legacy for desiring career development in the context of an industrialised 
economy. As the corporate hierarchy of a danwei simultaneously was a part of the political 
hierarchy, the Party maintained stern political control of who was allowed to climb the career 
ladder and not. The opposing concerns between job stability and career progression are hence 
a product of the new economy, as the pre-reform economy guaranteed the one and largely 
excluded the other. SOE and government jobs are those with highest job stability, but may 
impede career development due to the lack of personal professional development – “four 
people doing half a person’s job”, as Zhao Yumei phrased it. With the heightened stability 
and lax internal work pressure, the SOEs are considered suitable workplaces for women, as it 
is a belief that the ideal woman’s job is stable and not too demanding. What was presented 
above as the ideal job is has then characteristic that is male-biased, as ‘financially high-
yielding’ is replaced with ‘not exhausting’ in the description of the female ideal job, fitting 
nicely with a strong cultural ideal of the male breadwinner that will be discussed further 
below.  Zhao Yumei told me about a friend who works in an SOE who “work very hard 
without getting any promotions and the system really changed her. She does not really like 
her job. Most of her colleagues are really rich; one woman she works with even had diamond 
headed joints in her tooth bracers…” As Zhao’s friend could not climb the SOE career ladder, 
the really rich female colleagues did not earn their wealth from working at a low rung 
together with Zhao’s friend. Rather, they work in the SOE because their husband is doing 
swell elsewhere and can afford to have the wife making less money in exchange for a less 
demanding job, since the ideal job for a woman is stable and undemanding. The peculiar fact 
that hard work could not earn Zhao’s friend a promotion even when surrounded with 
colleagues who needed few ambitions of their own as they were already “really rich” 
indicates that Zhao’s friend lacked sufficient guanxi, revisiting the fact that young urban 
professionals dislike prominence of guanxi over ability. In the vignette, Francis Wang 
connected this directly to corporate management with his observation that foreign companies 
are “standard” (biaozhun) with “no office politics, no face games” as opposed to the SOE he 
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left.  
 While the social milieu of zhongjian distrust, backstabbing and alliance-making in the 
workplace has been discussed above, there is another aspect of management that influence the 
opinions of young urban professionals. According to Zhao, foreign companies always follow 
Chinese laws, while private Chinese companies and SOEs don’t. The worst exploiters are 
private companies with political connections, she said. It is not unknown to happen that 
Chinese companies simply do not pay their dues to foreign creditors, because the Chinese 
companies know their foreign creditor cannot win in the local Chinese courtroom. When 
asked about this, Susan Long commented that “companies doing that will lose their 
reputation, so it is not very common”. She still confirmed the existence of the phenomenon: 
“there will always be people like that…” Susan admitted that she treated foreign and Chinese 
companies differently, by always demanding pay up front from Chinese companies, while 
accepting pay after providing a suitable candidate that was hired from the international 
companies. Insurance salesman Robert Brown, a US expat with 6 years of Beijing experience 
was less diplomatic about it: “I hate dealing with Chinese companies. They’re myopic. They 
don’t see customer service as an option. China doesn’t do customer service. They are only 
concerned with making money. I don’t mind dealing with individual Chinese as customers, 
but I don’ want to deal with smaller Chinese companies that aren’t used to working with 
foreigners. Chinese companies treat brokers like servants. Some local brokers have started 
giving their commission back to the customer as grey money just to get the contract”. Susan 
and Robert deals with Chinese companies as customers/clients, while it is more interesting to 
see how young urban professionals view them as potential employers, and Zhao Yumei did 
indeed rank companies as exploiters, with politically well-connected private Chinese 
companies as the least trustworthy.  When asked to provide an example, Zhao referred to a 
friend who was sent to a remote location by her company for three months, in disregard of the 
informal norm that married employees should not be sent away on business for long stretches. 
Zhao’s friend was promised a promotion to sweeten the pill, making her put in a substantial 
amount of extra hours. When the time came to collect the promise of promotion, it proved to 
be false. Whether the company sees itself above the law is a management aspect that naturally 
influences the young urban professionals, as the general lawfulness of the company influences 
their stand towards the formals rights of the employee.  
 
Fu Tianlong shared his reflections about Chinese corporate life with me in a highly interesting 
conversation, touching upon the subject of corporate management. Approaching forty and 
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well-placed in the HQ of one of the big state-owned banks, Fu himself is somewhat older than 
most of my informants and perhaps too settled in life to pass as a young urban professional. 
Fu offered interesting perspectives as he was in charge of organising traineeships to the 
bank’s overseas offices and thereby interacted continuously with ambitious young urban 
professionals eager to add international experience to their CV’s. Reflecting on corporate 
development, especially the development of Chinese corporate management, Fu told me that 
“fifteen to twenty years ago, international companies were the most attractive employers by 
far. They paid twice or three times as much, and the technology and management were better. 
This has gradually changed, and Chinese companies are now as attractive employers as 
international companies, if not even more attractive. The management is better, the gap in 
salary level is bridged, and Chinese companies offer a job stability aspect that western 
companies do not. Most people think foreign companies have too hard competition, and one 
may too easily lose one’s job. The companies are very profit-minded and will cut staff if they 
are losing money. The SOEs can’t do this.” The fact that SOEs cannot simply lay off workers 
if running a deficit suggests that the SOEs are still subject to political influences; the Party-
state would rather have their companies lose money than having scores of laid-off urbanites 
spending their days contemplating how the Party-state had abandoned them despite their 
loyalty towards the Party-state. The SOEs holds another political function that companies 
without political constraints would not accept: the SOEs serve as educational institutions for 
Chinese business at large through the extensive SOE peiyang programmes. “Many graduates 
begin in SOEs to get peiyang to enhance their skills, and then they jump ship after three to 
five years to walk straight into a top job in a smaller company. Through this, SOEs have a 
great influence on society. Those guys over at ICBC
48
 are called the Huangpu
49
 of finance 
because they give so much peiyang”, Fu commented. The SOEs could have curbed this by 
placing no-compete clauses on peiyang, but only do this for the most expensive peiyang 
programmes, like getting peiyang abroad. Such no-compete clauses can only be cancelled for 
hefty compensations; the SOEs might accept losing many small fishes from the tank, but not 
the big ones.  
Since many of my Chinese informants from the private sector had been rather negative 
towards the SOE’s, I asked Fu to expand on the attractiveness of SOE’s. Fu cited a recent 
survey he had seen, where the most popular jobs were ranked. Public servant held first place; 
Fu attributed this to their stability. Second came SOE’s, with the private sector ranking third. 
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Hannah Liu had also emailed me statistics showing a part of the same tendency through an 
upsurge in popularity for the public service entry exam, the gongwuyuan kaoshi. Fu Tianlong 
was confident that “The SOEs will pass public service and become the most popular. As of 
now, public servants can currently combine job stability with access to resources, and access 
to resources means a source of grey money. When corruption is staggered through reform, 
grey income will be reduced and being a public servant will lose some popularity. The reform 
process is already initiated”.  
 If the survey Fu Tianlong recited from memory should be trusted, it provides us with 
an insight into which paths that young, educated Chinese choose when deciding how to apply 
themselves professionally. One may safely assume that these choices are made on the basis of 
careful considerations, vying to maximise some desired output. This desired output should not 
be reduced to the highest possible monetary reward; the decision of what, how and where to 
earn one’s daily bread is much more complex than comparing salary offers. The process of 
choosing jobs would only be a robotic mathematical comparison of salary if two different job 
offers were practically identical; if two jobs had identical tasks and responsibilities, travel 
distance, office size, office view, canteen lunch menu, equally nice colleagues and granted 
equal prestige through e.g. title given, one would expect that the one who paid a dollar more 
per day would be chosen. In all other cases, factors would be weighed against each other, on 
scales that are cultural. To use an example from Beijing: when weighing a prestigious address 
versus daily convenience in commuting: how many minutes extra per day is one willing to 
commute each way to live at a certain address? Fleischer’s affluent informants cited closeness 
to Guomao (Central Business District) as a convenient reason to settle at prestigious 
Wangjing, although their travel time was three times that of those informants who lived in un-
prestigious southern Beijing (Fleischer 2007, 299). A prestigious address versus commuting 
time is of course not specific to China; for instance Londoners and New Yorkers are not 
unknown to this particular dilemma either. The point to be made is that the process of 
comparing factors is universal, but the factors in play and the weighing of these vary.  
   
The State owned enterprise temptation: stability, benefits and peiyang 
An interesting observation I made was that only towards the end of my stay would some of 
those informants with whom I had discussed corporate organisation in China the most express 
cautious admiration for certain aspects of the State Owned Enterprises. This was probably 
because our relation needed to deepen in order to permit such confessions, making positive 
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remarks about SOE’s something conflicting, following Goffmann (1959), with the front stage 
performance of the role as young urban professional. It would seem plausible that since the 
term bailing emerged with the reintroduction of private enterprise combined with the rapid 
growth and importance of private enterprise, major private corporations in 1
st
 tier cities is 
considered the quintessential workplace for young urban professionals where the state owned 
enterprises comes with less prestigious connotations. Positioning between field worker and 
informant should here be considered, as it is to be expected that Chinese young urban 
professionals seeks to portrait themselves as modern cosmopolitans of an international 
metropolis. Shining in the light of new China, they must distance themselves from earlier 
political experiments. If the radical Maoist heritage of the danwei, as economically inefficient 
conglomerates essential in Party governmental techniques is closely associated with the SOEs, 
it would explain why no-one had anything nice to say about the SOEs at first.
50
 In late 
January, I asked Zhao Yumei if she could work in an SOE. She promptly replied “no, never”. 
Not a month later she told me that she used to hold prejudice against the SOEs, believing that 
they were all about office politics and guanxi, but now she was more open for SOEs, seeing 
that some of them are good and have good peiyang. I do not believe she had gained new 
insights about SOEs that had made her rethink her stance during this month. The explanation 
to Zhao’s rather sudden change of mind about the SOEs comes because our relation and level 
of trust had deepened greatly in the time passed between these contradictory statements, 
making the first a part of a front stage role exertion and the second statement a more deep-felt, 
backstage statement based on a higher level of trust.  
Fu Tianlong pointed out that 15-20 years ago, international companies would pay two to three 
times more than Chinese companies, but the gap is now closed. The SOE’s are known for 
giving, perhaps in continuation of the danwei corporate welfare legacy, extensive perks to 
workers. “SOE’s pay lower cash salary, but give loads of benefits. The SOEs don’t care about 
expenses when giving perks to workers. SOE’s give near-free apartments, supermarket 
shopping cards
51
, your children can attend guanxi danwei schools and they pay holiday 
bonuses”, Linda Wei told me. A guanxi danwei is a work unit that the SOE has a formal or 
informal agreement with. Bear in mind that workplaces are frequently still referred to as 
danwei, but must not be confused with the pre-reform “iron rice bowl” danwei. Linda 
summarized: “Therefore, people want to get into SOEs, but one needs connections. The 
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ordinary workers in SOEs have salaries that are not low, and the salaries are getting higher 
and higher. The top leaders in SOEs are well paid, one of the top level executives in an SOE 
bank made 66 million a year… and it’s almost impossible to get fired”. Linda wanted to show 
me a Southern Weekly
52
 article online about the salary levels of CEO’s and presidents in 
SOEs, but unsurprisingly the article, which was published two days before, has been removed 
already by the never-resting internet censorship apparatus. From memory, Linda recites from 
the article that the average annual salary for CEOs and presidents in SOEs now is 850 000 
yuan, so there are certainly money to be made in SOEs as well.  
The characteristics of a good job are to be financially high-yielding and stable, as Chen 
Xiaomei defined it above. Although there are conflicting statements about the 
competitiveness of SOE wages, it seems clear that the difference between what the SOEs and 
the non-state actors offer is not vast. The SOEs are said to be extremely stable jobs. The SOEs 
can improve their competitiveness by offering material benefits in addition to cash salary to 
an extent that other corporate forms does not. Further, hukou is of importance to young urban 
professionals, where the SOEs are the safest path to a Beijing hukou. The negative side of the 
SOEs are that young urban professionals seems to hold the SOEs out as less well managed 
than their non-state competitors, especially when compared to international companies. The 
importance of paying attention to face and the need for guanxi are held out as typical negative 
traits of the SOEs. Given that these are Chinese social techniques with long traditions, one can 
understand why “Chinese” is sometimes used as an adjective when describing companies with 
variations in corporate culture. In continuation of how “Chinese” can be an adjective 
describing businesses, it would be fruitful to look at how social techniques such as face and 
guanxi is extended beyond intrapersonal use and into the corporate realm. Susan Long, whose 
professional life mostly steered clear of guanxi reciprocity by dealing mostly with 
international companies, had in fact encountered guanxi through a demand from international 
companies for it. Susan told me that two international companies had approached her to see if 
she could bring a Chinese official on board for them, as they needed to improve their contact 
network towards official China. The problem is to find one that speaks English and is willing 
to leave the comfortable position as official, Susan says. One of the international companies 
were even willing to take an official that only spoke Chinese if that could mean getting the 
guanxi needed to getting things done. Zhao Yumei, who works as a secretary in a European 
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company, told me that her employer has strict anti-corruption regulations and she seems 
proud of this: “They don’t grease people, and this is why they don’t sell very much. They 
would do better in China if they did, but they are afraid of their reputation. It’s a good 
company with a good culture. They don’t compromise, even in China”. This shows that the 
international companies all must relate to the business-scape of Beijing, and must choose their 
approach to Chinese social techniques such as guanxi. It should be noted that not 
manoeuvring in the business market by employing the instrumental tie of guanxi is called 
having a good corporate culture by Zhao.  
In discussing the vying of young urban professionals: Hannah Liu laid out their preferred 
options as follow: “Ideally, young urban professionals either want to work for the government 
or work in private business in the big cities or migrate overseas”. The range of strategic 
options are here expanded by moving overseas as a new option. Leaving moving abroad as an 
option aside to be discussed later, is should interestingly be noted that in the opposition 
between career progression and job stability it is possible to both eat the cake and keep it. The 
road to salvation is peiyang. Peiyang was defined to me by Fu Tianlong as a two-dimension 
term: training plus in-house career mobility equals peiyang. In-house career mobility would 
here mean the promotion and advancement mechanisms within a company. Fu held it out as 
strength of the SOEs that they can groom an employee from the floor and all the way to top 
positions. Fu Tianlong would know, working with a foreign exchange training programme at 
one of the big banks; the opportunity to study and work abroad is very attractive peiyang. 
Zhao Yumei defined peiyang as “being given time, chance, training, future promise”, and 
related it to a friend in the same bank as Fu worked in that was sent to Europe to work in an 
overseas office there, a major boost to his career. Peiyang in its most common form seems to 
be classes, either after work or paid classes during work hours. I was allowed to participate at 
one of these sessions by Bradley, an American expat I knew was hired as an English teacher 
in an IT firm. All employees were given a two-hour weekly session of English training, and I 
was allowed to sit in on a group session of about fifteen young urban professionals. Bradley 
told them I was a spy for the Norwegian government undercover as a field worker; I think 
(and hope) they all got the joke. Young, educated people who cannot speak English normally 
suffers from overtly focusing on memorizing words, meaning they might know quite a lot of 
English words but be unable to make a comprehensible sentence, so the programme that 
Bradley set up focused on oral exercise. Bradley are not a trained teacher, but was hired on 
the basis of being a native speaker. As he happened to have a meeting scheduled with the 
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company management the day I visited, I was allowed to participate in that meeting too. The 
meeting was concerning the development of a progress testing regime and discussing the 
overall approach, as the company had clear stakes in improving the English of their 
employees; these classes were not organised exclusively to keep employees satisfied. Giving 
good peiyang, for example in form of expensive classes, might still be worth the cost even if 
the company does not immediately utilize the competence gained from the peiyang. Susan 
Long told me that what training a company could provide was very important in attracting 
young urban professionals, while companies with inadequate internal training would face a 
high employee loss rate.  “Now, young Chinese professionals want to keep learning and 
expand their world knowledge”, Susan said.  
 World knowledge would frequently mean enhancing skills relevant in the labour 
market, including gaining work experience. That work experience may serve as peiyang is 
extrapolated from what Zhao Yumei told me about guanxi as peiyang; when I asked if guanxi 
could be peiyang, Zhao said guanxi is only peiyang if your boss actively grooms you into 
guanxi, meaning that if the reason you get to participate in a business meeting where you are 
introduced to important people is because your boss needed someone to carry his briefcase to 
the meeting, the guanxi you obtained from establishing this relation should not be counted as 
peiyang. If your boss brought you because she wanted you to establish this relation, it counts 
as peiyang. Guanxi as peiyang was not something my informants commented much on, but 
the importance of work experience came up more frequently. Extending the logic from guanxi 
as peiyang, it seems to be that work experience is not peiyang unless one is being actively 
groomed by the company to expand one’s experience, giving chances to make experience that 
others would not get. If your boss let you try something because she actively wants to broaden 
your work experience, it is peiyang. If your boss makes you do the same thing because 
someone has to do it, you gain the same work experience but cannot count it as peiyang from 
your boss. Work experience, whether given as deliberate grooming or not, is considered quite 
important by young urban professionals. Linda Wei cited work experience as one reason she 
might consider looking for a better job, as she felt she had been put in charge of too broad a 
selection of tasks, making her unable to specialise her expertise and become an “expert53”. 
Chen Xiaomei told me with exclamation about a friend who had tried her luck in three 
different industries in three years upon graduation, something Chen ruled as highly unwise, as 
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 Scare quotes applied as the informant said it in a way that made it clear that “expert” was a figure of speech 
rather than something she actually expected to be recognised as – it is hard to do justice to the nuances of 
meaning expressed in oral speech when converting it into writing.  
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it impeded her from amassing work experience. Zhao Yumei stated her scepticism for SOEs 
by telling about a friend who is an engineer, who worked for a major SOE for three years in 
order to obtain a Beijing hukou. He paid a price, Zhao said: “After three years in an SOE, he 
had no work experience! It is four people doing half a person’s job. In SOE’s, they focus on 
meaningless things, like building guanxi.” SOE employee Fu Tianlong commented that 
“foreigners do not understand why people would choose SOE’s, but in fact the SOE’s are big, 
are good, provide stability and also give peiyang”. The SOEs are also especially good at 
peiyang because they do it on a massive scale, Fu told me. To illustrate scale he told me that 
programmes like the one he runs can have annual budgets of tens of millions of yuan. “In sum, 
opportunities are SOEs are many and great, and this attracts young people”, he concluded. 
 The many and great opportunities in SOEs are however not distributed as fairly as 
young urban professionals would have preferred, revisiting the tension between having 
connections and having ability, or guanxi versus meritocracy. Peiyang seems to come in 
degrees, for instance English lessons: the more qualified the teacher, the more expensive the 
programme becomes and the better the peiyang from it. Linda Wei received English classes 
through her employer. The programme is computer-based, with one session with tutor for 
each three computer sessions. The programme costs 45 000 yuan, of which the employer pays 
90% of the costs. This pales when compared to the peiyang Linda’s boss receives. The boss 
had managed to persuade the US headquarters to pay for a subsidized EMBA degree at 
Beida
54
, costing 600 000 yuan for a two-year degree. “A lot of mid-level and high-level SOE 
leaders do this too. The SOE’s are more notorious on giving perks to workers, they don’t care 
about the costs”, Linda said. When we touched upon this subject in a conversation a month 
later, Linda repeated the point in less diplomatic wording: “high-level SOE guys who are 
middle aged takes EMBA degrees from Beida or Qinghua to make their CV look good. 
Basically they just buy the degree”. Initially sceptical to the claim that China’s leading 
universities are selling degrees, I asked if the universities would ever fail a high-paying SOE 
bigwig student, upon which Linda exclaimed with shock: “Of course not! Are you crazy!?” 
Linda told me that this is called being gilded in Chinese. Linda’s remarks about gilded SOE 
leaders getting peiyang worth such high sums brings the question of fairness and distributive 
mechanisms up. Revisiting the tension between guanxi and meritocracy, Linda Wei 
commented that “unless you graduate from Beida or Qinghua, you need good connections to 
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 Beida is an abbreviation for Beijing Daxue, known as Peking University in English. Qinghua University and 
Peking University (Beida) are the two most prestigious universities in China, followed by Shanghai’s Fudan 
University. Both the Hu administration and the Xi administration are dominated by Qinghua graduates.  
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get good SOE peiyang. Have you heard the proverb: “the son of a mouse knows how to dig a 
hole
55”? You need a strong family background to get good peiyang in an SOE”. The returning 
importance of family serves as a suitable entry point to discussing how the young urban 
professionals view their chances as individuals in new China.  
Social rights in the era of the market economy  
When the state allocated jobs to the urban citizenry, the state also guaranteed their welfare. 
Terminating the first and relaxing the second of these responsibilities, the state transferred 
responsibility to the citizenry, allowing greater freedom both to fail and succeed. During 
radical Maoism, there was not much point in comparing what factors different danweis 
offered, as jobs were allocated from the state, transfers were rare, organising collective 
negotiations meant taking the risk of challenging the Party’s political hegemony and 
individual negotiations not really an option as the individual had nothing to offer that the 
authoritarian party-state could not demand anyway. The reform era brought an end to this, and 
the lay-offs that followed in the danwei reform caused great dissatisfaction among the urban 
citizenry. The urban citizenry who post-reform lost both state employment and state 
guaranteed welfare therefore had to enter the emerging labour market with the withdrawal of 
state welfare guarantees in mind, and this still applies to young urban professionals. Linda 
Wei aptly put it like this: “Poor people cannot afford to live long. No wonder everyone wants 
to get rich”. As discussed above, the state-market hybrid insurance solutions that were to 
replace the state guaranteed welfare does not impress the young urban professionals. One 
would assume the obvious solution would be to aim to make as much money as possible, but 
recent corporate development renders other viable strategic options. Francis Wang got himself 
a Beijing hukou from working for the road construction company, which in China is a highly 
desired non-monetary reward as it grants political rights to welfare in Beijing. Linda Wei told 
me she considers taking a Master of Public Administration (MPA) degree, as there is an 
option to get Beijing hukou for recent graduates without having to work at an SOE. For a 
fresh graduate, you need a recommendation from a potential employer and one from the 
university you graduated from. Linda’s employer could give her a recommendation, but too 
much time has passed since she graduated, so she would need to re-enter university to get a 
Beijing hukou. A Beijing hukou would be well worth two more years at school, it seems. In 
fact, hukou seems to be a bureaucratic entitlement highly influential on the choices of young 
Chinese. Annie Huang told me how Beijing is strangely competitive being a city full of 
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ambitious people born elsewhere who came to Beijing adamant on doing well in the big city. 
Annie commented that bendiren
56
 are less ambitious than waidiren
57
, because they already 
have home in Beijing and Beijing hukou. Chen Xiaomei, who is a Beijing native, a lao 
Beijingren
58
, said something in the same vein when discussing the priorities of young people: 
“waidiren are concerned with hukou, which means you normally need to work for the 
government or in an SOE. Bendiren aren’t concerned with this, and choose professions more 
out of interests or hobbies”. Here one can see the importance of hukou at work: for those 
without, the strategic choice of going all in for a Beijing hukou will very likely mean 
government or SOE employment. For those lucky few born to a Beijing hukou, not having 
this worry is said to influence not just employer, but choice of profession, which certainly is 
one of the major strategic decisions in life. To continue with Francis Wang as an example: 
Francis studied accounting, then did accounting for an SOE and got a Beijing hukou, upon 
which he quit in order to work his way towards working for an international NGO. The fact 
that he left the SOE upon obtaining one of its most desired benefits is notable, but the point to 
be made here concerns the importance of hukou in the making of strategic life choices. If 
Francis had tried to build a career on say, painting or music instead of a business-friendly 
profession like accounting, getting a hukou through the SOE/government job channel would 
have been nearly impossible. It is not known if Francis ever dreamt about becoming a painter 
or a musician, but it seems very plausible when Chen Xiaomei claims that people born to a 
Beijing hukou strategize differently, as they start the race having won one of the treasured 
prizes already. Annie Huang told me she did in fact dream about becoming a writer, singer, 
athlete or actress when she was a child. Instead, she studied chemistry and ended up in 
finance. Assuming Annie chose not to pursue her artistic childhood dream fearing that it 
would pay off financially in form of money or politically in form of hukou, these concerns 
acts as a constraint to the individual’s range of options that should be expected to have 
potential political consequences.  
The political agenda of any group in China, if not expressed as spontaneously improvised 
collective action such as a local strike, must be approached empirically by aggregating 
individual political sentiments as the one-party system disallows alternative political 
organisation. Certain similarities in political sentiments can indeed be recognised among 
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are likely to own a home that they purchased cheaply during the early waves of home privatisation.    
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young urban professionals in Beijing. Deng Xiaoping famously said that it is glorious to get 
rich, but young urban professionals showed dissatisfaction with how marketization has 
overtly glorified getting rich. Linda Wei told me how a hospital tried to over-treat a foreign 
guest of hers that fell ill, in order to be able to over-charge. Scaring the visitor with a possible 
blood clog on an MRI, the hospital wanted to convey that this was a complicated case that 
needed a special task force, of course a pricier solution. However, when a nurse surprisingly 
hinted to Linda that it was a scam, Linda took the foreign guest to another hospital where it 
was established that the blood clog was just a shadow on the MRI. The day Linda told me this 
she had taken a blood test at a hospital herself, and was dissatisfied that the hospital would 
only give you a cotton swab to stop the bleeding; if you wanted a plaster but did not bring one 
yourself you had to do without. “Chinese hospitals just have no service-mindedness, no 
concerns for people’s needs”, Linda sighted. Zhao Yumei had also experienced the same, as a 
hospital in Guangzhou tried to put her on a full round of antibiotics to treat a common cold.  
“Some doctors make BIG money from grey income”, she said with emphasis. “China is a… 
how to say… liangji fenhua shehui, what’s that in English...” [My phone dictionary translated 
it as “polarized society”.] “Yes, a polarized society, and there is a massive gap between the 
two poles. It’s deeply in the system, deeply cultural”. Corruption is the quintessential form of 
getting rich that the young urban professionals despise, noting with content that the Xi Jinping 
administration enforced a crackdown on corruption upon assuming power in January 2013. 
“They are taking down one big official per week. The government is really trying to fix their 
face”, Zhao Yumei observed with approval. Hannah Liu, who above says that Chinese public 
hospitals will let people die if they cannot pay extra, said that “schooling is the same as the 
health sector. If you want anything better than poor quality public services, you need to pay 
gifts or bribes if you want to call it that to the teachers, plus an extra tuition fee to the school.” 
Zhao Yumei told me that university teachers are too concerned with money, taking money 
from students, parents and companies. Grey income is, as mentioned above, harder to deal 
with in terms of corruption and the word used for money in envelopes trading hands here is 
“gift” rather than “bribe”. Hannah Liu once mentioned how she had seen married friends in 
Guangzhou spending weekend after weekend running from school to school presenting cash 
envelopes to teachers as “gifts”, hoping to get their child accepted to a decent school. This 
goes all the way through Chinese education: as mentioned above, hotel manager Emily Wang 
said the hotel had to give “gifts” to teachers to attract graduates as interns. It even into 
academic research: “The University teachers take on research projects and use their students 
as cheap labour, while afterwards taking all the credit themselves”, Zhao said, adding that the 
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students even have to refer to their teacher as “boss”, indicative of the marketization of 
education. “Things got so bad that the government had to issue a memo saying that the main 
occupation of teachers should be teaching”, Zhao said with little attempt to hide her contempt. 
“I can’t bear the Chinese education system. I won’t have children unless I can afford to put 
them through good education”, Zhao concluded. Marketization of education was held out as 
one of the problems with the Chinese education system, as Zhao Yumei tried to explain it by 
referring to a famous internet novel about the shopping list a first grader took home the first 
day of school, specifying everything the parents had to buy. Marketization was not the only 
concern; the way the Chinese educational system inscribes itself on its subjects was also 
problematized. “Because of the education system, people don’t think independently”, Zhao 
Yumei said. Linda Wei told me that “Chinese youngsters lack life goals. The rich kids will be 
provided for. For the rest, it’s more about pressure. The gaokao exam system kills all dreams 
and aspirations. Can I choose away gaokao to learn C+
59
?”, she asked ironically. “Most 
people cannot afford a dream”, Linda concluded. Zhao Yumei once said something similar 
when I asked the very open-ended question about her dream for her life: “My generation does 
not have a dream, or they have forgotten it, buried it. There is no time to pursue a dream”. I 
also asked Linda Wei about her dream, or rather, I asked for a Chinese dream that could be 
compared to the American dream about entrepreneurship. Linda answered: “for me, that 
dream is to go to the US, for the sake of my child. In the US, there is clean air, you don’t have 
to bribe your child into kindergartens, and you don’t need to cultivate guanxi. There are 
equal opportunities and basic human rights. Smart young people want to leave. There is a 
traditional saying that goes “those who are lazy when young will be sorry when old ”, but 
there has come a slang version that goes “those who are lazy when young will grow old and 
die on the mainland ”. Chinese people are tolerant towards the system; it is kind of in the 
blood. Weibo looks like a civil war is imminent, but the complainers are like me. They don’t 
worry about their next meal. The real people have enough with struggling. They don’t have 
internet or Weibo. People like me want changes, but no war. We could lose what we have. But 
since there is no change in sight, one wants to leave China instead, at least then one can 
change something for one’s own family”. The fact that Linda Wei works for a US company 
and have travelled to the US on business several times might explain her eagerness to move to 
the US. I asked insurance broker Robert Brown if the Chinese staff at his sales office ever 
talked about migrating. “One or two talked about studying abroad, then returning. For most 
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Chinese, China is their home, they don’t want to leave. The burgeoning middle class talk 
about leaving, they are disaffected since they are well educated and have VPN s, etcetera. The 
girls in our office have certain aspirations, but migrating is not one of them. Could be 
because my company does not have an overseas branch they can transfer to”, he said. Having 
an overseas branch might serve to attract disaffected young urban professionals: Zhao Yumei 
made the connection explicit: “I love my country, but I feel my future is not here. That’s why I 
chose to work for an international company”, she told me. “The girls in the office want to 
marry, settle down in a nice home, have the child and be comfortable”, Robert continued. 
“It’s the same aspirations as back home. They are just more obsessed with them”. 
 
The Beijing disappointment   
According to the combined reading of Schein and Fleischer presented above, Beijing is the 
most urban of urban sites in China, therefore the most developed and most modern site in 
China. If modernity and development has an address in China, it is Beijing. As Fleischer 
points out, it takes money to consume this modernity if one wants to do real shopping instead 
of window shopping, but young urban professionals make decent money. Then it is to be 
expected that young urban professionals, especially those who do not originally hail from 
Beijing, to praise the marvel of Beijing. They do not. The merits of Beijing are not denied, but 
rather questioned. This particularly refers to pollution and traffic, as China is increasingly 
fathoming that industrialisation and economic growth can have negative consequences. Annie 
Huang commented that “Beijing is over-developed. See the traffic situation? I had the 
privilege of staying in Beijing when Beijing broke all pollution records, scoring over a 1000 
at a pollution scale that has 500 as its maximum
60
. Linda Wei chose to spend 4000 yuan on an 
indoor air purifier, the Chinese pirated version. The Swiss original version costs over 10 000 
yuan. Linda related her spending patterns to the negative impacts of Beijing’s over-
development as she recently had spent nearly all her income on the air cleaner, organic 
vegetables, and what she called “the so-called best breathing masks”, expressing a concern 
that their quality was insufficient. Trying to laugh in the face of danger during what was later 
referred to as a smog-storm a married informant quipped that “there must be a huge market 
for breathing masks. Think about all the worried mothers like me”. When I asked Annie 
Huang if she spent extra on buying organic food, she said: “I doubt China has ecological 
vegetables at all. The soil itself is un-ecological, over-treated. When I travelled to Europe, I 
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noticed that the food quality was higher and the raw materials tastier.” Linda reflected on the 
price of development: “After thirty years of development, we are now paying extra to get what 
we had back then, like clean, farmers food”. The internationalisation that has provided Beijing 
with Ferrari, exquisite international restaurants and world-class coffee breweries with the 
world’s most expensive cappuccinos61 is acknowledged when young urban professionals talk 
about Beijing, but even this was contested as something not exclusively positive: “Beijing has 
all the luxury brands, but people in Beijing are more shrewd, because they are educated. They 
are more distrustful towards marketing. The fund I work in never invests in Beijing.”, Annie 
said. What is more, the internationalisation was described as in opposition to the authentic, 
genuinely Chinese: “People in Beijing and Shanghai are more international than in the rest of 
China. You will find the real China in the villages”, Annie Huang told me, implying that 
village China is more real than Beijing and Shanghai. There are cultural differences between 
the real China in the villages and the international China in Beijing: “I got a culture shock 
moving to Beijing. People are warmer in a village like I am from.” Annie Huang said. Annie 
Huang comes from Dashan
62
, a 3
rd
 tier city in southern China that has one million citizens, yet 
Annie keeps referring to it interchangeably as a village or a town. There are social differences 
that go in parallel to the economic differences. “Where I’m from, people are the same; you 
don’t have such difference between rich and poor. Everybody is equal. Annie is quoted above 
saying that there are less trust in 1
st
 tier cities as Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou as most 
inhabitants do not plan to grow old there, but to make as much as they can before moving 
home, often to parents who expect their return. None of my informants mentioned moving 
back to nurse old and frail parents, but consider the following statements about where they 
wanted their future to be:  
“I want to live in some middle ground between Beijing and Dashan. Dashan is for old people, 
it’s too slow. I could live there if I was fifty” – Annie Huang. 
“I want to move back to Fujian at some point. Beijing is too polluted and too expensive. You 
know, back where I’m from, normal people can afford to buy a house” – Francis Wang. 
“I want to leave Beijing in a long-term perspective. I would like to end up in a small, 
picturesque beautiful village, but I’m very flexible on the process getting there. – Zhao Yumei.  
“My dream is to move to the United States, for the sake of my [future] child” – Linda Wei. 
As these statements and the discussion above shows, young urban professionals do not accept 
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that just being in Beijing provides great meaning to their lives. Beijing might be a sparkling 
dream for young people who live in villages, and village is used broadly, as Dashan city with 
its one million inhabitants was called a village by Annie Huang. For young urban 
professionals, the sparkling dream of Beijing provides many joys as discussed regarding 
cosmopolitanism; the young urban professionals do enjoy their type of places. Still, the hefty 
real estate market, the pollution and the combustion and traffic is held out as negative, and 
those who points to these negative aspects gladly admit that they do not intend to grow old in 
Beijing.  
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CHAPTER 4:  Marriage, sex and gender – a particular balancing act 
 
As young people in China worry about how to secure their future, securing the future of future 
generations becomes a concern that receives enormous attention for those who have reached 
that stage of life where they think about children. As mentioned above, two female informants 
independently told me that they did not want to raise a child in China due to the frantic 
pressure in the education system. The pressure that Chinese youngsters are put under are 
described closer by Bøe (IN PRESS, 48), who followed an informant taking her four-year old 
son to Chinese chess
63
 lessons in order to improve cognitive abilities and provide extra-
curricular activities for his CV, a peculiar concern for a four-year old. One of my informants, 
himself father to a son in kindergarten age, told me that “education is an expression of love 
between parent and child”. Education is important in aiding the future of the next generation, 
where good education is an extra ticket in the great lottery of life. Establishing “a strong 
family background”, or in plain text obtaining guanxi social capital, is another way of 
improving both one’s own prospects and also the prospect of coming generations; Zhao 
Yumei’s father wanted her to become a public servant to increase family’s total guanxi for the 
benefit of the family, herein including an eventual grandchild. In terms of discussing 
individualisation, this serves as an interesting contemporary case of the family collective 
represented by the patriarch demanding the sacrifice of the individual for the greater good; a 
career as public servant that the individual did not want, for the family collective to benefit 
through increased social capital.  
 The father urging the daughter to consider the benefit of the family as a whole is a 
product of the one-child policy, as daughters was traditionally considered lost to the family 
when they married, as marriages was ideally exogamic and patrilocal. The occurrence of 
single-surname villages especially in southern China indicates that the ideal of patrilocality 
held greater importance than exogamy. Yan Yunxiang has argued that in the traditional 
Chinese family the family ties ascribed primacy was the affinal ties rather than the conjugal 
ties; the father-son relation was seen as superior to the husband-wife relation (Yan 2003). Yan 
argues that policies of radical Maoism were able to alter this, making the conjugal relation the 
dominant relation in Chinese families (Yan 2003). Interestingly Norman Stockman writes that 
this was an explicit goal for the Communist Party family policy discussed in chapter two:  
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“The power of the state was to be used to shift the basis of family relationships away 
from the hierarchies of generation, age and sex to a more egalitarian model. The 
conjugal family of husband, wife and children was to be extracted from its 
embeddedness in patrilineal and patriarchal structures, and made the basis for a new 
form of harmonious family life: the husband-wife relationship was to replace the 
father-son relationship as the core dyad of the kinship system” (Stockman 2000, 103) 
 
The question that arises is how the importance of marriage, the one socially acclaimed 
conjugal unit in China, plays out in young urban professionals’ conceptualisations of 
desirables, options and strategic decision-making in regards to family. During my first 
designated interview with Hannah Liu, I asked a question as open as “tell me what it’s like for 
young, educated people to participate in the Chinese economy”. Within very few minutes, we 
were talking about marriage in China. I first thought that we had just derailed from the 
original topic, but when this happened again the same week with another informant, it became 
clear that this was not derailing, but following an empirical connection between concepts, 
where the is a strong interrelation between the concept of economic life and the concept of 
marriage. When I later mentioned this correlation to Zhao Yumei, she nodded and said, 
tellingly: “when I hang out with young professionals, marriage always comes up”. 
Ideal women, left-over women and the economy of marriage  
One of my most talkative informants was Hannah Liu, a huayi, meaning overseas Chinese, 
from Singapore. As S. Gordon Redding discusses, it is ambivalent if the huayi should be 
called Chinese overseas or overseas Chinese (Redding 1993, 2). I discussed this with Hannah, 
who readily agreed with Redding that you can take the Chinese out of China, but not China 
out of the Chinese. I initially considered her primarily an expat, but came to realise that 
Hannah can be expat to other expats and Chinese to other Chinese as she pleases. Her 
diaspora family maintained a more conservative Chinese culture than most Chinese in China, 
she told me. Hannah is in her mid-thirties and has lived in China for 7 years, 5 of them in 
Guangzhou. I should note that she is single, because this is a considered a prominent feature 
of Chinese social identity for women of Hannah’s age. Hannah is a corporate lawyer and 
became one of my key informants, providing many interesting insights from the higher 
echelons of Chinese business. During one of our first interviews, we were talking about social 
life in high business and I asked her to make a ranked list from the top of her head of what 
high end men talked about. She provided the following answer straight away: “The favourite 
topic is the Chinese stock market. Second comes real estate, third comes jobs. If they’re single, 
you can add what kind of woman they want to find below that”. Expanding on the latter, she 
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told me about a friend who based his ideal spouse from a famous Chinese woman from the 
sixties, although Hannah couldn’t quite recall the real woman’s name or how she’d made it to 
become famous in China. The traits that Hannah’s friend was looking for based on this 
mysterious celebrity were stated to be: “She should be sexy, coveted by men, good looking. 
She should have overseas education; I think the celebrity woman from the sixties was an 
architect. Thirdly, she should make her own money, but still be dependent on her husband and 
finally, she should be smart and talented”.  
Hannah went on to tell me that in China, marriage is the best option for poor women; most of 
what is called “leftover-women”64 are leftovers because they are highly educated and don’t 
want to marry down, she said, herself using the word “left-over women”. Being older than 
twenty-five and not married, Hannah herself what in Chinese is called “left-over woman”. For 
successful and highly educated women like Hannah, the number of potential partners is 
narrowed greatly unless they are willing to marry down, but marrying down is not necessarily 
an option as Hannah’s listing of the ideal female spouse’s attributes shows that the ideal 
woman is capable and earns her own money, but should not exceed her husband in either of 
these. Cruel and insulting, the fairly new term “left-over woman” communicates clearly a 
social expectation for women to be married before a certain age; if not married by then you 
are a “left-over”. It also implies that the failure to do so will be taken as a sign that something 
is wrong with you; you are among the undesirables, who failed to get picked. If contrasted to 
the traditional form of marriage in China, where marriage was brokered between lineages, the 
scornful label “leftover-woman” is a privatisation of blame for not getting married, as 
responsibility is moved from a male family head to the potential bride herself. For men, the 
responsibility for getting married is also moved from lineage to the individual, but Yan’s 
observed shift in primary family tie represents a somewhat different change for men. Where 
being filial for the individual is largely a choice to make of whether or not to submit to 
codified behaviour towards the group, getting married takes the explicit approval of another 
party – save for some notable exceptions that will be discussed below. This construction of a 
socially good self is made harder as filialness is dethroned by conjugality, which requires the 
approval of a partner which the individual, not the family, is responsible for securing. Where 
marriage traditionally was brokered between two family heads, it is now primarily the 
individual who is being rejected if courtship fails rather than the family if traditional marriage 
negotiations should fail. It should here be mentioned, as discussed above, that not continuing 
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the family line was in itself seen as the ultimate un-filialness; continuing the family line was a 
quintessential ingredient in the primacy of the filial father-son relation. The change, then, is as 
follows: for women, the blame for failing to become married is being relocated to the 
individual. For men, marriage has moved from being a mean to be filial to being more of an 
end in itself, while also here the responsibility of securing a partner has become individualised. 
For both genders, marriage therefore plays an altered and seemingly more important role in 
the construction of the successful self. Also, as lineages and extended families are being 
replaced as the domestic unit, the responsibility for seeing the individual married is moved 
from lineage or extended family level and closer to an individual level. This transition 
between traditional family collectivism and modern individualism is in a state of flux: Zhao 
Yumei told me of a university classmate, whose parents-in-law to-be demanded a specific 
sum of money to allow her to marry into the family, resembling the traditional bride wealth, 
causing a breakup instead. As bride wealth is still practised in urban China, the conflict arose 
from the attempt to fix the amount as well as the in-laws demanding control over the bride 
wealth, which is normally given to the bride.  
 
The interrelation between prestige, provision and marriage presents strong-felt cultural ideals. 
Hannah tells me that male acquaintance of her suffered from impotence because his wife 
made more money than he did. Although this couple is Chinese, they did not even live in 
China, but in New Zealand, where a wife earning more than her husband is not such an 
embarrassment for the husband as in China. Here one might think of Bourdieu’s habitus, 
where social norms are embodied, manifesting themselves as bodily responses. On another 
occasion, a Chinese couple I know confirmed this phenomenon, as they had heard about the 
same thing happening on the mainland. “It happens”, they said, “but it is not common”. They 
did make it clear that they considered this a rather extreme manifestation of what is a common 
male concern; to make more money than the wife.  
 This example can illustrate a broader phenomenon. As Hannah Liu put it; “Chinese 
men find it difficult to be with more successful women”.  It is not necessarily, or only, the 
financial success of women which men find challenging: a Chinese man Hannah dated had 
refused to meet Hannah’s foreign friends, as he felt his command of English, which Hannah 
says is a prestige language in China, was insufficient. “I was surprised by that. He did not 
mind me making more money than him, he was modern like that. His ex-wife was also very 
capable”. What Hannah considered modern can be contrasted to what she considered 
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traditional. “The traditional belief is that men should marry down, women should marry up. 
This makes the man the undisputed head of the household, the undisputed breadwinner”. A lot 
of girls from humble stations study and work very hard so they can climb the social ladder 
before marriage, and then hopefully marry up as a second leap of social mobility. Hannah 
referred to an article online she said she’d email me: “How to marry a rich man”. Hannah says 
there are two life span options for young, rural women to choose between: marry a farmer or 
get education, get a good job and marry a rich man. Education and a good job is a dual-egged 
sword: if your education and job is too good, you risk becoming a leftover-woman. A popular 
joke has emerged in China that there are three kinds of humans: men, women and women 
with a Ph.D., as women who have conquered the highest degree in education are seen as 
freaks, which certainly are un-marriageable. There is a self-imposed glass ceiling between 
bachelor and master degrees for women, as taking a master degree would mean one would 
have to gamble for a man with a Ph.D., while settling with a bachelor degree makes a man 
with a master degree the undisputed leader of the household, and men with master degrees 
come in ampler supply than doctors.   
Marriage, mistresses and prestige 
Since failing to marry signals a deficiency in the individual, being able to marry demonstrates 
an individual’s capacity, which makes marriage a vehicle of prestige and success. During a 
discussing on how marriage is a question of prestige in China, Hannah Liu asked me: “do you 
know what match-makers ask about in China? They ask about income, assets, appearance, 
age and height”. This is a telling case as match-making, be it through an intermediary or 
through contact ads, is concerned with the construction of an idealized persona along certain 
criteria. In constructing this idealized persona, the individual will be transformed to a 
description based on culture-specific conventions. Chinese match-makers do not ask for 
hobbies, personal interests or any description of personality such as “kind, sporty”, etc. I am 
under the impression that it would be a grave breach of genre in western European contact ads 
to specify income or assets save for sometimes including a fairly cryptic reference to “good 
personal economy”. The five Chinese match-making criteria can be grouped as either wealth 
or visible appearance. Applying supply-demand thinking at its most basic level, one may 
safely assume there is a reason for Chinese match-makers to ask what they ask about and omit 
what they do not ask about. As wealth and appearance are the criteria for comparison to an 
idealized persona, this ideal match would be someone rich and good-looking. Although the 
poor and ugly are never popular items in blind-dating or match-making, it seems that the 
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match-making is more explicitly focused on this screening in China than in Western Europe. 
From this explicit focus on wealth and appearance, one may propose that match-making and, 
through that, marriage in China is interrelated to ideas about economy, economic safety and 
provision on one side and social acceptance and prestige on the other side.  
Prestige, wealth and appearance had been touched upon earlier in this conversation, when 
Hannah told how common she thought it was to have affairs. Hannah related this to a former 
boss of hers who had a very obvious affair with a secretary. Although divorce rates are 
soaring in China, Hannah emphasised that “Chinese social climbers will never divorce their 
wives”. They will instead have mistresses. In Hannah’s words; “it’s like the feudal system 
where the beauty of your concubines showed your social prestige, only now it’s the beauty of 
the mistress”. Hannah listed expensive cigarettes, baijiu and, more westernized, watches as 
prestige objects, and then the mistress. I had read about mistresses in Leblanc’s book 
“Business Republic of China”, and asked if the Chinese word was ernai65. Leblanc tells of 
meeting a business-official for dinner that brought a young woman clearly for her beauty to 
shine upon him, and she is referred to as an ernai. This was not the case, what Hannah was 
here referring to she labelled xiaosan. She explained that the difference between ernai and 
xiaosan is that a xiaosan might break a marriage.  
 A similar observation was made by another informant, Annie Huang. Annie is in her 
mid-twenties, comes from southern China and works in finance, in an investment fund. She 
too noted that having a xiaosan was very common. Apparently, a xiaosan is not necessarily an 
extramarital affair, as a man may have a xiaosan before marriage. It seems still clear that it is 
something outside another romantic relationship.  Annie claimed that sometimes a girlfriend 
must knowingly accept that her boyfriend keeps a xiaosan. Getting married does not 
necessarily mean dismissing the xiaosan. Annie too said that girls are a way for men to 
demonstrate their wealth. They both specifically said wealth, but in an example Annie told me, 
it seems clear that it is a more general prestige that is being paroled rather than an expression 
of economic capacities. Annie referred to a case she’d heard about in Chinese social media, 
where a 19 year old girl committed suicide after a drinking bout with a professor. The girl was 
brought as a substitute escort, and could refuse neither to come nor to drink due to face, Annie 
explains. The authorities kept the case under lid. Tragic as the case is, it is of some analytic 
interest; did the professor signal his wealth by bringing a young lady, or did he convey a more 
general prestige? Professors, being on a government payroll, are not well paid in China, 
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especially compared to those who succeed in the private sector. To say it with Sahlins, is the 
professor behaving like a big man to pretend that he has the wealth of a big man, or is his big 
man behaviour here unrelated to wealth? If the latter is the case, then the beauty of the 
concubine is a cultural capital, following Bourdieu, in its own right rather than just a symbolic 
expression for financial capital, as it would be if the concubine was but a means to 
demonstrate wealth. One of the key applications of Bourdieu that social anthropology can 
take into the field is to study the conversion of financial capital (wealth) into cultural capital 
(prestige) and social capital (obligations) and the eventual reversal of this. In some contexts, a 
man can demonstrate wealth through women directly; the ability to economically provide for 
more than one demonstrates an economic capacity that not all men have – the classic big man-
approach, where entourage demonstrates wealth. This is not applicable in the case of the 
university professor, who draws the majority of his prestige precisely from being a professor, 
as teachers and scholars has been held in a high esteem for millennia in China. Since it is 
common knowledge that a professor does not earn very well on his government payroll, it 
seems unlikely that the professor is trying to pass as rich by behaving like the rich. Rather, he 
is demonstrating his capacity to obtain a desired status object. This status object can be 
purchased for those whose capacity for obtaining the status object is financial, but can also be 
achieved through other capacities, making the status object a demonstration of an unspecified 
capacity rather than conveying exclusively financial capacity.  
 I asked Hannah if the gender roles could be reversed for prestige effect; they cannot. 
The beauty of a neo-concubine is strictly a male prestige token. A woman cannot impress by 
having a pretty guy on her arm, although she could impress with a rich guy, Hannah said. 
Annie elaborated on this based on a concrete example, a friend of hers from Fujian. Her friend 
is an actress, living in Beijing. “She’s doing well. She’s got a rich boyfriend and she makes 
her own money from shooting advertisements. But her boyfriend is cheating on her, so she’s 
looking for a new boyfriend”. –“Is she still dating the cheating one while looking for a new 
one?” I asked. –“Yes, she is. I advised her to go back home. The competition here in Beijing 
for a good man is too hard. There are too many pretty girls, not enough rich men. Pretty girls 
need a lot of money to stay pretty”. Again expanding on Bourdieu, beauty here becomes a 
form of social capital for women, which needs financial capital for its maintenance. Her 
friend had dismissed her suggestion of moving back to Fujian saying: “only ugly girls will 
move back home”, something that reaffirms the disputed notion that being in Beijing contains 
an intrinsic element of success. It became clear from context here that Annie was using 
“pretty girls” in a quite specific way. Annie herself is good looking, but still talks about pretty 
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girls as “them”. She separated herself from them by saying “life is harder for them than for us. 
I feel sorry for them” and by claiming that most pretty girls won’t accept a foreign boyfriend, 
while Annie is engaged to a German engineer. Annie speaks good English, but suggested a 
reason for the reluctance of “pretty girls” to date a foreigner could “possibly be because of the 
language barrier”, implying that “pretty girls” do not speak English. It might be so that 
“pretty girl” here means women with beauty as her only, or most prominent, asset, which 
would separate them from Annie who have made her own luck based on abilities, possibly 
supported by connections, but not by her good looks. This beauty-as-asset explanation could 
also be supported by another proposed reason to why “pretty girls” will not date foreigners: 
“It could be the language barrier… or maybe because foreigners don’t treat”. If “pretty girl” 
is a social approach rather than just fortunate looks, foreigners who “goes Dutch66” will 
certainly not be as lucrative as a high-spending Chinese Casanova eager on having a good-
looking neo-concubine to include in his conspicuous consumption entourage when going to a 
fancy nightclub. In fact a neo-concubine can be integral to elements of new conspicuous 
consumptions, as rich men avoid regulations against property speculation by buying 
expensive apartments in their mistresses’ names, registered on the hukou of the mistress. This 
social approach can also be extended to the office: when Hannah Liu told me how there are 
always women in a workplace willing to sleep with the bosses, she also told me about 
experiences from a company she had worked in: “There was a secretary there with big boobs 
that did not know how to make photo copies or make invoices, but she would give the boss 
massages in his office”.  
Ladies and ladies with babies in the labour market 
Women in the labour market might lose career progression if they are not willing to sleep 
with their boss. Other factors that can impede the careers of women are the glass ceiling we 
will see that women implies on themselves, and of course the more orthodox proverbial glass 
ceiling of gender based discrimination. Although the supply-demand situation in their 
segment of the labour market is in favour of the young urban professionals, they are not 
unfamiliar with the problem. I interviewed Emily Guang, who works as operational manager 
at a four-star hotel near the Olympic Park. Emily herself might be older than what one would 
count as young urban professionals, as she graduated in 1998. The interview came in place 
through a friend as I wanted to hear the opinions of someone working with young urban 
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professionals from the management side. In the beginning of the interview, Emily provided 
some interesting reflections on changes in the labour market from when she was applying for 
jobs herself. She studied landscaping in college. This included both landscape architecture 
and actual gardening. Emily never worked within landscaping, for it was hard for girls to get 
hired, based on gender. “A company told a college teacher who was trying to find jobs for his 
graduation candidates that if they got two boys, they’d take on a girl too”, Emily recalls. Male 
classmates ended up mostly working in parks, although one male classmate was able to get a 
job in the national icon Yiheyuan, the Summer Palace.  
 In the hotel industry, Emily says there is no gender discrimination on salary. For 
workers with a Beijing hukou registration, the hotel has maternity leave insurance. Emily 
herself had 3 months of insurance-paid maternity leave, but returned to the hotel with the 
baby after one and a half month, resuming her work duties from a hotel room. The insurance 
company still paid for the remaining six weeks, so on the hotel’s books, Emily worked for 
free this period. Although Emily makes an effort to tell this in a way that makes this early 
return her wilful choice as a dedicated employee, it seems far more likely that Emily chose as 
she did to avoid having the maternity leave damage her career progression. Telling about the 
welfare benefits that befalls mothers, Emily gladly admits that the hotel prefers hiring boys. 
When asked if she could have had her own career progression if she had started ten years 
earlier, Emily somewhat contradicting says that “the hotel industry isn’t like other sectors; 
hotel career progression depends on ability and personality. Before, girls wouldn’t get the 
same chances, but it’s more equal now.” Given that she two minutes before said that the hotel 
prefers hiring boys to avoid paying maternal benefits, this seems not to be the case. There is 
an explanation that dissolves the contradiction somewhat: that once one has crossed the 
threshold and become an accepted insider, opportunities are more equal. This is not to say that 
there is no gender stereotypes applied to accepted insiders. Emily says that the hotel also like 
to have a woman as the front office manager, as “girls are more soft, more warm”. Emily 
herself was offered the position of General Manager, bur declined as she felt that this position 
ought to be held by a man. “Women are not aggressive enough to hold such a position. The 
General Manager must be tough because he must make some tough calls. I may not be 
confident enough to steer the hotel in the right direction”. The fact that Emily Huang was 
offered the position in the first place shows that the glass ceiling is not absolute; as a 
candidate, she was preferred rather than ruled out. It was still gender-based stereotypes that 
kept Emily Guang from becoming General Manager, but it was her own.  
 On the topic, Annie Huang quite tellingly told me: “in China there are no male 
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nurses.” It was an effective way of saying that there is still a considerable distance between 
men and women in the labour market. As the divide between the ideal woman’s role and the 
expectations from the workplace have been clear, more “aggressive” women wants to 
compete with men, Annie explains. She adds that “in my MBA class, all the professors are 
men”, signalling that there is still ground to be covered for women. It is interesting to note that 
she uses “aggressive” instead of say, “ambitious”. Although she make it clear from context 
through intonation and mimics that she used “aggressive” in an extended sense (hence the 
scare quotes), “aggressive” is not intrinsically positive, like “ambitious” would be. Further, 
“aggressive” carries certain male connotations; Emily Guang said women should be front 
desk managers because they are soft and warm, while the General Manager had to make 
tough calls, so he must be tough, so he must be a man. There might be another dimension of 
“aggressive” that is specific to Confucian-influenced East Asia. “Aggressive” is close to being 
in diametric opposition to Confucian ideals such as being tempered, controlled and virtuous. 
Li Hongtao surveyed gendered opinions on gender and found that “men’s criteria for 
appraising both men and women followed traditional gender order norms, disliking […] 
“women who do not know and keep their place””(Li 2006, 67). The Confucian ideal person is 
sometimes referred to as the template Confucian gentleman, for he is certainly male. Li 
Hongtao’s table of positive and negative gendered characteristics shows a significant 
correspondence between Confucian ideals and the male expectations towards both men and 
women, while Li also notes that “women’s view on gender relations revealed a position that 
challenged such norms” (Li 2006, 67). If neo-Confucianism is seen as an answer to the 
ideological vacuum created when Mao’s maxim of serving the People was replaced by Deng’s 
maxim that it is glorious to be rich, in many ways similar to Gordon Gekko’s maxim “greed is 
good”, then it should be questioned if Confucian gender relations re-emerge as part of this 
neo-Confucianism.  
New gender relations in New China?  
Fei Xiaotong asserted famously that “Chinese society is fundamentally rural (Fei 1992), 
arguing that the key to understanding China was to understand the village. Certain features of 
a more traditionalist economy can still be identified, also under “socialism with a market 
economy”. Hollywood has sold the notion of romantic love with great vigour, but this notion 
is nevertheless a fairly new idea in world history; Claude Levi-Strauss famously argued that 
the exchange of women, goods and messages are the basic forms of communication: “In 
human society, it is the men who exchange the women, and not vice versa” (Lévi-Strauss 
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2008, 47). Yan Yunxiang talks about the development of the notion of romantic love in China 
(Yan 2009), (Yan 2003). According to Hannah Liu, there is still an explicit instrumental 
dimension to many Chinese marriages: “a lot of women see their husband as a long-term meal 
ticket”. From the male side, there has been an instrumental dimension to marriage for ages; 
the duty towards the ancestors to continue the family line by having one or preferably several 
sons. Although ancestor worship is not as fundamental as it was, the plight to pass the family 
name on to a son still weighs heavy on Chinese young men, I was assured by a Chinese male 
friend who told me about the relief he felt when their one child was born a son. Hannah Liu 
introduced me to her friend Zhao Yümei, who comes from Dongbei
67
, and could tell me the 
same as in Kirkpatrick’s disturbing book about life in North Korea: many female refugees 
across the Yalu or the Tumen river have a forced marriage in a Chinese village as their final 
destination instead of the promised land of Singapore, as some brokers simply sell them as 
brides to villages where all the females of marriageable age have left for the cities. 
(Kirkpatrick 2012). Hannah said that in southern China, the phenomenon also exists, but with 
girls from Viet Nam. “It’s a package with after sale services included”, Hannah said dryly. 
That means that if the women run away, they will be chased down by the sellers and delivered 
back to the buyer. Disturbingly, Kirkpatrick (2012) describes the same phenomenon, in fact 
using the exact same corporate rhetoric of after-sale services. Hannah said the price for a 
Vietnamese wife in Guilin is 50 000 Yuan. From food-ticket mentality to refugee bride 
brokers, the message is clear; marriage in China is not necessarily founded on mutual 
romantic feelings. Some (men) even find it better to be the volunteer part of a forced marriage 
than to not be married.  
 This instrumentality in marriage is certainly challenged as it is confronted daily with 
popular culture’s gospel of romantic love, from Hollywood or from China’s own productions. 
Yan Yunxiang has noted how “many villagers identified the messages of soap operas and pop 
music as a major source for changes in the family ideal”(Yan 2009, xxv). In TV shows there 
are little room for the filial, obedient and self-sacrificing wives society once demanded. The 
TV show is interrupted for commercials, and you cannot fail to notice how picture-perfect 
families can be used to market nearly anything in China. No matter what you want to sell, it 
seems you can market it by showing a  happy family, who centres on the young couple with 
their healthy, smiling and playful son and one (or both) of the grandparents apparently co-
residing in a grand, well-decorated apartment, living in great harmony with a view over the 
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lake and a green lawn outside. The commercials end, and a TV show where true love and self-
realization is the catalyst continues. The high divorce rate in China bears witness to the 
expectations and realities of marriage not corresponding; when I was living in Kunming, Dr. 
Huang Jiansheng (pers.comm) told me about two-week marriages, a phenomenon 
increasingly common, he said. A two-week marriage is typically when two one-child policy 
youngsters who are used to having the world revolve around them marries and, since their 
mothers are not there, discovers that dishes don’t wash themselves after all. They have a 
massive argument about what to do about the dirty dishes, the romantic bubble bursts and 
they decide to divorce and move back home to mum, where dishes do wash themselves. 
Spoiled adolescents aside, the divorce rate is considered a political problem by the Party, for 
two reasons. One is obviously social stability. The other is the long-running elite notion in 
China that the low human quality (suzhi) of the general populace is keeping China for 
modernising. As Confucianism is re-emerging as a public discourse of morality, seen for 
instance in Hu Jintao’s notion of “harmonious society”, the five relations of Confucianism 
becomes a state concern again although they are not referred to explicitly. This serves as an 
interesting context when Hannah Liu pointed out for me that the government now is working 
to change the husband-as-meal-ticket mentality, advocating values and true love. One of these 
government campaigns I observed myself; it was hard to miss it as it was big, pink and with 
hearts, plastered on big posters in Beijing’s metro stations, making sure that many millions 
would see it every day. Although it seems somewhat totalitarian when the mutual (or less 
mutual) agreement to dissolve a marriage becomes concern for the state, totalitarianism rarely 
comes as Big Brother advocating true love and genuine romantic feelings. It might be called 
for: when I were talking with Hannah Liu and her friend Zhao Yümei about north Korean and 
Vietnamese brides-for-sale, the latter put the concluding remarks on the topic as 
straightforward as this: “In poor places, there is no love in families”. Poor places will often 
translate into rural areas in China, and also so in Zhao Yümei’s statement, as she continued 
with a contrasting remark: “In the countryside, marriages can be assisted. Bendiren in cities 
marry into peaceful, happy lives, because they have a house in the city. A family where all 
four grandparents are Beijing citizens will have no material worries”. Bear in mind that due 
to the one-child policy, these two couples of grandparents will have one child and one 
apartment each, and these two children will parent the grandchild, who will be the sole 
inheritor to two Beijing apartments. If this two-apartment Adam should marry a two-
apartment Eve, they could sell three apartments; join the higher echelons of the Chinese 
middle class without working a day of their lives and still have an apartment to pass on to 
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their (one) child. Being born is a lottery, and Zhao Yumei’s point strikes home: being born as 
a proper citizen (hukou-wise) of a 1
st
 tier Chinese city is indeed striking good fortune.  
One should however not reduce marriage in China to a question of instrumentality, prestige, 
linage continuation, provision and breadwinning. “Naked marriage is becoming a big word 
these days”, Susan Long says when I ask if she is acquainted with the term. A “naked 
marriage” is the scornful nickname for a marriage where the preferred material prerequisites 
are lacking, such as a house. “Women don’t want to marry a man with no house”, Susan 
continues. “Women with higher education or western education aren’t as adamant on this, 
though”. Securing ownership of independent living quarter, what Susan calls a house, is 
normally buying an apartment as a whole free-standing house would be ridiculously 
expensive. Buying a standard apartment in an apartment block is challenging enough. Hannah 
Liu invested in an apartment in Guangzhou in 2005 with a friend, paying 1.8 million yuan. 
The previous owner bought it in 2004 for 900 000 and kept it empty, waiting for prices to rise 
– an increase of 100% on one year! Hannah and her friend sold it in 2009 for 2,75 million 
yuan If a bailing with a net income of 15 000 a month saved his entire monthly salary, it 
would take more than fifteen years to save up 2,75 million yuan, assuming that the price of 
the apartment did not increase during those fifteen years. Hannah Liu told me, “Young people 
want to buy homes. It’s related to career and marriage, and it is a cultural value to own one’s 
own home. But now, paying down a house in a big city might take 60 years of down payment. 
20 years down payment on a normal apartment would cost approximately 11.000 per month, 
so even if one is doing OK with a salary of 15 000, it will eat most of the salary. This is called 
shoufangnu
68
, it means slave to own home”. Hannah’s own calculation of the period and cost 
of down payment for a “normal apartment” suggests that the one she sold in Guangzhou in 
2009 was somewhat above average. Further complicating, one now need a Beijing hukou to 
be able to loan 80% of the purchase price, otherwise one can only loan 50% of the price. 
Initially meant to give Beijing hukou holders a head start in their home city real estate market, 
the policy also keeps ordinary young urban professionals who has not obtained Beijing hukou 
from entering the real estate market. One is only allowed to own one apartment in first tier 
cities, making rich men buy apartments in the names of their mistresses, Hannah told me. 
Annie Huang also said that billionaires would use fake IDs to own extra apartments in 1
st
 tier 
cities; a famous media case a while back starred a female billionaire exposed for owning 41 
apartments in Beijing. “No house” comes in levels, as owning one outranks renting, which 
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outranks living with mum. An obvious reason for women’s reluctance to marry a man without 
his own living quarters would be if he is living with his parents; if they marry, so will she. If 
he rents, the landlord can terminate the contract at an inopportune time, and that could also 
mean living with his parents whereas a man owning his own living quarters are considered 
safe. The rental market in China also works in its own peculiar ways. As Annie Huang said it; 
“Short term perspective is typical for China. For instance, if a landlord has no guanxi to the 
renters, why should he then renovate the apartment properly?” Annie told me of a colleague 
who rented a two-storey hutong apartment where part of the 2
nd
 storey floor fell down, but the 
landlord did not agree that this was sufficient reason to terminate the contract! Hannah Liu 
commented on the unfriendly rental market that: “In China, it’s not worth taking the cheaper 
deal when renting. The costlier alternative saves you a lot of hassle”.  
 In the question of housing, the parallel individualisation of economic and social life 
comes together very clearly. Naked marriages happen to such an extent that an expression for 
it was coined. Although there is optimism in this defiance of materialistic thinking, a 
materialistic pessimism lurks in the shadows; although a naked marriage is better than not 
getting married, the ideal situation would be entering a marriage with material conditions 
above those of a naked marriage. As Chinese young women are increasingly reluctant to 
patrilocal marriage, once the ideal of traditional China, the pressing social concern of entering 
wedlock, places the burden of securing independent housing on the hopeful bachelor, which is 
an economic concern. In traditional China, both these concerns would be aided by the 
patriarchal family or lineage. During radical Maoism, urban marriage happened within the 
danwei and the danwei provided housing. As many State Owned Enterprises inherited 
housing complexes from their danwei predecessor, being able to marry by securing SOE 
housing could be the motivation for a young urban professional to make a strategic decision to 
work for an SOE.  
 The fact that one must have a Beijing hukou to secure favourable loan policies for 
housing loans in Beijing aptly demonstrating the importance of hukou, which comes through 
one’s employer and thereby becomes another asset that young urban professionals strategizes 
to secure, to the point of choosing career paths likely to provide hukou over those not likely, 
and likewise with choosing employer.  
                                                                                                                 
94 
 
CHAPTER 5: Understanding Young Urban Professionals – a summary 
discussion. 
 
Go It Alone? 
In this final chapter my aim is to reflect further on certain key areas arising from the 
discussions in the thesis. The first point relates to the overall focus on individualization and 
how my case represents a Chinese form of individualization. As Yan has argued, 
individualisation in China is “characterised by the management of the party-state and the 
absence of cultural democracy, a welfare state regime and classic individualism” (Yan 2009, 
290). In acknowledgement of the unique circumstances of the Chinese process of 
individualisation, the management of individualisation by the party-state has been discussed 
through revisiting the historical development of China, following developments in both 
economic and social life. During radical Maoism, the danwei total institution was central in 
both economic and social life as a cradle-to-grave welfare provider with such a cellular 
structure that danwei endogamy became a common marriage form. As the danwei total 
institution was reformed into State Owned Enterprises, the corporate welfare provided by the 
state diminished greatly. The State Owned Enterprises do however accept a plight of social 
responsibility that their private competitors would not, as the SOEs strive to avoid layoffs and 
are not as concerned with employee loss rate as they see it as a gift to society when an 
employee who the SOE has invested in jumps ship for employment outside the SOE. The 
SOEs are also holders of key resources that young urban professionals strive to obtain, such 
as Beijing hukou, peiyang and company-owned housing with subsidised rents. As access to 
individual living quarters in order to secure neolocal residence is an immensely important 
asset when looking for a spouse, the SOEs may provide the solution to another concern here. 
On the other side, the SOEs are considered the most “Chinese” of Chinese companies, here 
with negative associations as young urban professionals want their abilities to count more 
than their social persona, and therefore dislikes both workplaces where guanxi is emphasised 
and the role of guanxi in society at large.  
My second point relates to how my informants expressed themselves while talking about this 
process of individualization. We have noted that a special concept stands out pointing towards 
the way the informants conceptualized this. The concept is peiyang, a form of corporate 
grooming that consists of the training offered by the workplace and the internal career 
mobility within the company. This is held out as important by my informants, suggesting that 
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they intend to remain faithful to their ability-based approach expressed in the rejection of 
guanxi as career-maker in the workplace. It further relates to suzhi concerns, as the Party has 
strived to make education the answer to the supposed problem of insufficient “human quality” 
in the population holding China back. If one can obtain continuous education, it will imply 
continuous improvement of one’s suzhi. Further, young urban professionals owe the majority 
of their success to their ability rather than their guanxi, and continuously increasing their 
abilities secures them from stagnating professionally, which could lead to them being 
bypassed and made irrelevant at their workplace, which again could lead to the ultimate 
insecurity of losing one’s job unless employed a SOE who offers a remarkable job stability. 
By conceptually connecting peiyang to well-established concepts such as suzhi and guanxi, 
individualisation in China are seen in a new light as the peiyang –suzhi connection highlights 
how the individual strives to improve oneself, a reaction to the demise of a socially defined 
ideal citizen as either being a filial member of an extended kin group nor being a good class.-
struggling communist are ideals that provide meaning in China today. The peiyang – guanxi 
connection reinforces the tension between guanxi and nengli, social connections versus 
individual ability, notwithstanding that guanxi in fact can be given as peiyang.  If the Chinese 
dream is to get connected, but connections are means to an even higher end, the meritocratic 
approach of young urban professionals stand out as an alternative strategy to achieve this 
higher end – hereby not implying that young urban professionals would mind getting 
connected if they could. As long as they have merits but lack connections, young urban 
professionals will praise the merit approach and throw moral accusations against the 
connections approach, while continuing to improve both their merits and their suzhi through 
peiyang. 
Managing the social Self 
We have also seen in this thesis how concerned the young urban professionals were in their 
reflections about marriage, sex and gender, and I also want to raise this issue again and fit it 
into this process of individualisation. Firstly young urban professionals are under considerable 
pressure to get married; Hannah Liu commented that “marriage is a religion to Chinese 
parents”. The insensitive label “left-over woman” demonstrates what society offers those who 
failed to get picked, an individualisation of what was previously a social concern between kin 
groups. “left-over women” are ironically often over-achieving women, either being too highly 
educated or earning too much as there is a strong social emphasis on male superiority in 
marriage. As the individual is increasingly left to fend for itself after the retreat of state 
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welfare, it is noteworthy that society chastises women who fend so well for themselves that 
men feel intimidated. Women do not want to become left-over women, which is shown when 
fear for becoming over-educated prevents women from taking master’s degrees, thereby 
submitting to the ideal of the undisputed male breadwinner. Women with Ph.D. degrees are in 
particular seen as truly unmarriageable freaks, even being joked about as a third sex. It seems 
safe to assume that all Chinese female doctorates have thoroughly contemplated this 
dimension before making the strategic life choice of applying for a Ph.D. Bear in mind that 
Annie Huang, who considered a Ph.D. degree, is engaged to a German who does not share 
this Chinese ideal of male superiority. Another strategic option that women can choose with 
ramifications to the notion of the Self is to be a “pretty girl”, a distinctive social approach 
which young urban professionals relate to the absence of ability; “pretty girls” are generalized 
as not in command of English. For those who fail to become a full-time neo-concubine, 
women must make a strategic choice regarding whether or not to apply themselves sexually in 
the workplace to secure strategic benefits; there are always women willing to sleep with the 
bosses”, Hannah Liu says above.   The emergence of neo-concubines is an old measure of 
male prestige resurfacing, as men can reinforce themselves as successful through having 
mistresses; this concerns the construction of the successful new male Self. The social ideal of 
the undisputed male breadwinner takes its toll on men too, as I was told about a husband 
unable to make love to his wife from the stress caused by knowing that she earned more 
money; a peculiar case of Bourdieu’s term habitus, the embodiment of social concerns. It is 
noteworthy that Francis Wang, successful in many measures for young urban professionals, 
quickly changed the subject when the marriage emerged as a topic, indicating unease towards 
discussing this yet obtained measure of success; the construction of the successful Self was 
not yet completed, something that was uncomfortable to talk about. Further it should be noted 
that Francis redirected the discussion about the successful life away from marriage and 
towards the ideal residency, which at some point in life ceases to be Beijing as no young 
urban professional who was asked expressed any desire to live out their days in Beijing, in 
fact quite the contrary. At some point they wanted to leave Beijing, having tasted the Beijing 
dream and found it did not fully earn its reputation. This rejection of a once held dream also 
extends through their political disaffection towards the marketization of the Chinese economy, 
and particularly the welfare services that urban professionals once had universal access to. 
Through the renkou suzhi discourse of the CCP the shortcomings of China is blamed on the 
Chinese population, and as young urban professionals tend to internalise their political 
grievances and thereby focusing their explanations on themselves, in which the Self is made 
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responsible for all of its own shortcomings. This is seen in the desire to move abroad that 
surfaced when discussing the political concerns of young urban professionals: they 
themselves are the only thing they can change, the only factor that can be altered in the 
equation and all contributions to improving society must therefore come through improving 
oneself.  
Young urban professionals as a class?  
A final discussion is to return to the question about who these young urban professionals are. 
In the introduction we pointed at the emic concept of bailing as well as the etic concept of 
yuppie. Here I want to discuss both within the wider question of whether the young urban 
professionals make up a class. Introducing new classes to the analysis of a socialist society 
that now itself refrains from using the word class in political discourse should be 
problematized, as official China now refers to what it used to call classes as “social groups69”, 
between which there are no Marxist dialectical oppositions and no need for any class struggle 
that would disturb the national harmony. Still, anthropologist Fenggang Yang calls yuppies a 
new class when discussing how yuppies in China consume modernity through McDonalds 
and Christianity. (Yang 2005, 438). In its original form in the US “yuppies” was rather a way 
of discussing class without using the word class, as “yuppies” started as a media buzz word 
and class is not a very popular word in American political debate. Hammond avoided using 
the word class when he referred to yuppies as a “political species”, ironically comparable to 
when Chinese official discourse rephrases class as “social status groups”. A “political species” 
of shared economic background and interests would probably be called a class an sich if Marx 
was asked.  
 Chinese yuppies are treated as a something very close to class in literature, without 
necessary being called a class, or being called a class without being treated as such. Yang 
(2005) for instance initially separates conceptually between young professionals (employees) 
and business people (employers) but nevertheless treat them as one group for the data 
collection and analysis. Cui and Liu (2001) calls yuppies “the most prosperous urban elite in 
China”, and “prosperous urban elite”, which might sound like a class that a Marxist would 
suggest that the less prosperous classes should struggle against, while Cui and Liu at the same 
time estimating their average annual household income to be 78.181 RMB  (Cui and Liu 2001, 
96) The observant reader will note that this household average income is less than the 
                                                 
69
 See for instance http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90778/8335846.html  (accessed 15.12.2013).  As this 
newspaper is often referred to as a government mouthpiece, it is safe to treat this as the voice of official China.  
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annualized minimum income required for an individual to be called bailing
70
, but it is more 
problematic to refer to those with an annual household income of 78 000 RMB as the most 
prosperous urban elite in China. Compared to very many places in rural China 78 000 is 
surely a lot of money, but the most prosperous urban elite in China’s 1st tier cities can easily 
spend that on a single night; a huayi co-student at BLCU had sufficient guanxi to be treated a 
dinner where Maotai rice liquor costing no less than 30 000 RMB per bottle was served. 
Cheng Li writes about yuppies as  
“A group of young, well-educated, urban economic elites – China’s “yuppie corps” – 
has recently emerged and taken the spotlight. A few distinguished members of this 
new elite group have already become chief executive officers (CEOs) of many leading 
companies in the People’s Republic of China” (Li:1).  
 
I argue that the social distance between Cui and Liu’s yuppies with a household income of 
78000 RMB and Li’s CEO yuppies excludes merging these claims about yuppie status into 
one larger definition; they cannot both be right. Even though a bailing exceeds Cui and Liu’s 
average household income with a significant margin, they cannot be placed in the same class 
as the Ferrari-driving CEOs of leading companies that Li calls yuppies. The CEOs of the four 
Fortune 500
71
 companies that Li mentions may be young, urban, high-earning, highly 
educated and very professional in their work life, but should be excluded from the empirical 
category “young urban professionals”, as they are surely excluded from the emic category 
bailing. That bailing has a financial limit also upwards suggests that a bailing might outgrow 
himself and cease being bailing, for instance if promoted to CEO. If young urban 
professionals should be counted as the elite segment in China, as Cui and Liu proposes, this 
calls for a clear-cut separation between the young urban professionals and the super-elite. 
This separation addresses both differences in economic and political capacities, which 
increasingly travel in pair in China after Jiang Zemin decided to allow Party membership to 
capitalists. As it seems hard to pinpoint young urban professionals as a class an sich, young 
urban professionals would need some shared political agenda to be discussed as a class für 
sich. As the bailing category came as a response to new realities created by the economic 
reforms that also fuelled the development of individualisation, a bailing political agenda 
should be approached in light of economic reforms and individualisation. The political 
disaffection of young urban professionals are duly noted, as for instance their frustration over 
the over-commodification of welfare services that emerged as an unintended outcome of the 
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 According to Chen Xiaomei’s definition a bailing should make 8000-15000 Yuan per month; this is 96000 – 
180000 Yuan per year.  
71
 Fortune magazine’s prestigious list of the 500 largest companies globally in terms of revenue.  
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marketization of welfare. Their political disaffection is directed against the power holders. 
Hannah Liu commented that “educated Chinese people know that the government is spinning 
them by tail, but the government still treat people like they are idiots”. Something Linda Wei 
once told me serves to exemplify this. “Do you want a fake feel-good moment? Watch the 
national news. There was a story of government-owned apartments in Tianjin being rented 
out by the city government for 17 yuan per month”, Linda said with a headshake and a giggle, 
amused by the notion that the government expected people to believe such an unlikely tale 
about government benevolence. Yet this political disaffection see no practical consequences 
that might change political realities in China, save for the constant tug of war
72
 between 
internet censorship agencies and disaffected citizens in social media. I will argue that the 
prime reason for not discussing young urban professionals as a class für sich is their tendency 
to internalise political grievances.   
Internalisation as a response to individualisation: suzhi discourse  
As the discussion about “chuppies” as a class encountered the same problem of definition as 
yuppies did in the US, it is hard to argue that “chuppies” are a class an sich, in Marx’s 
vocabulary. There is little indication that young urban professionals see themselves as a class 
für sich either, despite Zhao Yumei calling China a polarized society which could be seen as 
in line with dialectical materialism. As the discussion above shows, the political grievances 
that young urban professionals holds against society finds internalised, individual solutions 
such as emigrating because the system cannot be changed, only personal circumstances or 
refraining from having children. Another solution would be to yield to what society agrees is 
happiness, as in Robert Brown’s remark about Chinese office girls being more obsessed with 
settling down and establishing a nuclear family than young women in the US.  
As resourceful, highly educated and holding a key place in the all-important economic growth 
of China, young urban professionals have done everything society asked them to, but society 
does still hold out an ideal to strive against, albeit not as clearly defined as the “learn from Lei 
Feng”-campaigns of radical Maoism. This ideal is to constantly improve oneself by raising 
one’s suzhi, whose national insufficiency hampers China from developing. Regarding the 
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 Gain a metre one day, lose it the next: Chinese “netizens” use sound sameness to avoid censorship. When 
“harmony” (hexie – 和谐) became a politically sensitive word as it was the slogan of Hu Jintao social policy, 
netizens started using “river crab” (also hexie –河蟹) to avoid censorship; the censorship algorithms looks for 
the characters for “harmony” while all human beings understand that criticising “river crab society” is a critique 
of Hu Jintao，including the employees of the censorship bureaus which manually censors retrospectively what 
the algorithms miss.  
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daily concern of young urban professionals, they can choose to keep improving themselves 
hoping that change for the better lies in keep doing what society demands.  Suzhi as a 
substitute for class is well-known from literature:  
“While I agree that the word suzhi has displaced that of class, I cannot accept the 
conclusion that suzhi discourse elides discussion of class in the same way that 
(neo)liberal discourse does. Neoliberal discourse asserts that class difference and 
social hierarchies of all forms are non-existent, unimportant, or irrelevant. Suzhi 
discourse reifies rather than elides forms of hierarchical difference; it offers a way of 
speaking explicitly about class without using the word ‘class’”(Kipnis 2007, 390) 
 
In discussing young urban professionals as a class, it could be referred to the un- or 
underemployed rural graduates in Stornes’ (2012) study, who also conquered the Chinese 
education system, only to find that society would not reward their efforts with a job in Beijing. 
Instead of showing any political sentiments that could serve as a base for a class mentality, the 
explanation to their misfortune was internalised and the fault placed entirely on themselves. 
Society could not be blamed for their failures; they needed to improve themselves. The 
importance of improving oneself is so central in Stornes’ study that the study is named 'I want 
to improve myself'. Underemployed rural graduates in urban areas of China’ (Stornes 2012). 
There is a major difference between the un- or underemployed rural graduates at the outskirts 
of Beijing that Stornes studied and the young urban professionals working and living in 
Beijing proper I interviewed, yet I found that improving oneself was of vital importance also 
among young urban professionals who had overcome that final challenge of getting a good 
job in Beijing. Did reaching the promised land of employment remove improving oneself as a 
pressing concern? It did not. Peiyang discourse shows the drive to keep improving oneself, 
also for young urban professionals. Linda Wei attended English classes after work, paid for 
by her employer. Linda also told me she considered taking a part-time Master of Public 
Administration degree, in which case she would negotiate with her employer about getting it 
subsidised, which would be peiyang. Annie Huang, who was taking a Master of Business and 
Administration (MBA) degree in addition to working full time, even considered taking a Ph.D. 
degree in finance until her boyfriend, who is a German (not sharing the Chinese male fear of a 
women with higher education than himself), vetoed it on the grounds of being too time-
consuming. Annie told me: “it’s good to improve yourself constantly”. Internalising the blame 
for one’s failure to do well in the new competitive market economy through suzhi discourse 
can be related to a deliberate attempt from the political power apparatus to establish this 
conceptual link in the minds of those who fail. This is accepted, as it corresponds with the 
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freedom to both succeed and fail that the market reforms offered; as Beck writes in one of the 
classics on individualisation:  
 
“Individualization in this sense means that each person’s biography is removed from 
given determinants and placed in his or her own hands, open and dependent on 
decisions”. (Beck 1992, 135).  
 
This then serves to summarise as follows: young urban professionals must navigate an 
ongoing process of individualisation in China driven by the economic reforms and the 
development of a form of capitalism to the liking of a communist party, setting its mark upon 
both economic life and social life in contemporary Beijing.  
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